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Preface
In the Netherlands, the art of painting has a long tradition that has given us Rembrandt and Van
Gogh. From this rich tradition, the school of "De Stijl", with painters like Piet Mondriaan,
emerged in our century. The paintings of artists of De Stijl are an attempt to condense visual
experience, to reduce perception it to its essential elements, straight lines and primary colours.
Is this way of looking at the world around us inspired by the world as it has become in our age?
Or have we shaped our environment like this, because we started to look at it this way 7 Whichever
is the case, once familiar with the style elements of De Stijl, one tends to recognize (hem fre-
quently in everyday experience.
Like artists, economists in their models attempt to condense economic reality to what they see
as its elementary features. Models impose a structure upon reality and filter out the elements
considered inessential. As models find their way into our minds, they determine what we see.
We are like painters that train to see three dimensions in terms of two and surfaces in terms of
lines. As Keynes remarked, the observers who believe themselves to be most impartial are
usually the slaves of some obscure economist.
This thesis is about my attempts to construct a model of economic behaviour, my search for the
essentials. It is about what to put in and what to leave out. It was my aim to come up with a
Mondriaan painting: three straight lines well placed and two bright colours, clear, unambiguous,
austere and brilliant, a picture so plain and simple that when you pass it by in a museum, you
look and think: I could have done that (but I didn't).
This book was started more or less by accident and it largely happened to develop in reverse:
from the empirics to the theory, from data to concepts, from concrete to abstract, from the
complexity of reality to the cleanliness of mathematics. In 1986, after completing my studies
at Amsterdam University, I came to Maastricht to participate in a research project with Franz
Palm and Joan Muysken on employment effects of technological change. This project got me
on the track of diffusion models which ultimately resulted in the last chapter of this thesis. A
next project concerned a similar issue in the banking industry, giving me the basics for chapters
four and five. As I tried to work out the issue of diffusion, I became interested in the micro-
economic representation of technological change, elaborated in chapter three. This book is thus
the inverted report of an erratic but instructive journey.
Many people contributed to the genesis of this dissertation. I am very much indebted to my
supervisors Joan Muysken and Franz Palm, for stimulating me in making a book out of my
capricious ventures, for reading the countless drafts and notes that I produced on my way to the
present version, and for helping me with numerous suggestions. I am grateful to the members
of the evaluation committee, Luc Soete, Paul David and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, for their
helpful comments. I am indebted to Luc also for giving me the opportunity to work within the
stimulating environment of MERIT.viö
My sincere gratitude goes to René Kemp and Rombout de Wit, with whom I closely cooperated
on the projects that lay at the roots of this dissertation. I wish to thank Eugene Canjels for his
valuable research assistance. I would like to thank Bart Verspagen, Huub Meijers, Adriaan van
Zon and all other members of the MERIT 'productivity group' for stimulating discussions and
for their comments on draft chapters. My thanks go furthermore to Geert Woltjer, Arie van Lier
and Rezaul Kabir for many helpful discussions and for their moral support. I thank the
administrative staff at MERIT and at Quantitative Economics for helping me with many
day-to-day things that served to make my life as a university staff member a pleasant experience.
I would like to thank Malgorzata Wozniak, who firmly supported me in this project as in many
others, and my parents, who first enabled me and later always encouraged me to pursue and
persevere.
Maastricht, January 19931. General introduction
7.2 Economic J am/ r^c/in/ca/ ctoij<
ant/ ouf/tn* o/di* r/icji*
1.1 Introduction
One of the permanent puzzles of human existence is the problem of free choice: do we really
choose when we think we do and to what extent can we determine the course of our life. Is the
essence of our existence in our power to decide, to act and to be responsible, or in our aptitude
toexperience, to undergo and to accept These questions present themselves in different societies
and eras in different guises. They find their way into religion and metaphysics (freedom or
determinism), ethics (the meaning of responsibility), studies of history (e.g. the importance of
the individual in the historical process), psychology (the role of the unconscious; behaviourism)
and other social sciences. Answers to these questions seem to depend on cultural background
and historical experience. One is likely to encounter quite different attitudes concerning these
matters in India, Poland, the United States or The Netherlands. Questions of freedom of choice
are also at the roots of economics: to what extent can the economic process be guided, can the
coordination of production and distribution be designed; to what extent can a society choose its
economic policies and implement them effectively? Does not the economic system seem
autonomous, and therefore maybe deterministic, fcfeause it is founded on free choice of the
individual? Present day economists, more than economists two or three decades ago, tend to be
rather optimistic about individual choice, but pessimistic about collective choice. There is
confidence in individual rationality, but a lack of confidence in the ability of agents to take
efficient decisions collectively and to implement them consequently. The grown confidence in
the efficiency of market coordination, the acceptance of theories of rational expectations, the
recognition of prisoners dilemmas and the demise of Keynesian macroeconomic policies can
be taken as evidence of this.
The problem of the existence of real choice manifests itself in an especially explicit way in
economics in the study of technological change. Technology determines how we can transform
our material and immaterial environment to our benefit or detriment. It is the long term basis
of activity, productivity and wealth. Thus it is important to answer the question whether the
speed and course of technological change can be steered and how. Are we the masters or the
slaves of technology, does technological progress liberate or subdue us? Scientists, entrepreneurs
and managers decide on matters of technology, but they do so given the circumstances which
they collectively create. Decisions on technology are often characterized by large external
effects, both at present and in the remote future, which are unforeseen at the moment the wheel
of invention is put in motion. Once the wheel is running in a certain direction, it seems to get a
momentum of its own. This has led many to turn to a form of technological determinism:
individually we may choose, but only within the limits set by the way history progresses;
technology determines society. But we cannot afford technological determinism, since it maytake us down any blind alley. Thus there is every reason to come to grips with the social and
economic determinants of the process of technological change, the mechanisms of innovation
and diffusion, and to discover in what way they can be influenced.
1.2 Economics and technical change
Economic theory deals with issues of human behaviour, starting from the premises of both
unlimited needs and scarcity of resources. Because resources are limited, not all needs can be
fulfilled. Therefore agents have to choose, to lake decisions regarding how to put available
resources to use. A common assumption in economics is that behaviour is rational in some sense
and that decision making can be described as optimizing under constraints. Given these
assumptions about individual behaviour, an important economic problem is the issue of
coordination of the behaviour of individuals in an society. Available resources are in the hands
of a variety agents which all simultaneously take decisions on how to put them to use. The
decisions of one individual have repercussions on the possibilities of others. Therefore there is
in every economy an institutional structure, a mechanism of interaction, by which individual
decisions are coordinated. In economics one usually considers coordination of decisions through
a market mechanism. Thus the core of economic theory consists of the behavioural assumption
of rationality and the institutional assumption of a market coordination mechanism.
Technological change occurs when new and more advantageous possibiUties to use the limited
resources in society open up. It has a direct impact on the constraints of an agent's decision
problem, and therefore on the behaviour that economic theory tries to explain. There are two
main questions regarding technological change in this context: first, what economic factors
OIM£? it to occur and determine its shape, and second, what q^cw does it have on economic
behaviour and performance. For a long time. the first question was largely ignored by economists.
Technological change was considered exogenous. The second question, however, has gained a
place in two parts of economics some decades ago. On the one hand, technological change has
become part of production function theory. The level of technology is represented by a parameter
in the production function, and changes in this parameter transform the production function over
time |see e.g. Coombs, Saviotti and Walsh (1987), Gomulka (1990) or any other textbook on
the economic theory of technical change]. On the other hand, technological change is dealt with
in a welfare theoretical context. New technologies have to a certain extent a public good
character: they can be both non-rivalrous and non-exclusive in their use. Therefore the market
may fail to ensure a Parcto efficient level of their provision. Market failure can be seen as a
justification for government intervention or regulation [see for analyses along these lines e.g.
Gomulka (1990), Stoneman (1987) and Dasgupta and Stoneman (1987)].
Over the last decade, however, some new trends have emerged. Since the beginning of the
1980's, as a consequence of changes in the structure of the world economy and of diverging
rates of growth between industries and between countries, a specific range of economic issues
has increasingly called for attention. New economic powers seem to emerge and take over
leadership in world trade, new industrial and service sectors start to dominate economic
development. Growth of industries is uneven and unstable, and fast growing and leading
industries often seem to be characterized by large firms, oligopolistic competition and dis-
equilibrium. It proved a challenge to analyse and explain these dynamic features, which could
not satisfactorily be met within the framework of traditional analysis. This has led both to efforts
to extend the traditional framework into new directions, and to increased critique on the foun-
dations of the whole theoretical structure. Among important extensions are the so called newgrowth theory and recent developments in industrial economics, in particular the analysis of
strategic behaviour, with its applications ot 'game theory. A fundamental critique of mainstream
economic theory has been developed within the context of what has become to be called
evolutionary economics. It is remarkable that both in the recent extensions of the traditional
approach and in the alternatives advanced by economists critical of established views, tech-
nological change occupies a more or less central position. There seems to be a general recognition
of the importance of the technology factor for the explanation of the above mentioned structural
changes and economic dynamics.
Because the modelling approaches in subsequent chapters try to combine elements from both
mainstream and evolutionary thought, it is useful to lake a closer look at evolutionary economic
theory. As mentioned, evolutionary economics has originated from studies of uneven patterns
and cycles in economic development. Therefore, the basic questions of this field concern the
determinants of economic dynamics. Attempts at an explanation of these uneven patterns of
development have led to the articulation of a different notion of the determinants of economic
behaviour, a new set of key concepts to analyse economic development. A basic conjecture is
that changes in economic activities should be understood in relationship to technological and
institutional development. The explanation of patterns of economic gmwth and structural change
should be sought in the development of a technological paradigm, which can be defined as 'a
pattern for solution of selected lechno-economic problems, based on highly selected principles
derived from the natural sciences. A technological paradigm is both a set of <Mrm/>/<;r.v - basic
artefacts which are to be improved (...). and a set of Aruri.trior.' |Dosi (19XK)|. A technological
paradigm revolves around some key factor [Freeman and Perez (1988)), which is characterized
by low and falling costs, nearly unlimited availability, and general applicability in many sectors
of activity. One may think of oil in the past decades, or of semiconductors presently. The
appearance and development of such a key factor opens up a vast range of profit opportunities
through product and process innovations in different industries. It thereby leads to changes in
factor demands and demands for skills, to unevenly distributed jumps in potential productivity,
to new types of best practise organization of firms, to new forms of (market- or other) coordi-
nation of economic activity, to a new structure of the economy and, arguably, even to new
socio-political regimes [see e.g. Mathews (1989), Boyer (1988)). A recurring theme in this
literature is the complex relationship between free choice and determinism. Economic devel-
opment, in this view, is predisposed by its historical context, and current investment and growth
opportunities are limited by past development. Economic development is path dependent, a
specific path can be chosen by mere fluke and there is no reason to assume that any chosen path
is globally optimal.
The dynamic analysis of economic development and technological change is a field pioneered
by Schumpeter (1939, 1942) and subsequently developed and extended by a wide range of
authors, of which Freeman, Dosi and Nelson and Winter are among the most well known [see
e.g. Nelson and Winter (1982) and various contributions in Dosi <-/. a/. (1988)|. The approach
has been applied to tackle problems and policy issues ranging from microeconomics to
macroeconomics and economics of international trade. It is remarkable, however, that evol-
utionary thought, though rather dissimilar in approach from mainstream approaches in econ-
omics, seems close to the theories of some authors starting out from other perspectives. Anexample would be Scott, who published a theory on economic growth [Scott (1989)].' Scott's
main contribution is his inquiry into the character of investment, rejecting the definition of
investments as physical increments to a capital stock. He alternatively defines investment as
"all expenditures undertaken to improve assets (whether human or not), over and above required
maintenance", as the cost, in terms of consumption forgone, of changing economic arrangements.
By describing investment in this way, all growth results from investment of some kind (ab-
stracting from demographic change), and there is no necessity any more for a separation between
investment and technical progress as causes of growth [Scott (1989), section 1.5]. Scott stresses
the relationship between investment, investment opportunities and innovation: investment
opportunities and opportunities for technological progress are not gradually exhausted, nor are
they created by exogenous scientific advance. Rather, "it is undertaking investment which itself
creates and reveals the further opportunities" [Scott (1989), section 6.5]. Investment leads to
change and change is essential to learning and invention. Application of these views in growth
theory leads to a dynamic and history dependent growth model, in which technological progress
is an integral part of change.
The evolutionary analysis of economic behaviour also accords to a large extent with views
expressed by authors like Porter, writing on strategic management issues [see in particular Porter
(199()a&b)|. Porter analyses in his books the process of competition and the determinants of
competitiveness of firms. Competition is a dynamic process, a struggle in a constantly changing
environment. Competitiveness is the sustained capacity to generate income from producing and
marketing products. Like evolutionary economists. Porter puts technological change at the centre
of his analysis, stating that 'competitiveness depends on the capacity to innovate and upgrade',
and that 'the basis of competition has shifted more and more to the creation and assimilation of
knowledge' | Porter (1990b)). Sustainable rates of innovation, leading to cost reductions through
rises in productivity and, more importantly, to product differentiation, are the key to profitability.
Porter argues that a sustained flow of innovations needs a conducive and challenging envi-
ronment to come about and be maintained, and then uses hundreds of pages to analyse in great
detail which factors make up the conditions which favour innovative activity. The main message
is that competitive pressure is vital to innovative activity, and that therefore government policy
should be directed at maintaining a competitive environment.
Over time, the development of this evolutionary analysis of economic cycles has broadened and
instigated a more fundamental discussion on the appropriateness of the usual premises of
economic theory. To see the relevance of this discussion, it is useful to trace the reasoning that
leads to the argument. The starting point is the recognition of the central importance of innovative
activity for competition and the course of economic development. Innovative activity is any
activity directed at rising the earning capacity of a firm by introducing a novelty of some sort.
It requires the utilisation of scarce resources, and therefore falls within the realm the theory of
decision making. The question of central concern is thus, to what extent innovative activity can
be analysed with the tools of economic theory. The main problem here, as distinguished by
evolutionary theorists, is the character of information in innovative activity. There are two
aspects: first, the information that has to be dealt with in (deciding on) innovative activity is
generally vast and complex, and second, there is genuine uncertainty (in the sense of Knight
1 Soott't bask RMMM. although developed «sing other mathematical tools, is quite akin to the model in chapter 3
MOW, M CM be Men by comparing Us basic assumptions lo the iwes advanced here [see Scon (1989).
especially chapters 3 to 6. or the summary of result;, at the beginning of the book).G«ir ra/ inmx/ucrion
(1965)) in innovative activity. The latter assertion means that it is impossible to imagine the
likely outcomes of innovative activity and the path of future technological development, because
essential information is lacking.
Consequently the assumption that decision making on innovative activity can be described with
the help of the concept of rationality or optimizing, becomes subject for debate. If in deciding
on innovation there is so much information involved that to consider all of it in detail would be
prohibitively costly, and if there is vital information lacking which can only be produced by
carrying on with investing in innovation, then one may ask in which sense decisions on innovative
activity can be optimal. Rather they may be better described as determined by routines and by
bounded rationality. This introduces components in decision behaviour which are historically
determined, which are by nature unsystematic and unpredictable if considered separate from
their historical context.
If agents would be able to optimize, then (disregarding exceptional circumstances) markets will
coordinate decisions such that an equilibrium over time will appear: a situation in which no
agent is willing to change his course of behaviour, given the circumstances and the behaviour
of all other agents. A persistent equilibrium requires that there are no unprediclublc future
feedbacks from current action. Agents can estimate the possible consequences of their actions
and their likelihood. If behaviour is not optimizing, then there is no reason to assume that
coordination of decisions through a market mechanism will lead to equilibrium. Actual behaviour
is likely to be non-equilibrium behaviour. The coordination of the market will induce agents to
adjust their actions, but there is no guarantee of optimality or stability. Thus there is likely to
be continuous disequilibrium and adjustment. The market does not coordinate decisions to be
optimal, but acts as a selection mechanism for the relatively better decisions. ,
Finally, if actual decision making is non-equilibrium behaviour, which is by its nature not
predictable or systematic, seen separately from its historical context, then it is questionable
whether decision making should always be the starting point of economic analysis. If there is a
fundamental indeterminacy in decisions that are taken, why then should an economic theory
about the behaviour of aggregates allow for a decision theoretic, microeconomic, underpinning.
If the purpose of the exercise is not so much to provide an explanation of economic decisions,
as to explain economic activities of production, trade and consumption, then to start n#r from
a theory on decision making might be more fruitful. Thus it is not clear a priori that it is more
satisfactory to take firm behaviour as unit of analysis, rather than e.g. a technology. „ ,
Leaving this discussion here for what it is, it may be illuminating for the chapters to come, to
distil from it two different stylized sets of characteristic assumptions, the first of which could
be associated with the mainstream approach and the second with the evolutionary approach to
economics (see Table 1). The characterizations are tentative and may be seen as ideal types,
with many actual theories and models falling somewhere in between [compare e.g. Silverberg
(1988)]. Table 1 may be seen as a framework in which the theories and models in subsequent
chapters find their place.
Technological change has become a more important factor in mainstream theories, that is more
and more being modelled as endogenous rather than exogenous, especially in long run growth
models [see e.g. Lucas (1988), Romer (1990)]. In evolutionary thought its role is different, and
it can be said to occupy a central position. Because of that, and because of the complex and
uncertain character of new technologies, genuine uncertainty and suboptimal decisions are a
vital ingredient of evolutionary thought. Within the framework of mainstream theories, genuineTable 1: Stylized difference» in approaches towards economic theorizing.
technological change important endogenous, key variable
behavioural ass. optimizing, rational routines, bounded rationality
ass. on information determinism or risk complex information, genuine uncertainly
unit of analysis firm or agent decisions decisions or other variables
system properties equilibrium disequilibrium, dynamic adjustment
no unpredictable feedbacks unpredictable feedbacks
role of time ahistorical historical, pall) dependent
uncertainty cannot be analysed, and therefore at most risk (in Knight's sense) is assumed.
Suboptimal decision behaviour and lack of information about future likely consequences of
present decisions do not yield a market equilibrium, and thus evolutionary analysis concentrates
on dynamics, adjustment mechanisms and path dependencies.
1.3 Purpose and outline of the thesis
This thesis is about constructing models of technological change. A model is like a pair of glasses
to look at the world, an instrument to understand certain features of economic processes.
Constructing such a model is an exercise in analyzing reality, in an attempt to discern its essential
characteristics. It is a matter of choosing what to put into the model and what to leave out. Much
attention in this thesis is devoted to these choices. It involves first of all clarifying a number of
definitional issues: a workable definition of technological change, the nature of terms like
equilibrium, optimizing behaviour, dynamics. Secondly, it involves distinguishing key variables
that determine the process, like e.g. capacity, inputs, investments, prices. Finally, it concerns
making the causal relationships between variables explicit.
The thesis is restricted to certain aspects of technological change. It deals mainly with the
diffusion stage of the process of technological change, more specifically, with the diffusion of
process innovations. It does not deal explicitly with the generation of innovations, but con-
centrates on models describing the consecutive adoption of new process technologies by business
enterprises. An important feature of this research is that it tries to deal with two related phenomena
simultaneously. First of all, there is the familiar observation that innovations diffuse slowly
through an industry, that firms adopt the same innovation at different times. Secondly, there is
the observation that over time firms adopt different innovations. We shall try to deal with these
two features of reality in an integrated framework. Innovations are thus seen, not as isolated
phenomena, but as steps on a technological track, on which firms move from different starting
positions and with different speeds. ()n the one hand, there is the movement of innovations
through an industry, and on the other hand, there is the movement of firms through a range of
innovations.
The main questions addressed in this thesis arc about understanding the role of technical change
in determining economic behaviour and capturing this in a model. To start with, there are a
number of analytical questions on how to understand certain assertions about technological
change and translate them into a model. Important assertions concern the endogenous nature oftechnological development, the path dependent nature of progress, the complexity of information
and bounded rationality, and the determinants of the dynamics of adjustment to new techno-
logical opportunities. These questions will be dealt with by developing models of technology
adoption and diffusion. Related to these issues are questions concerning the consequences of
assumptions of endogenous technical progress, path dependence and bounded rationality for
growth rates and patterns of industry development. To some degree models will be helpful to
evaluate these consequences. Complementary to questions of analytical nature, there are
empirical questions about the relative importance of supposedly determining factors for actual
processes of technological change. Answers to such questions are sought by analysing a 'case'
of technological change, the introduction of a number of innovations in a group of Dutch banks
over a period of nine years, and by estimating (some versions of) the theoretical models.
An interesting aspect of these matters, to which empirical research may give an answer, is the
question at which level of aggregation economic development is most regular and predictable.
In particular, there is the issue of the importance of rationality and predictability at the microle vel
for orderliness at the aggregate level: is it helpful to model innovation adoption and then
aggregate, to describe diffusion accurately, or can the diffusion curve better be predicted by
reference to aggregate variables directly? It could be that, though technology adoption is rational
and deterministic at the microlevel, it may lead to irregular patterns at the aggregate level, due
to externalities and unpredictable interactions and feedbacks. It could also be that, though
innovation adoption may be irregular and unpredictable at the microlevel, it may be regular at
the aggregate level, due to mutual feedbacks, the averaging out of noise, adjustment and selection
mechanisms. In that case, a certain pattern of technology adoption is followed, but one cannot
predict which firm plays what role in this process.
The treatment of the questions above is to be considered within the context which has already
been sketched in section 1.2 above and in Table 1. The issues will be approached using both
concepts and techniques from mainstream economics, but in doing so an attempt will be made
to take advantage of insights from evolutionary economics. The body of the thesis consists out
of five chapters. The argument starts out, in Chapter 2, with an attempt to put technological
change in a broader perspective. The topics introduced above are elaborated and an overview
over issues concerning innovation diffusion and adoption which commanded attention of other
researchers in the field is presented, with references to previous literature. A representation of
two models, a firm model of induced innovation and the epidemic diffusion model, is given,
because they will serve as a starting point for models in later chapters. In Chapters 3 and 6, two
main models are developed and explored. These models fall into different categories, as
described by Table 1. Chapter 3 is an attempt to use the basis and the techniques of mainstream
economics, but to insert into this framework a number of elements drawn from evolutionary
thought. In particular, a dynamic model is developed which describes the investment planning
of firms, confronted with opportunities to invest in technological progress. The firm is assumed
to optimize an objective function under technological and market constraints. This model
contains some elements of bounded rationality and routinized behaviour, disequilibrium
dynamics, dynamic increasing returns and path dependence.
The model is tested empirically, using a database from a Dutch banking organization. In Chapter
4, recent technological developments in banking are briefly described, and the database used to
test the models is introduced. An inductive analysis of automation, size and costs in the case
study banking organization is given and evidence of scale economies is explored. Chapter 5
deals with empirical tests of some aspects of the model in Chapter 3. The data available containonly short time series, bul there is a lot of cross section material. In Chapter 5 the model is
adapted to fit the restrictions posed by the database, and consequently a simplified version of
the model is estimated.
In Chapter 6 the modelling problem is approached from a different angle. The models used there
take a specific production technique as unit of analysis, there is no reference to equilibrium, and
economic behaviour is represented as some type of an adjustment process. These models have
some features stressed by evolutionary thought, but they are not evolutionary models in a narrow
sense, in that they do not contain an explicit selection mechanism, describing how less efficient
firms arc forced into bankruptcy, nor a chance mechanism generating innovations at unpre-
dictable moments. The type of model explored there does take regularity at the aggregate level
as its point of departure, however, without making explicit assumptions about optimizing
behaviour at the micro level. Results of empirical testing of the models of Chapter 6 are reported
in the same chapter.
The thesis ends with a summary and some general conclusions. The main theoretical results of
the study concern, first of all, the analysis of investment planning by firms that operate in a
market where opportunities to invest in productivity rise are important. The relationship between
technological opportunities, market constraints, planned growth of output and planned pro-
ductivity rise are illuminated. Secondly, results concern the process of competition in a market
by heterogenous firms that invest in technical improvements. Some light is cast on the
relationship between firm size, market structure and the speed of technical progress, and on the
issue of steady stale growth. The main empirical results pertain to the mechanisms of diffusion
of innovations in banking. It is found that adoption behaviour shows regular patterns but is
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2.1
This chapter will be used to render the perspective which underlies the theory and models in
later chapters explicit. The starting point, in section two, is a general sketch of economic
behaviour, in relationship to the emergence of technological change in an economic system.
The third section deals with the relationship between the adoption of innovations and the process
of diffusion, and highlights a number of characteristics of the diffusion of innovations. The
fourth section considers two models describing the introduction of innovations. These models
originate from two different approaches towards modelling and consider innovation at a different
level of aggregation. The fifth section highlights a number of distinctive issues on which different
authors dealing with the adoption and diffusion of innovations have taken different stances.
2.2 Technological change and economic development.
For many decades, the explanation of technological change has been markedly absent from
mainstream economic analysis. Paradoxically, this was the case in an age in which actual
technological progress was far from stagnating, and in which the technology factor became an
ever more decisive determinant of economic success. Economic history of the last century is a
chronicle of launches of innovative products, revolutions in process technology, new devel-
opments in work organization, and intensified search for whatever is new and can be sold. In
this very period, technical change moved to the background in economic theory. It seems that
technology did not slip out of economic analysis because of a lack of empirical relevance. Rather,
it disappeared because it gradually drifted out of the economist's analytic perspective. The
development of economic analysis and of its main instruments has taken such a course that
technological change has shifted from being a variable at the centre of economic analysis, which
it was for Ricardo, Marx and Schumpeter, to being an exogenous parameter, a phenomenon at
the margin of the realm of economic analysis.
This marginalization of the technology factor may be partly explained by the prominence over
the last decades of the short run unemployment problem on the economist's agenda. Another
reason may be the popularity of an ever more mathematical approach towards economic analysts.
The tools of mathematics often seem to resist to be used for the analysis of qualitative progress,
discontinuities in behaviour and unpredictable changes in e.g. technological opportunities. But
focus on problems of unemployment and the momentum of the development of the economist's
mathematical tool kit may be only part of the explanation. The marginalization of technological10
change is probably also related to the fact that the study of allocation through the operation of
the market mechanism has become ever more firmly established as the core of economic analysis.
This focus on market coordination diverts attention from activities taking place te/öre economic
agents enter the market, from the stages in which investment and production are planned,
expectations are formed, innovations are developed, and production takes place. In these pre-
market stages of economic activity, technological change takes shape. Here, on shop floors, in
laboratories and in board rooms of business enterprises, other social mechanisms operate than
the market mechanism, other types of information are available and applicable to decision
making and other constraints are relevant. The marginalization of technology in economic
analysis is a consequence of the paradigmatic custom of economics to put market exchange at
the centre of analysis. Though fruitful for many purposes, this diverts attention away from some
essential aspects of behaviour and coordination, when exploring the relationships between
technological developments and long term economic changes.
«-
2.2.1 An economic system
To put the above propositions, it may be helpful to start out from a very general description of
activity in an economic system. Any economic system can be thought of as a system in which
agents act in relationship to each other. Agents, decision makers at the lowest level of aggre-
gation, arc individuals that both think and do. Economists are predominantly interested in what
agents do, in terms of production and distribution of the yield, but this is closely related to what
and how they think. This can be schematized using Figure 1 [this scheme is used by Kornai
(1971), chapters 4 and 5]: in an economic system, every agent is active in two spheres, in the
sphere of real activities and in the sphere of cognitive activities. In the real sphere there is
production, trade and consumption, in the cognitive sphere experiencing, wanting and decision
making. In the cognitive realm, one can distinguish between motivation and control activities.
The agent's motivation is his urge to fulfil his needs, which can be of many different types,
ranging from food and shelter to appreciation, status and knowledge. The individual tries to
attain his goals, satisfaction of his needs or maximization of his utility, by acting in the real
sphere: he searches for opportunities, spends time on work, produces, exchanges and consumes.
These activities are directed and controlled through cognitive activity: evaluating, checking,
deliberating. Real sphere activities require cognitive activities to monitor and control them.
Both in the cognitive and in the real sphere, agents interact. There is exchange of information,
through observation and communication, in the cognitive sphere. There is exchange of goods
and services in the real sphere, often through institutions like markets. The market mechanism
is a particular type of exchange mechanism in the real sphere.
Economic analysis is generally concerned with the explanation of activity in the real part of an
economic system: production, exchange of products and consumption. Real activity is visible
and can be measured in terms of quantities of product, hours of labour, trade volumes and the
like. Activity in the cognitive sphere, on the contrary, can hardly be seen and measured. However,
it must be presupposed to understand the activities that take place in the real sphere.
Starting from this representation of an economic system, analysis must proceed in two directions
to arrive at an economic model. On the one hand, structure and detail has to be added to the
general description of the economic system: one has to assume an institutional setting, property
rights, markets, organizational structures like firms, countries, governments, and for someU





























purposes social classes or auctioneers. On the other hand, one has to introduce useful abstractions
and aggregations which do not obscure the essential features of the processes under study.
Usually there is a trade off between abstracting of variation in one aspect against abstracting of
variation in another, and there is a trade off between detail and traclability of analysis. There is
a certain risk to abstract from elements which are decisive for the process one wants to explain.
Considering Figure 1, it seems that there are at least five types of abstractions, five dimensions
over which aggregation can take place. One can aggregate over agents, production (processes
and products), motivation, control processes and time.
Aggregating over agentt can be done up to different levels: firms, industries, aggregate supply.
A firm is an aggregate of agents and, although we often use the assumption that the firm decides
and produces, it is in fact a conglomerate of agents that search, ponder, deliberate and argue,
and finally decide, produce and sell. Likewise, /jrodwett are commonly aggregated into one
homogeneous output and production procures are aggregated by the use of one single pro-
duction function. Another common form of abstraction is aggregation over r/m*. One aggregates
the time it takes for the economic process to adjust to some change in parameters into one single
instant. The issues of aggregating over agents, production and time have defined the border lines
between micro and macro theory, and between static and dynamic analysis. .••••-12
Then, moving to the cognitive sphere, abstraction of variety in ffiörivafio/j takes different forms.
Different consumer needs can be aggregated into some utility concept, firm goals can be
aggregated into profit, but also into market share, sales volume and the like, and the government's
goal into welfare or re-election. Aggregating over co/ifro/ ac/ivi/i» in economic analysis, in
contrast to the other dimensions, is usually rather implicit. Control activities in reality are
manifold: searching, analysing, computing, negotiating, deciding, evaluating, monitoring.
Mostly control activities are aggregated into decision making. Control is reduced to deciding,
on what and how to produce, on what to sell for what price, and so on. Sometimes control
activities are recognized as a cause of transaction costs.
An important question in matters of aggregation is: what characteristics of the constituting units
are retained at the aggregate level. Taking aggregation over agents as an example, it is often
useful to think of firms a* »ƒ they would decide, or of labour supply as //it would react to a
change in the wage rate, because the aggregate decisions and reactions are similar or bear a clear
relationship to the decisions at the microlevel.' However, the higher the level of aggregation,
the more characteristics of the constituting parts may be lost.
Another important question in matters of aggregation is: how does the loss of variety at the
aggregate level affect the analysis. To what extent can e.g. firm behaviour be understood, if we
abstract from the fact that the firm is a coalition of individuals with different and often conflicting
interests. And therefore, what parts of firm behaviour cannot be explained any more when we
do not take account of principal-agent relationships within the firm, of divisions of power,
bureaucratic procedures, rights, obligations and responsibilities. And at a higher level of
aggregation, it can be asked to what extent competition can be understood, if we abstract from
variety among suppliers of a market. Can we explain prices if we aggregate supply and do not
lake account of rivalry.
Issues of aggregating over agents, production, time and firm goals have inspired the development
of new approaches, to overcome restrictions caused by certain types of aggregation. Limitations
of models where individuals are aggregated into firms have given rise to principal agent theory,
and limitations of models of aggregate supply have stimulated the use of non-cooperative game
theory in industrial economics. There are models of product diversification, market segmen-
tation, quality competition, alternative firm objectives and so on. A lot of effort goes into
microeconomics underpinning of macroeconomics, and into construction of dynamic models.
Aggregating over control activities, however, has long gone without much debate and contro-
versy in the economics discipline. These issues are touched upon in theories of bounded
rationality, but have gone without much explicit formalization in the economic literature so far."
In the context of an analysis of technical change, it is necessary to reconsider the aggregation
1 Methodological individualism holds (hat aggregation over agents distorts our view on economic processes to
such extent that our understanding is severely hampered In Schumpeters words: "It keeps analysis on the sur-
face of things and prevents it from penetrating into the industrial processes below, which are what really
matters It invites a mechanistic and formal treatment of a few isolated contour lines and attributes to aggregates
a life of their own and a causal significance that they do not posses " [Schumpeter, 1939, p 44]
2 One can refer to Atkinson and Sugliu (1W) and Nelson and Winter (1982) as examples of models where the
concept of bounded rationality is invoked as a cause for the localized character of technical progress.13
over control processes, because the variety and complexity of these cognitive activitta Mem 10
be decisive factors in the process of technological development. Technological development
originates in the control sphere of the economic system, results from cognitive activities.'
The most far reaching aggregation of control activities is to aggregate all control processes into
decision making, and at the same time to aggregate all information relevant for decision making
into prices. These two abstractions arc related: if all relevant information is contained in prices,
then problems of control easily reduce to decision making. The model of the economic system
simplifies in three important respects. First of all, prices arc public knowledge. Thus we abstract
from information which is not accessible to every agent. Equilibrium prices then truly reflect
the scarcity value of tradables, and that is all that is relevant to know to take a decision on
production or exchange. Secondly, prices are quantitative measures. There is no problem of
relating different types of information to each other, because all information is measured on the
same scale. Prices can be directly compared. Thirdly, information in the form of prices involves
no complexity and can be readily evaluated. There is no training, skill or research involved in
understanding all information. If information is only price information, control comes down to
arithmetics, and is therefore relatively easy and cheap.
Abstraction in the realm of control processes may obscure some important features of technical
change. The development and use of technology is to a large extent a control process: it is getting
to know how to make or do something. This type of control activity is different from decision
making by calculating. It is a process that works with technical information, beside price
information, which has rather different characteristics. First of all, technical information is not
readily accessible. Secondly, it is complex and cannot be reduced to a single dimension. Thirdly,
it requires research and training to be able to put technical information to use. Thus control
processes, when technological information is involved, are not limited to computing and
deciding. There is also gathering and researching of information, comparing and evaluating,
studying and mastering, training and developing skills and building up routines. These are all
processes that require an investment of time and effort. Thus cognitive activities acquire the
characteristics of a production process: inputs are transformed into outputs, which are, beside
decisions, knowledge and skills, inventions and innovations.
In this context, it is worthwhile to refer to an alternative to the usual rationality concept, the
concept of bounded rationality. Simon, who first introduced this term, argues that, due to
cognitive constraints, rationality in economics is restricted: "In any realistic description of the
environment of a human decision maker, the variables and information to which he might attend
(and to which he must attend to satisfy the strict requirements of rationality) arc innumerable.
The hypothesis of bounded rationality claims that human beings handle this difficulty by
attending to only a small part of the complexity about them. They make a highly simplified
model of the world, and they make their decisions in terms of that model and the subset of
variables that enter into it. Now this approach may work very well (...) if the number of very
important variables is small at any given lime, and if this list of important variables does not
change from time to time without the change being noticed." [Simon (1986) p. 33-34]. Simon
3 Mueller argues that our understanding of (be functioning of the business corporation has suffered, not so much
from lack of recognition of constraints, but from the unwillingness of economists to adopt a more realistic set of
behavioural assumptions about managerial motivation. He supports bis attack on the assumptions of profit and
shareholder wealth maximization and his plea for broader models of managerial motivation with empirical evi-
dence from principal/agent and industrial organization literature [Mueller (1992)].14
thus points out that, in taking decisions, human beings use some type of model of the world
which is a simplification in two respects. In the model, not only the relationships between the
variables in the model are a simplification of reality, in the sense that there is a limited repre-
sentation causal links, but more importantly, there has been an a priori selection of the variables
which enter the model. A lot of information has been left out of consideration, on the a priori
assumption that the costs of including this information in decision making, and of broadening
the range of possible outcomes, would complicate the process of taking a decision to such an
extent that the extra costs would outweigh the benefits. This procedure works well and is efficient,
so long as the model is not a poor approximation and as long as the structure of the decision
problem does not change, in the sense that formerly unessential variables which are external to
the decision model become of great importance, while the decision making procedure is not
adjusted.
Bounded rationality points at the limitations of human cognitive capacities. In taking decisions
on the introduction of new technology, these limitations are of influence, because these decisions
are usually complex in a number of respects, and different types of variables can be relevant.
There is usually a lot of technical information to be dealt with which can be complex and veiled
in uncertainty. Moreover, the adoption of new technology is often tied up with strategic issues
and decisions on the long term course of the company.* If bounded rationality is a concept,
relevant to the description behaviour of firms with respect to their day to day business, then it
is certainly relevant to a description of firm's behaviour with respect to new technology.
This brings us back to the two important questions about matters of abstracting or aggregating:
what characteristics of the constituting units are retained at the aggregate level, and how does
the loss of variety at the aggregate level affect the analysis. First of all, it is clear that if one
considers decision making on the basis of price information as the only type of control process
in the economic system, a lot of costly and lime consuming activity in the economy moves out
of sight. Since comparing readily accessible price information and determining the best offer is
relatively easy and cheap, in comparison to searching and evaluating, there would be no good
reason why control processes should take lots of time and be subject to capacity constraints. It
would be difficult to understand, why all decisions are not taken instantaneously and why routines
develop. However, in reality a lot of cognitive activities do not take the form of computing, but
of searching and learning. This requires time, capacity and investment of scarce resources. The
production of new technology is an example of a cognitive activity that requires investments in
searching and training. Capacity constraints in this field of control processes seem to determine
the speed and scope of progress. Secondly, variety is an important element in the competitive
struggle: firms try to outperform competitors by developing positive differences. Variety in
technological capacity, in control and search routines, in command over information and in
ability to create is an important element in the determination of the dynamics of competition.
Abstracting from the variety in constraints in cognitive capacities lakes away an important
explanation of economic development.
4 Freeman (1982. p. 149) distinguishes between technical uncertainty, market uncertainty and general business
uncertainty.15
2.2.2 Summary and implications for modelling
Comparing the real sphere and the cognitive sphere of the economic system, we see there is
similarity and difference. A similarity, which is often disregarded, is Ihe fact thai in both spheres
production takes place and is constrained by capacity limits. In the cognitive sphere, beside
decisions, information, knowledge and technology are produced, using human energy and time.
An important difference between the two spheres, also often disregarded, lies in the fact that
exchange in the real sphere concerns appropriable commodities, and transaction costs are mostly
relatively minor, whereas exchange in the control sphere concerns information, which is often
less appropriable, and which can involve high transaction costs. To acquire information /><•»• ,\r
can be costless, but to acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to absorb information can
require large investments in training and study.
There is a tendency in economic analysis to abstract from the complexity and variety of cognitive
activities in the economic system, and, in parallel to this, to aggregate all or most information
into prices. On the one hand, this is the consequence of a concentration on real sphere economic
activities. On the other hand, this is caused by a focus on issues of allocation and the operation
of the market mechanism. In this way activities leading to technical change have tended to gut
marginalized in economic analysis. The reduction of cognitive processes to choice processes
leads to a neglect of important constraints in economic development. It diverts attention from
investments needed to pursue these cognitive activities, investments in making choices, in
producing and searching for new information, and in learning to reap the benefits of information.
These investments arc both large in value terms and extensive in terms of time. Moreover, to
overlook the importance of these complex cognitive processes leads to a blurring of our per-
spective on factors influencing competition.
On the topic of constructing models of economic development, in which changing technology
is important, some conclusions can be drawn from the exposition above:
1. In an economic system, agents not only produce goods and services (or equipment to
produce goods and services), but also information, capacity to deal with information
and capacity to produce information. Information, knowledge and technology are output
from a largely cognitive production process; agents invest in study to master knowledge
and they invest in their ability to develop new knowledge and technology. So there are
two types of production processes in the economy, production of goods and services
and production of knowledge and technology. In models of economic development over
longer periods of time, it is important not to abstract from the last.
2. Cognitive processes, production and processing of information, are costly. Production
of technical knowledge and skills requires investment of scarce resources.
3. Time is an important factor. Capacity to produce technical knowledge and skills, to
generate information and to reduce technical and economic uncertainty is restricted by
human capabilities to learn, to invent and to develop.
4. Although the production process in the cognitive sphere of the economy is similar to
that in the real sphere, in the sense that both require inputs to yield outputs, the /7r«J«c/,
new information, is of a different character from the products in the real sphere of the
economy. An important difference is the lesser degree of appropriability of information
which, however, often goes together with relatively high transaction costs. These fea-
tures complicate market exchange of cognitive output.5. Production of goods is preceded by and dependent upon production of knowledge and
technology. A change in technical knowledge can lead to a change in the capacity to
produce goods.
This completes the sketch of the general framework. These conclusions may later be referred
to when considering the models of chapter 3. We now turn to a descriptive analysis of the
introduction of new technology in enterprises.
2.3 Adoption and diffusion of innovations ''
Economic systems go through changes over time. There are institutional changes, changes in
the volume and composition of production, and consequently in prices, in the allocation of
resources and in the distribution of returns. One of the important causes of change is technological
progress: changes in the process of transformation of inputs into output. This section deals with
an outline of this process of technological change.
23.1 Aspects of technical change
It is traditional to distinguish between invention, innovation and diffusion as the constituting
parts of the process of technological change. Innovation is defined as the first commercial
application of an invention, and diffusion as the spreading of the innovation. This distinction
suggests that there is an innovator that bears major costs of research and development, launches
a new product on the market and tries to recoup his investment before others enter. Potential
followers see that a new market has opened up and try to enter at low costs, taking advantage
of the research and development expenses of the innovator. Though conceptually straightfor-
ward, this partition of the industry between one innovator and a herd of imitators is of limited
practical significance. It suggests a large difference between the first firm to exploit an innovation
and later firms. If the innovator is just one out of a number of firms that follow a similar offensive
strategy, then the difference between the innovator and early followers will be small, often
smaller than between early and late followers. The more proprietary a new technology is, or the
more effectively it is kept secret, the less followers can take advantage of R&D efforts of
innovators. However, only in few instances an innovator's lead is protected effectively by a
patent [Nelson (1988)]. Commonly an innovators lead is challenged quickly by competitors that
follow a similar first mover strategy. Early followers often bear costs of R&D which are
comparable to those of innovators, run similar risks and also enjoy above normal profits, once
they manage to enter the market. Also, early adopters often contribute substantially to the
development of a 'dominant design' and to further diversification [see e.g. Abernathy (1978)].
In the case of many process innovations, the origin of the innovation is not one of the competitors
in a market, but a supplier of capital goods.' In such cases diffusion is promoted by the capital
supplier and there is even less room for differences between the first mover and later adopters.
Thus, there is no essential difference between the characteristics of innovators and of followers
as such. Rather is there a continuum of firms pursuing different strategies and setting different
targets [see e.g. Twiss (1986), Martin (1984)]. The spectrum ranges from firms that are inclined
5 Product-related RAD is estimated to account for 75 lo 90% of tool R&D expenditures in manufacturing [Dosi
(I991.p.l88).77i«>i?rica/ bidtgroufu/ 17
to venture early innovation to ones that tend to imitate, differentiate or popularize a new product
Generally, earlier firms run higher risks, invest larger amounts and have higher chances on
higher returns than later firms. However, competition makes that not all can reuch their targets
simultaneously. In principle all firms invest to create progress, hut some invest mure and more
effectively than others, and as a consequence have an earlier result and a higher return.
Another traditional practice is to distinguish between adoption and diffusion. Both terms refer
to the introduction of new technology, but each from a different perspective. Adoption refers
to the introduction of an innovation as a matter of choice, from the perspective of an agent or
firm. "Adoption analysis considers the decisions taken by agents, typically organizations such
as firms, to incorporate a new technology into their activities. It is concerned with the process
of decision making, and leads to propositions linking the nature and timing of adoption decisions
to specified characteristics of adopters, e.g. the size of firms, or their sociometrie position within
a communications network." [Metcalfe (WHS, p.561)]. Adoption is a choice referring to u
moment in time. Diffusion, by contrast, refers to the introduction of new technology in firms
from an aggregate perspective. Diffusion analysis is not directly concerned with the explanation
of decision making, with behaviour of an economic agent, but: "Diffusion analysis is concerned
with how the economic significance of a new technique changes over lime." |Metcalfe (ibid.)|.
The analysis centres, not on the agent, but on the new technology. According to Rogers,
"Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels
over time among the members of a social system." [Rogers (1983, p.5)]. Thus the concept of
diffusion does not refer to a choice in time, but to a process over time.
Obviously, adoption decisions and diffusion phenomena are related. By aggregating adoption
decisions at every moment in time, one arrives at a diffusion path. A question which is important
for modelling is now, whether diffusion is to be conceived of as a coherent process. To understand
a sequence of events as constituting a (historical) process implies that one assumes that there is
some direct or indirect causal relationship between the events that follow upon each other in
time. Thus the question is, whether and to what extent successive adoptions of new technology
are causally related to each other, to what extent agents take account of the adoption decisions
of others when taking a decisions on technology adoption themselves. It may be that a smooth
diffusion curve results from adoption decisions that are not directly causally related: there is no
feedback from an adoption decision to the conditions for adoption of other potential users. It
may also be that adoptions are directly related: the driver of diffusion is endogenous to the
process itself. There could be a feedback through a spread of information, leading to a bandwagon
effect, through network externalities, or through markets for inputs and outputs, which would
affect the profitability of the innovation relative to the old technique. This determines whether
it is possible to explain and model diffusion as a function of aggregate variables, or whether it
can only be explained by explicit aggregation of underlying behaviour. It determines whether
there is some internal logic or coherence to the process of diffusion, or whether the diffusion
path is just the sum of the constituting parts. If adoption decisions are not interrelated, then
diffusion patterns are in a sense accidental (exogenous) in shape and can only be modelled by
aggregating models of individual firm decisions. If individual adoption decisions are strongly
related, if every adoption decision is largely determined by foregoing adoption decisions, then
the diffusion process can be described by reference to its own history. This would allow for
relatively simple models, avoiding the problem of explicit aggregation.18
In the first case, modelling and explanation can follow another course than in the second case.
Using the terms of Mohr, there are two types of theory, two modes of explanation, variance
theory and process theory [Mohr (1982)]. Variance theory is the archetypal theory in science.
"In variance theory, the precursor (X) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the outcome
(Y)." In other words, the variation in the dependent variable (Y) is explained by the variation
in the independent variables (X), in the sense that variation in variables (X) are both sufficient
and necessary for variation in (Y) to occur. If adoptions are independent of each other, variation
in adoption decisions (Y) at any moment in time must be explained by variation in firm char-
acteristics (X) at some moment in time.
According to Mohr, there is another type of theory, called process theory, that can also be
accepted as a type of explanatory theory. A process theory states necessary conditions, in this
case the existence of potential adopters and an innovation, but does not explain the adoption of
this particular innovation by that particular firm by recourse to a sufficient cause. "In process
theory, the precursor (X) is a necessary condition for the outcome (Y)." The precursor is not a
sufficient condition. If there is no innovation, then there is no adoption, but not: if there is an
innovation, then it is adopted by this or that potential user. However, since we are after an
explanation of (Y), we are concerned with when (Y) occurs, not when it does not. The fact that
the precursor is necessary for the outcome is insufficient to constitute an explanatory theory. In
process theory, identification of necessary conditions is supplemented by a probabilistic process
that specifies the chance that the one necessarv element, the innovation is linked to the other
an element out of the population of potential adopters. Together, the necessary conditions plus
the chance process explain that in time firms adopt the innovation.
Mohr expresses the difference as follows: "Whereas a variance theory explains a behavior or a
characteristic of an object, a process theory explains the pairing or other rearrangement of
mutuully autonomous objects, such as the bets of the players and the number on the roulette
wheel, whose individual courses arc determined independently of one another by forces external
to the core of the theory." A variance theory can explain, by identifying the necessary and
sufficient conditions, why at a particular moment in time an innovation is adopted by a particular
firm. A process theory can explain, given that there is an innovation and that there are potential
users, the event that there arc potential users that adopt the innovation.
Mohr holds that process theory is not a watered down version of variance theory, in which a
probabilistic element has been slipped in to make up for the lack of identified sufficient
conditions. Process theory explains specific types of events in a particular way. The fact that
you did not win in roulette can be explained by analysing the speed of the ball and the wheel,
the shape and the weight, and so on. The same fact is also explained by taking into account that
there were necessary conditions (the bet, the ball and the wheel), and a chance of one in 37 of
winning. For most purposes this is an entirely satisfactory explanation of the event of not winning.
What type of theory would constitute a satisfactory explanation of innovation diffusion, a
variance theory or a process theory? Gerybatze describes the situation in diffusion research as
follows: "Nicht überwunden wurde aber (...) die Vernachlassigung des dynamischen, pro-
zessmössigen Charakters der Diffusion. Nahezu alle Diffusionstudien bauten auf cinem Para-
digma auf, das als Varianztheorie bezeichnet wird. Es wurden Korrellationen zwischen
zahlreichen okonomischen. psychologischen. organisational und sozialen Variabelen
einerseits und Merkmalen der Innovativitat' von Individuen und Organisationen andererseits
ermittelt. (...) Dennoch weiss man aber nicht, wie diese vielen Faktoren sich im Zeitablauf77t«>irrica/ badk^rmind 19
gegenseitig beeinflussen und den Verlaul der Diffusion pragen. Es mangelt an eincr Prozess-
iheorie der Diffusion (...). Dieser Mangel ist besonders gravierend deshalb. weil die Diffusion
ein kausal- genelischer Prozess ist. bei dessen Analyse varian/theorelische Kon/epte versagen
(...)." [Gerybatze (1982, p.23l)]. The diffusion process, according toGerybat/e, propagates its
own causation, has its internal coherence and logic. A process theoretical explanation of diffusion
would illuminate this coherence of the sequence of adoptions, something which is difficult to
accomplish by variance theory. This gain in understanding of the coherence of the process,
however, goes at the expense of tractability down to the individual decision maker.
Intuitively, Gerybalze seems right in pointing out that there is a causal relationship between
innovation adoptions that follow upon each other, either directly or indirectly. Diffusion seems
to be a process with a certain internal logic and regularity. However, the extent to which adoptions
can be explained by previous adoptions, relative to other causes, is an empirical matter There
is no a priori answer to the question whether it is more fruitful to explain the spread of innovations
in an economic system as a coherent process, or rather as a sequence of not directly related
adoptions. It is not clear a priori that process theories will succeed where variance theories seem
to fail. In subsequent chapters, the introduction of innovations in firms will be analysed using
both perspectives. We shall look at both adoption and diffusion models, employing variance
and process theories respectively.
2.3.2 The introduction and spread of innovations
Diffusion processes have aroused the interest of social scientists from different backgrounds.
There is a considerable tradition in diffusion research among sociologists | notably Rogers
(1983)], anthropologists and geographers [e.g. Hagerstrand (1956)]. Attention of economists to
this phenomenon dates back to seminal articles ofGriliches( 1957) and Mansfield (1961). There
are some differences in approach between different disciplines. Whereas other social scientists
have usually been concerned with the spatial patterns of diffusion, economists commonly deal
mainly with the time dimension.' Also, the aspects of innovation diffusion that attracted the
attention of sociologists are different from those studied by economists. Sociological research
seems to concentrate on the mechanisms, whereas economic research primarily looks at out-
comes of the diffusion process. The economic research in the field is predominantly occupied
with the identification of factors, notably cost and benefit variables, that correlate with the
diffusion speed. What is often considered less important, is an analysis of the events that actually
take place in the course of the diffusion process, in terms of interacting, forming expectations,
searching for information, decision making, adjusting and learning. This contrasts with the
sociological approach of Rogers. He concentrates on social mechanisms, on communication
networks, decision procedures, public opinion, change agents, authority, norms, etcetera [Rogers
(1983)]. His analysis centres more on social processes and less on the inputs and the outcomes.
Rogers defines innovation diffusion as the spread in time of an innovation through certain
communication channels among the members of a social system. There are three explanatory
variables in the diffusion process that figure in this definition: the innovation, the communication
channels and the social system. To put the issues involved in perspective, it is useful to consider
6 An exception would be Karlsson (1988). His study combines time and spatial aspects of diffusion.some aspects of each of these elements. We shall look at the appropriability of the innovation,
the use of market channels as channels of communication, and the existence of market institutions
and property rights as important ingredients of the social system.
An innovation is the first commercial use of an invention. Innovations can be categorised
according to their character as: 1) product innovations; 2) process innovations; 3) market
innovations; 4) organizational innovations; S) legal and institutional innovations. In practice
different types of innovations are often related. Process innovations frequently require new
organizational arrangements or stimulate the development of new products. Product innovations
stimulate the exploration of new markets and the development of new production processes.
This study deals predominantly with process innovations, but this is not to be interpreted too
narrowly. Introducing a new process can involve adjustment of the organization of labour, an
upgrading of the final product, an innovation in marketing, everything that improves efficiency
in production of value. A process innovation is thus often accompanied by other changes and
can stimulate further developments, e.g. new features and improved product design.
According to Rogers, innovations have the following five attributes:
1. Relative advantage: the degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than the
idea it supersedes.
2. Compatibility: the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with
the existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters.
3. Complexity: the degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult to understand
and use.
4. Trialability: the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited
basis.
5. Observability: the degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others.
"In general, innovations that are perceived by receivers as having greater relative advantage,
compatibility, trialability, observability, and less complexity will be adopted more rapidly than
other innovations." [Rogers (1983, pp. 15-16)]. Although Rogers was not writing with process
innovations in firms in mind, his attributes are applicable to some extent to these innovations
too. Relative advantage is generally measured in terms of costs and benefits, in terms of effi-
ciency. The most important attribute of a process innovation to an adopting firm is that it saves
costs and increases productivity or capacity. But the other attributes are also forceful factors
influencing adoption decisions. Compatibility and complexity determine the costs of adjustment
when some innovation is to be introduced. The more compatible and the less complex an
innovation, the less costs have to be incurred, first on research and assessment, and after the
firm has decided to adopt, on organizational change and training. Trialability and observability
determine the risk of adopting an innovation. The more triable an innovation, the less com-
mitment is required to gain experience. Greater observability of an innovation reduces the costs
of information gathering. Summarizing Rogers' partitioning, it can be said that there are two
essential aspects to an innovation, the relative advantage in terms of costs and benefits that it
Can bring in the real sphere, and the difficulties that it involves to the control sphere: to assess
the advantages and risks of adoption, to learn to work with it and to adjust working practices.
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successful diffusion of an innovation, it is often not sufficient to explain adoption or
non-adoption. Costs connected with compatibility, complexity, irialability and observability can
speed up or retard adoption.
Innovations can take different physical forms. An innovation can be contained in knowledge or
in a source of information.' One could think of something like the chemical formula for u drug
or a blueprint of a machine. It can also be embodied in a consumption or investment good.
Furthermore, an innovation can be tied to labour (as treated in the literature on learning by
doing), to workers that have developed some skill or knowledge which is not cosilessly trans-
ferable to others. An example could be a good software programmer, who has developed skills
specific to some problem area. Finally, an innovation could be contained in an organization, in
its structure, its routines or culture. It then has the character of an intangible asset. The physical
form of an innovation determines its degree of appropriabiliiy. An innovation in the form of
ideas, recipes and blueprints is less appropriable than an innovation hidden in u machine or tied
up in an organization. The degree of appropriability of an innovation determines the channels
through which it spreads, the costs of the transfer and the time it takes for an innovation to
diffuse. Innovations in forms that permit property rights to be effectuated and protected can
spread through market channels. The trade in a new machine embodying an innovation is
governed by the same laws of demand and supply that govern any other market process.
Innovations whose transfer involves high transaction costs, like complex knowledge, spread
througri scftoofs and courses, /nno vafrcms f/ra( nave a more accesrifrte form spread (/firmg/r orfwr
channels: there is search for information, reverse engineering and imitation. Summarizing one
can state:
1. Information and knowledge are usually cheap to reproduce. It is often hard to enforce
exclusive ownership on disembodied knowledge or information. According to Baldwin
and Scott, "Severe, even crippling, sources of market failure have been identified, when
knowledge, in and of itself, is viewed as the commodity transferred or diffused in a
process of voluntary exchange. If such abstract knowledge is envisaged as salable, its
marginal cost of production approximates zero." [Baldwin and Scott (1987, p. 114)).
However, information and knowledge are sometimes expensive to transfer, because it
may take a lot of education and training to be able to make use of new knowledge.
2. New commodities, consumer and capital goods, are reproduced in a traditional pro-
duction process and transferred by selling. Production capacity limits the availability
of an innovation. Property rights can be enforced more effectively on commodities that
embody an innovation than on knowledge /vr 5?. However, patent evasion and reverse
engineering can constitute problems.
3. The reproduction and transfer of skills is a matter of teaching and learning. Learning
capacity limits the adoption speed of an innovation. The diffusion of skills is partly
regulated through the market for schooling. The relevant price is not only the sum
transferred in the market, but also the opportunity costs of the time and effort spent by
the trainee.
4. The reproduction and transfer of an organizational innovation also depends on learning
and on factors like the flexibility of job contracts and organizational hierarchies.
7 Metcalfe (1988, p.563) distinguishes between technology as knowledge and technology as artefact.22
Intangible assets are difficult to transfer, but organizational change is to some extent
tradable, and its spread tend to be propelled by management consultants and business
schools.
In connection to these issues, Baldwin and Scott distinguish between two different types of
diffusion process. On the one hand, diffusion can be initiated or encouraged by the innovator.
This type of diffusion is also called dissemination. One can differentiate between vertical and
horizontal dissemination [Baldwin and Scott (1987, p. 117)]. The mechanisms that lead to vertical
dissemination are the same as those leading to purchases of raw materials or sales of final goods.
Horizontal dissemination frequently takes the form of allowing another firm to produce a pat-
ented or otherwise proprietary product under licence. If unauthorised copying of licensed
technology is effectively prevented, the innovator thus loses none of the monopoly control over
its knowledge, but merely chooses whether to reap the monopoly gains through profits on its
own sales or through the royalty fees charged its licensees.
On the other hand, diffusion can be without the permission or approval of the innovator, initiated
by other agents. This type of diffusion is coined imitation. "Unauthorized imitation is a major
diffusion mechanism when patents are easily circumvented, when high litigation costs and
uncertainties make patents little more than a 'licence to sue', and when 'reverse engineering',
or the analysis of how a competitor's product was made, is routinely pursued." [Baldwin and
Scott (1987, p. 120)). The appropriability of the innovation determines the type of likely diffusion.
If property rights can be enforced, then a producer of an innovation will probably market his
product. If property rights are limited or cannot be secured, imitation is prone to occur.
The mainstream of diffusion literature focuses on vertical dissemination, looking at sellers and
users of an innovation as clearly different groups and assuming them to deal through market
channels. Diffusion literature has little to say on horizontal dissemination, which involves not
only the sale of the innovation but also affects the licensor's competitive position on his own
regular product market. A lot of research addresses licensing, but usually not to the extent that
conclusions about the (optimal) time profile of the spread of an innovation can be drawn [Baldwin
and Scott (1987, pp. 118-119)]. Imitation as a strategic alternative to innovation has been
considered by several researchers, but not in connection to the diffusion rate [e.g. Martin (1984),
Licberman and Montgomery (1988)].
If the channel through which an innovation spreads over adopters is a market, then it is feasible
to apply the usual market models to innovation diffusion. There can be an influence of market
structure on diffusion rates, and there can be distortions of the market mechanism and market
failure. The relationship between innovative activity and the structure of the product market has
been the subject of extensive research. The usual Schumpeterian conclusion is that some degree
of monopoly or monopolistic competition is a necessary condition for dynamic efficiency
(Kamicn and Schwartz (1982), Baldwin and Scott (1987)]. Empirical evidence, however, is
mixed [Schercr (1980), Cohen and Levin (1989)]. The relationship between, on the one hand,
investment in new technology and time of adoption and, on the other hand, firm size and market
concentration has been extensively researched [e.g. Mansfield (1968). Davies (1979)]. Empirical
evidence on the relationship between concentration and diffusion speed is mixed [Baldwin and
Scott (1987, p. 132)].23
A market functions efficiently under a number of preconditions, one being full and free infor-
mation about the commodity being traded to all parties involved. One market distortion is
introduced by Ihe problem of reduced appropriability. A related problem emanates from the fact
that asymmetries of information are unavoidable in the trade of knowledge. A full disclosure
of information on the innovation is not viable, if the innovation is contained in that very piece
of information. Obviously, if this information is part of the traded commodity, secrecy must
interfere with the market process. Information available to the traders in the market is incomplete,
asymmetrically distributed over supply and demand, but probably expanding over time as
diffusion advances. Information is incomplete, because commonly there is considerable
uncertainty about both the technical and the economic characteristics of an innovation, about
performance and profitability. This uncertainty hampers the estimation of the value of the
innovation and thus the determination of the demand curve. In the words of Baldwin and Scott:
"There is a paradox in the market for knowledge. Markets arc presumed to work efficiently only
if buyers and sellers have complete and accurate information on the commodities being traded.
But by definition, this necessary condition for efficiency is violated, since buyers of knowledge
do not know what they are acquiring, nor what its worth to them will be, until after they have
bought it. For if they had sufficient knowledge, they would not have to acquire it."
Furthermore, the supplier of the innovation often has substantial market power vis-a-vis buyers,
since he is much better informed than the potential buyer. Often the supplier is not willing to
reveal all information about the innovation to the market, since this would eliminate the reason
to pay for this information and thus destroy the market for the innovation. However, the opposite
asymmetry is also likely to occur: "Alternatively, the discoverer of a new unit of knowledge
(such as an independent scientist) may not be in a strong position to exploit it, and thus the
preponderance of market power may lie with large enterprises which are the main potential
customers of a new technology." [Baldwin and Scott (1987, p.115)]. Finally, experience with
the innovation builds up in the course of time. This decreases the risk involved in determining
the value of the innovation and in introducing it. The collection of experience depends on both
trialability and on observability of the innovation.
2.3 J Implications for model construction
These considerations about the process of innovation diffusion and the relationship between
adoption and diffusion have some implications for model building:
1. If successive adoption decisions are largely unrelated, then microeconomic adoption
models, together with a distribution of decisive characteristics over firms, fully explain
diffusion of innovations. Regularity in diffusion patterns is then caused by some reg-
ularity in the distribution of some firm characteristic. If successive adoptions are strongly
related to each other, then diffusion may be adequately explained by a model at the
aggregate level. Then a detailed inquiry into the characteristics of individual firms might
not add much to our understanding of the diffusion process. In this case microeconomic
underpinning of diffusion models may be superfluous, since each adoption is mainly
determined by previous adoptions by other firms, by a process at a higher level of
aggregation than the particular firm. It may also be a fruitless thing to explore, because
the relationship between micro characteristics and diffusion patterns is weak.
2. Adoption of innovations is partly a real sphere process and partly a control sphere
process. The timing of adoption of an innovation is not only determined by relative
advantage, but also by necessary investments in search, work adjustment and training,24
which depend on observability, complexity, trialability and compatibility.
3. Diffusion of new technology is only partly a market process. There are problems of
appropriability and, related to this, problems of disclosure of information. There can be
considerable transaction costs. This limits the applicability of standard models of market
behaviour.
4. To the extent that diffusion is accomplished outside the market, e.g. by free transfer of
information or by costless imitation, models of innovation diffusion cannot rely on cost
benefit arguments as explanation for observed patterns. If diffusion happens by imi-
tation, then it is not so much constrained by profitability of the innovation, but by
capacity to gather and sort out information.
2.4 Some distinctions in approaches to modelling technological change
The related processes of adoption and diffusion have inspired a large research effort over the
last decade or so. Numerous studies have been conducted, both theoretical and empirical, after
the mechanisms of the spread of new technology. There are several excellent surveys of the
literature available [Stoneman (1983,1986,1987), Thirtle and Ruttan (1987), Baldwin and Scott
(1987)| and a number of critical assessments of the state of the art [Gold (1981), Metcalfe (1988),
Dosi (1991), Silverberg (1991)1. Rather than to repeat their work, I shall single out a couple of
issues in the rest of this chapter which are of importance for the construction of models of
technical change, and on which different researchers have made different choices. The purpose
is to illuminate the choices that have been made in subsequent chapters, and to put them into
perspective. Before tackling these issues, some pages will be used to review two models in more
detail: a model of induced innovation and the so called epidemic diffusion model. The first
describes the development or adoption of innovations at the level of the firm, and the second at
the level of (he industry. The first model can be classified as a variance theoretical model and
the as second a process theoretical model. The first explains a change in technology as a logical
consequence of optimi/.ing behaviour and technical constraints. The second explains a change
in technology as a chance process, where the changes in the circumstances determine the changes
in the probability that a firm will adopt a new technology. These models are outlined here,
because they can be used as illustrations later in this chapter, and more importantly, because
they will serve as points of departure for model constructing in later chapters.
2.4.1 Induced innovation
The theory of induced innovation is an attempt to re late the rate and direction of technical change
to the structure of factor demand and changes therein. The original formulation of the general
idea is due to Hicks: "A change in the relative prices of the factors of production is in itself a
spur to invention, and to invention of a particular kind - directed to economising the use of a
factor which has become relatively expensive." [Hicks (1932)]. This assumption, that the
direction of technical change is in part determined by factor cast ratios, or changes therein, has
been analysed by a variety of authors during the 1960's [see e.g. Kennedy (1964), Dandrakis
and Phelps (1965). Samuelson (1965)]. They dealt with the question whether a rise in the wage
rate provokes labour saving innovations which could lead to unemployment. The theory has
been contested by Sailer, who claimed that technological change has no intrinsic factor saving77i«>frrica/ fejdkxroitfu/ 25
bias, because firms attempt to reduce all their costs, no matter what they are spent on [Sailer
(1966)]. In his model, the marginal revenue of every factor is equalized in equilibrium, and the
firm is indifferent between marginal reductions in factor demands of any kind.
Most authors have studied the conjecture of induced innovation in a macroeconomic context.
Also they generally assumed a static framework: decisions on innovation are taken with only
the present state of the system, characterized by factor prices and an innovation possibility
frontier, in mind. Moreover, the focus in this work is usually on the determinants of the direction
of technical change, assuming the rate of progress fixed exogenously. Binswanger and Rullun
have developed the theory further, giving it a content based in microeconomics [Binswanger
and Ruttan (1978)]. Few authors have used the idea of induced technical change in a micro-
economic model of the firm [see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1969). Magat (1979). Sato and
Suzawa (1983), Sato and Ramachandran (1987)|. The latter models referred to are elaborations
of the contribution of Kamien and Schwartz (1969). Kamien and Schwartz analyse a model
which is microeconomic. dynamic and in which both the rate and the direction of technical
change are decision variables. The model describes the intertemporal decision problem of a firm
maximizing discounted profit. By investing in factor augmentation, the firm can determine both
direction and rate of technical progress. Their analysis confirms Hicks neutrality in equilibrium
as the optimum for the firm.
The firm models in subsequent chapters draw heavily on the approach of Kamien and Schwartz.
In the next chapter, a similar type of model will be considered, introducing however a number
of alternative assumptions concerning the firm's production possibilities and its decision rules.
Some new elements will be introduced in line with the conclusions drawn in the last two sections
above. The technical features of the model will be retained, however, which allows for analysis
of the model by standard methods and for the derivation of some elegant results.
In order to focus on the effects of technical change and the optimal rate of factor augmentation
for a profit maximizing firm, Kamien and Schwartz (1969) posit very simple assumptions about
the environment. The firm operates in a static and certain world. It faces a stationary demand
curve and constant factor prices which are unaffected by the firm's course of action. The pro-
duction function is of the neoclassical type:
<>(f (BAT.AL)) = y (1)
Here AT and L are capital and labour respectively. B and A are 'augmentation' parameters, such
that Btf and AL are amounts of capital and labour in efficiency units. F is a continuously
differentiate linear homogeneous function, determining the curvature of the isoquanls. The
function <|>(F) is monotone increasing in F and WO) = 0. The transformation <}> affects only the
spacing of the isoquanls, not the curvature. Capital and labour are assumed freely and
continuously variable in unlimited quantities at constant costs of r and w respectively. The firm
can substitute between labour and capital along the isoquant without costs. It can also adjust the
scale of production to the optimum without adjustment costs.
When B and A grow at different rates, this affects the curvature of the isoquant. This will change
the optimal ratio of capital and labour. It can be shown that the relative change in the optimal
capital labour ratio over time depends on the relative changes in B and A, together with the
elasticity of substitution. Thus by constructing an optimal time path for B and -4, an optimal
time path for the capital labour ratio follows. The properties of 0 assure that there is an optimal26
scale of production. Thus the net revenue function depends exclusively on choices concerning
factor augmentation. Choices for the growth rate ofB and A determine time paths for AT and L,
and for production y.
Factor augmentation is assumed to proceed at a certain cost and there is a trade off between
capital and labour augmentation. For a flxed budget, it is assumed that there exists an innovation
possibility frontier, as in Kennedy (1964). Let a dot over a variable indicate a time derivative.
For one par/icn/ar rate of spending on technical advance A?, the maximal proportional rates of
factor augmentation which may be achieved are related through AM = #(£/B) = g(P), where P
is defined by the last expression and where:
Feasible combinations of proportional rates of factor augmentation are thus related a by
downward sloping concave function #(P), lying entirely in the first quadrant. Selection of a
value for P determines g(P) and thereby the direction of progress #(P)/p. In addition, it is
supposed that more spending on technical progress can shift the innovation possibility frontier
outward. The relationship between the expenditure of an amount Af and the position of the
frontier of feasible rates of factor augmentation is expressed by the function /i (Af). The function
/i(Af) is a nonnegative, monotone increasing, concave function of Af:
Putting the above elements together (scaling such that >>(Af) = 1) the expressions determining
factor augmentation are now as follows:
The firm maximizes the sum of discounted net revenues, subject to the constraints on the
improvement of technology. Given a demand curve for its products which is unaffected by the
behaviour of the firm, constant factor prices and a production function, net revenue /Vis a function
of B and A only. Let p be the constant discount rate, then the firm's object function is written
as: • 'i. •-..-:.-. -.. ,--•«. -..• .. • • • J
MaxZ= *"**(/V(A,B)-AfW;
Jo ••,.:•-.•••:••'•-,
• • -•: . • •' • - •••>. V
subject to: < - :
/4 =Aj?(p)/t(M) £=BP>i(Af) (8)
The model can be analysed using the Maximum Principle of Pontryagin. In order that the values
p and Af, for all time r, be optimal, there should exist continuous functions X, and Xj, such that
P and Af provide a maximum at every point in time t for the Hamiltonian:7fc«?rr rica/ feocikjf rowi^ 27
The transversality conditions must hold, implying that value of the cosiate variables X, should
approach zero as t goes to infinity. It is assumed that the discount factor p is large enough to
ensure convergence of (S) and the existence of an interior solution.
To determine p and Af, the Hamiltonian is differentiated with respect to these two variables and
the derivatives are set to zero. This yields:
(9)
The time derivatives of the costate variables are obtained by differentiating the Hamiltonian
with respect to the stale variables M and fl:
Using (4) and rearranging terms, this can be written as:
Kam ie n and Schwartz prove the second equalities above to hold (Lemma 5, op. cit., p.676).
Equations (12) and (13) say that in equilibrium, marginal benefits from factor augmentation
equal marginal costs. Thus, given that shadow prices of technical change X, go to zero as l goes
to infinity, these equations yield on integrating: ,
(14)
U5)28
These expressions are convenient, because the costate variables are expressed in terms of
quantities and prices only. We can substitute equations (14) and (15) into (8) and (9) respectively.
Equilibrium values of P and Af must satisfy at all times;:
r
f %"*•*£«** +Pƒ
Thus we have equilibrium expressions for the slope of the functions # and A. The changes in
these slopes over time can be traced, and since the general shape of the curves g and /i is known
from conditions (2) and (3), the changes in slope indicate the direction of the changes in the
optimal values of p and Af themselves. Therefore the time derivatives of (16) and (17) are
considered:
From (18) it follows that P will reach an equilibrium value when:
The stationarity of p" requires #'((}) to be stationary. According to (20), ^'(P) is stationary when
rAT/wL is constant This is the case when AT and Z. grow at the same rate. Kamien and Schwartz
prove (Lemma 4, op. cit., p.671) that in equilibrium the growth differential of AT and Z. is
proportional to the growth differential of A and B. Thus A and fl are required to grow at the same
rate. This implies that in long run equilibrium p° equals ^(P). Thus the equilibrium direction of
technical change is Hicks neutral and is independent of the long term factor price ratio [cf.
Kennedy (1464) and Samuelson (1965). which generate a similar outcome in a macroeconomic
framework).
The long run development of the optimal A/ can grow or to decline monotonously, depending
on the development of total costs. Kamien and Schwartz then continue to consider the stability
properties for the optima for P and Af These turn out to be dependent on the elasticity of sub-
stitution and on the cast function. ,..,-. .,77i«>irrira/ 6act#rr>und 29
The result of Hicks neutral technical change in equilibrium is not very surprising. Il is assumed
in this model that the two factors of production, capital and labour, have exactly the same
properties, and only differ in their prices. Capital and labour appear symmetrically in the pro-
duction function, they can be substituted for each other without cast, and they can be purchased
and scrapped without limit against a fixed price at any moment in time. To this model a
mechanism of induced technical change is added that takes care of compensating the factor price
difference by changing the productivity of the factors. The relatively more expensive factor is
made relatively more productive. If the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one (Kamien
and Schwartz (1969), p. 680), the relatively expensive factor will then be used relatively less.
This decreases the revenues from further investments in augmentation of that factor. The process
continues up to the moment that further augmentation of both factors yields an equal increase
in revenue. Then the symmetry between capital and labour is complete: factor augmentation of
both factors proceeds at the same rate.
2.4.2 The epidemic diffusion model
The second model to be outlined here is the most prominent and widely used model in the field
of diffusion studies: the logistic or epidemic model. This model has been introduced in economic
analysis over three decades ago [Griliches (1957)], and has in several modified forms been
employed extensively since then [notably by Mansfield (1961, 1968), Nabseth and Ray (1974)].
The mathematical representation of the basic model is very simple:
-.-*(.-5)
(21)
Here n, is the number of potential adopters of the innovation, who have already adopted at time
r, a dot indicates a time derivative, (5 is a parameter measuring the steepness of the diffusion
curve, the speed of the process, and W is the total number of potential adopters of the innovation
which is assumed to be constant in time. The model has been used in various fields. One
application stems from epidemiology where it is used as a description of the spread of a
contagious disease over a homogeneous population. Suppose that there is a population that has
N individuals, of which n, are ill at time r. The chance that one individual meets any other is p.
The chance on contagion of the disease equals the number of individuals that are ill, times the
chance that they meet another individual, times the probability that this other individual is
healthy. Together this gives equation (21). This differential equation can be solved:
JV (22)
' l+exp(-a-Pr)
Equation (22) is a sigmoid curve which has three parameters: P determines the slope, a the point
at which the curve begins, and W the ceiling that will be reached. A lot of empirical work has
sought to explain variation in these parameters over different diffusion processes, by relating
them to all kinds of economic variables, like profits, costs, cash flow, liquidity, etcetera. The
justification of the use of the logistic curve in economics has ranged from stressing some analogy
between the spread of epidemics and innovations to labelling the curve as a mere "summary of
the data" [Griliches (1957)]. A sophisticated use of the logistic model in a Schumpetcrian30
framework is presented by Iwai (1984). Iwai considers the appearance of a series of innovations
in the course of time and achance mechanism to describe imitation, assuming that "the probability
that a firm is able to copy a particular production method is proportional to the frequency of
firms which employ that method in the period in question." [Iwai (1984), p. 165].
The limitations of the model are generally recognized, however, and have been most thoroughly
analysed by Gold (1981), but also by others [Stoneman (1982), Freeman (1988), Coombs,
Saviotti and Walsh (1987), Rosegger (1986), Thirtle and Ruttan (1987)]. The main criticisms
arc of two kinds. First of all, the model lacks a decision theoretical basis: it "pushes aside many
of the more interesting theoretical questions - such as the nature of the adoption decision by the
individual enterprise - and substitutes a rather mechanistic hypothesis of behaviour." [Karlsson
(1988)]. Secondly, the model is rather rigid: post innovation improvements are left out of the
picture; the number of potential adopters is fixed; the group of potential adopters is homogeneous.
2.5 Issues in modelling the introduction of new technology
The model of Kamien and Schwartz, and the logistic diffusion model originate from two different
research traditions. The literature on models of induced innovation is firmly rooted in the
neoclassical tradition, with an emphasis on theoretical analysis of profit maximizing behaviour
under constraints. The Kamien and Schwartz model describes decision making behaviour of a
single firm, trying to optimize its future income stream by investing in improvement of its
technology. Technology is thereby identified with factor productivity. The model does not
specify explicitly whether this investment is in R&D, in ready to use technologies developed
outside the firm, in adapting technologies supplied by capital producers or in imitating com-
petitors. It only assumes that investment raises productivity and that there is a choice in both
extent of productivity improvement and mix over factors.
The literature on epidemic diffusion models is more empirically oriented, with less emphasis
on the analysis of firm behaviour and more eye for friction in the spread of information and for
adjustment mechanisms that operate in disequilibrium. The focal point of the analysis is a
qualitatively defined technology. The logistic diffusion model describes the changes in the level
of use of a production technique, an aggregate variable, leaving the decision behaviour of the
individual firm implicit. In this respect, it is similar to most models that describe a phenomenon
on the aggregate level that results from a variety of activities on the micro level.
The two models describe different aspects of the same phenomenon: the introduction of new
technology. The logistic model summarizes the outcome of this process; the induced innovation
model describes in general terms the optimal investment behaviour that could be underneath.
These two models appear next to each other here, not because one is to be presented explicitly
as the decision theoretic basis of the other, but because they constitute two ways of looking at
technological change in an industry. The spread of new technology in an industry involves two
dimensions: over «m^ a variety of/ïrwu in an industry go through a range of r^c/wo/ogica/ fcv*fo.
Thus there is variation over time in the technology dimension and in the firm dimension, of
which either model consider only one. The epidemic model picks out a technological level and
considers the number of firms that reach or pass this level over time. The model of induced
innovation considers a single firm and describes how it passes through different technological77i<ro/Yrica/ /wct^roufiJ 31
levels over time. Both approaches to the description of the introduction of new technology have
some illuminating features, and both have their blind spots. The rest of this chapter will be used
to shed some more light on some of these aspects, also in reference to other models.
2.5.1 Equilibrium or disequilibrium
Traditional explanations of economic development often assume that an economy tends to
progress along some type of long term equilibrium growth path, occasionally deviating tem-
porarily from this track in response to frictional imperfections. There are factors like time lags
in the adaptation of the capital stock, interest inelasticity of investment demand, limited factor
substitution and wage and price inflexibilities, which might lead to departures from equilibrium
growth. These factors are all of a technical nature, pointing at physical and organizational
limitations in the economic system, which hamper equilibrium growth, despite the tendencies
of rational agents to move towards an equilibrium.
Evolutionary economists, however, stress that the equilibrium concept by itself fails to capture
the essential characteristics of economic development. Economic dynamics are not to be
described as an equilibrium process, not so much because of the above frictional imperfections,
but, first of all, because of the existence of genuine uncertainty, and secondly, because of features
of economic behaviour itself: entrepreneurial behaviour by nature is an attempt to disrupt
equilibrium in search for new profits opportunities. Technological change is a central ingredient
to this view: it is both a source of this fundamental uncertainly and it is an important element
in competition, as already pointed out by Schumpeter. "In Schumpeter's framework it is dis-
equilibrium, dynamic competition (in the sense of 'imperfect' competition) among entrepre-
neurs, primarily in terms of industrial innovation, which forms the basis of economic-
development. Thus, the emphasis is on the supply side, that is, autonomous investments rather
than on demand induced accelerator investments or multiplier processes (demand push) as
driving forces in economic development." [Freeman, Clark, Soete (1982), p.31J.
This issue tums up, not only in studies on innovation, but also in research into technology
diffusion. In the context of the diffusion process, equilibrium and disequilibrium are terms
applying to dynamics at the aggregate level. Disequilibrium can refer to different things. First
of all, it may mean a deviation from equilibrium, some sort of stationary situation, due to
adjustment lags or delays in the spread of information. Metcalfe relates disequilibrium to
imperfect information and to adjustment time. In his words, the issue is "... whether diffusion
is to be viewed in terms of an equilibrium or a disequilibrium process (Griliches, 1957), whether
diffusion patterns reflect a sequence of shifting equilibria in which agents are fully adjusted and
informed, or whether, by contrast, they reflect a sequence of imperfectly perceived disequilibria
lagging behind the development of a 'final' equilibrium position." [Metcalfe (1988), p.561).
Disequilibrium development results when agents are not fully informed about and adjusted to
the changing circumstances. The use of the disequilibrium concept in this sense applied to
diffusion is to a certain extent arbitrary. The spread of information and the pnKess of adjustment
of agents may be called an equilibrium process itself. As Metcalfe notes in this respect: "... one
can tum any disequilibrium model into an equilibrium equivalent and vice versa by a suitable
definition of the information sets and perceptions of adopting agents." [Metcalfe (1988), p.561 J.32
Secondly, disequilibrium can mean a deviation from equilibrium, in the sense that there is an
inconsistency between planned behaviour and the diffusion process as it develops. There may
be two types of inconsistency. On the one hand, planned behaviour of a firm at some point in
time may be inconsistent with optimal behaviour at a later moment, thus leading to revisions of
plans over the diffusion process. This may occur in the diffusion process if adoptions of a new
technology generates new information that induces revisions of plans. On the other hand, firms'
planned courses of behaviour may be mutually inconsistent. Mutual inconsistency of plans may
occur in the diffusion process if information about competitors is incomplete. Note, however,
that disequilibrium at the aggregate level does not have to be at odds with rational or optimizing
behaviour at the level of the individual.
Dosi hints at the latter type of disquilibrium as he stresses the importance of the flow of infor-
mation which is produced and released during the diffusion process. In his view, feedback loops
from adoptions of innovations to further diffusion and further innovative activity are central to
the understanding of the process of technical change. He refers to diffusion dynamics as an
equilibrium processes, "whenever micro decisions are postulated to be rfci/?roaj//v conj/iffnr
and 'rational' microbehaviors all turn out to be fulfilled in their objectives". Conversely, dis-
equilibrium diffusion processes are "all those dynamics wherein (a) the 'attractors' of the process
change themselves as a result of the very actions of the agents - such as when there are
system-level increasing returns to technology adoption and/or (b) the diffusion process is
explicitly represented in terms of the trial-and-error efforts of the agents, which exhibit 'dis-
equilibrium behaviors'and deliver'disequilibrium signals'to other agents." (Dosi, 1991, p. 191).
The disequilibrium between individual plans and the resulting process of diffusion that Dosi
refers to is a consequence of particularly strong feedbacks, like the unforeseen emergence of
increasing returns, which account for a certain type of unpredictability of the future course of
the process: "Of course, if /w.wrivf /r«#>tfdto between adoption of innovations, their further
improvements, and the cost of acquiring them are important enough, this implies, in technical
terms, a source of non-convexity in the technological opportunities at the level of the firm, the
industry or the whole economy. We leave the world of a>«v<T£<wf to macro-level JO/UZ/WIS
and of equilibrium paths which can be defined independently of the acrwa/ technological and
economic history of particular clusters of innovations. On the contrary, we are in the path
dependent world ol 'Arthur (1983 and 1988) and David (1985), wherein the long term positions
of the system may well depend on even minor initial fluctuations, individual choices, institutions,
and policy measures." (Dosi, 1991, pp.198-199). Disequilibrium in diffusion, in Dosi's view,
is thus rooted in unpredictable externalities of innovation adoptions with such a pervasive effect
that they lead to radically different conditions in the further course of the process.
Finally, disequilibrium may imply a by-passing or a rejection of the notion of an equilibrium
path of diffusion as a point of reference altogether. This assertion may be related to a rejection
of the assumption of optimizing behaviour. Dosi seems to hint at such a view when referring to
'trial-and-error efforts of agents" and 'disequilibrium behaviors'. Nevertheless, disequilibrium
at the aggregate level in this sense, based on microeconomic 'non-optimizing' behaviour, does
not preclude a certain regularity in the pattern of diffusion, e.g. because the market works as a
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For the purpose of modelling, the first description of disequilibrium does not clarify a lot. as
already indicated. The second description, inconsistency of individual plans und aggregate
outcomes, seems an intuitively relevant characterization of disequilibrium in diffusion. It hinges
on the assumption of incomplete, heterogeneous and dynamically changing sets of information.
The problem is how to capture those incomplete, heterogeneous and dynamically changing
information sets in a model. One may distinguish between real unpredictability and limited use
of information. Numerous models are based on the assumption that agents do not make full use
of all available information represented in the model (e.g. money illusion and adaptive instead
of rational expectations), which may lead to inconsistency of agents" plans and periods of
adjustment. This is not fully satisfactory in modelling diffusion, since it leaves out the important
but unpredictable feedback loops from adoptions to innovations. Yet. the possibilities to deal
with these unpredictable factors are much smaller than those to model limited use of information.
In the next chapter, a firm model of induced innovation, based on the Kamien and Schwartz
model above, will be used to explore (disequilibrium) aggregate behaviour, where linns employ
heterogeneous information sets and make individually optimal but mutually inconsistent plans.
Lastly, the third description of disequilibrium applies in a certain sense to the epidemic diffusion
model, in the sense that no explicit reference is made to equilibrium. The course of diffusion is
expected to follow a regular pattern, which is asserted without being based on optimizing
behaviour or any other behavioural rule.
2.5.2 Exogenously or endogenously propelled diffusion
Diffusion of innovations and technical progress in firms are processes in time. The sequence of
events that makes up such a process can be comprehended in two ways. One can assume that
the process is driven by external factors, or that it is propelled endogenously. If ihe process is
driven by external causes, no event in the sequence is causally related to other events in the
sequence, the order of events is exogenous, time is exogenous, and so are the speed of the process
and the serial correlation of events. If a process in time is understood as a sequence of events
without internal cohesion, then its state at any moment in time can be described by a static model.
If the process is driven endogenously then there are feedback loops between the process as it
progresses and its own further development. In such a dynamic process, speed is endogenous
and the events have an endogenously determined sequence. To describe such a process one
needs to model the way every next event depends upon its predecessors; a description of the
state at any one moment has to take the history of the process into account.
A type of model where the diffusion process is described as a sequence of events, driven by
causes which may be either exogenous or endogenous to the diffusion process itself, is the probit
diffusion model [see e.g. David (1969, 1975), Davies (1979)]. The main assumptions of this
model are, 1) that there is a heterogeneous population of firms; 2) that a firm adopts the innovation
as soon as benefits exceed costs; 3) that there is full information on benefits and costs; and 4)
that gains change over time and/or costs of adoption change over time. These changes in gains
from and costs of adoption are both exogenous to the diffusion process in the probit model.
David describes the general features of the model as follows [(1969), quoted by Reinganum
(1989), p. 894]:34
"Whenever or wherever some stimulus variate takes on a value exceeding a critical level,
the subject of stimulation responds by instantly determining to adopt the innovation in
question. The reasons such decisions are not arrived at simultaneously by the entire
population of potential adopters lies in the fact that at any given point of time either the
"stimulus variate" or the "critical level" required to elicit an adoption is described by a
distribution of values, and not a unique value appropriate to all members of the population.
Hence, at any point in time following the advent of an innovation, the critical response
level has been surpassed only in the cases of some among the whole population of potential
adopters. Through some exogenous or endogenous process, however, the relative position
of the stimulus variate and the critical response level are altered as time passes, bringing a
growing proportion of the population across the "threshold" into the group of actual users
of the innovation."
Potential users of the innovation are assumed to differ in some crucial aspect, say size. If there
were positive returns to scale in using the innovation, then adoption at high prices would be
profitable for the larger firms only. Costs of innovation adoption, however, could change e.g.
because of increased competition or technical progress in the innovation supplying industry,
because of changes in wages or prices of inputs, but also as a consequence if the diffusion process
itself. As the price of the innovation would drop, adoption would gradually become attractive
for ever smaller firms. Suppose that a density function /(j/ze) describes the distribution of the
population of firms over different sizes. As adoption costs fall over time, or as firms grow, a
diffusion curve emerges (see Figure 2). Off course, the model may be refined by assuming the
adoption to influence profitability, and thereby growth. Thus the size distribution may change
endogenously. Beside size, the crucial characteristic determining the profitability of adoption
can be many things, but in the literature a couple of other variables have been singled out for
analysis: seaah costs, age structure of the capital stock [Karlsson (1988). p.23], prior beliefs
on uncertain benefits, transport costs and factor costs [David and Olsen (1986)], and risk-av-
ersion.
Figure 2: Th« probll model
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Generally two different elements can be encountered in the literature which are assumed to
explain the adoption of an innovation: changes in available information about the innovation
and changes in profitability of the innovation. In the prohit models mentioned above, changes
in profitability moves diffusion forward. Exogenous changes in information drive diffusion in
a model by Jensen [Jensen (1982)]. He assumes new information about the innovation to be
released every period. The information has a certain probability of being positive, if the inno-
vation is truly profitable, and a lower probability of being positive, if the innovation is in fact
unprofitable. The firm starts out with a prior belief about the qualities of the innovation and
adjusts its beliefs as new information accumulates. (>n the basis of its new expectations, the
firm can either decide to adopt the innovation or to wait for the next piece of information. It is
shown that it is rational for the firm to adopt the innovation, as the expected probability of
profitability exceeds a threshold level. The diffusion pattern then depends on the initial dis-
tribution of prior beliefs about the innovation.
The models reviewed here contain a number of elements that are appealing in the explunation
of diffusion. The decision to adopt depends on perceived costs and benefits, and variation in
adoption times is caused by the fact that there is a variety in firm characteristics. However, there
seems to be a limitation to this explanation of diffusion, in so far as the 'driver' of the process
remains outside the model. As Metcalfe states, stressing the spread of information: "The crucial
point here is that the information sets of the population of potential adopters are independent of
the number of actual adopters of the innovation. They may well change for other reasons but
these are unrelated to the adoption process jw.ve." [Metcalfe (1988), pp.564-565|. The process
of diffusion itself does not cause the generation of more or better information on the innovation.
Agents are fully informed about the innovation the moment it comes on the market. Thus fashion
and bandwagon effects, learning effects and reduction of uncertainty are not included as an
explanatory factor for diffusion. Moreover, not only a feedback loop from previous adoptions
to the current availability of information on an innovation may be important, but also feedbacks
from adoptions to profitability, possibly through other variables, like market shares and growth,
prices of inputs and outputs, supply of the innovation or incremental innovations. Therefore, to
model diffusion as driven by external causes might be to miss a substantial part of the process.
2.5.3 More on endogenously driven diffusion
Treatments that are explicitly concerned with feedback loops of the diffusion process to further
adoptions have emanated from game theory and industrial economics. This work has concen-
trated predominantly on identifying characteristics of firms, innovations and markets which are
likely to affect incentives to adopt, but has not had a significant impact on applied work. Two
types of feedbacks from adoptions can be distinguished: effects of adoptions on information
about the innovation, and effects on profitability of the innovation. In models dealing with the
first type, a mechanism of expectation formation or learning is presupposed. Expectations may
be defined as a set of possible outcomes, together with a probability distribution connected to
these outcomes. Learning is in this context the modification of expectations on the basis of
experience. In the present context, expectations are notions about the properties of a new
technique that can be formed before or after adoption. There will be expectations, on the one
hand, on the operating price, adjustment costs, performance and profitability of the innovation
and, on the other hand, on the further development of the new technology, both the possibilityof improvements and the chance of replacement by a more efficient successor [see e.g. Rosenberg
(1976)]. Firms can base their expectations on their own adoption of an innovation or on the
adoptions of others. In the latter case there are technology spill-overs.
Endogenous expectation formation on the technical quality of an innovation has been explored
in Stoneman (1981). There a learning mechanism is specified in a model describing the behaviour
of a single firm which every period adjusts its expectations concerning the performance of the
new production technology and accordingly chooses a 'portfolio' of production techniques
[Stoneman (1981)). The firm has an idea of profitability of the technique and an estimation of
the risk involved. Every period the firm uses the technology, experience build up, and the firm
adjusts its estimate of expected profit and variance accordingly, following the rules of Bayesian
statistics. According to Stoneman, "This is the closest we get to an 'economic' theory of
learning." [Stoneman (1981)]. The main elements of the model are a utility function that depends
positively on expected profit and negatively on the anticipated variance of the returns (as agents
are assumed to be risk averse), a Bayesian learning mechanism and quadratic adjustment costs.
Together, a choice of technique procedure, learning and adjustment costs produce an intra-firm
diffusion path.
In models dealing with the second case of feedback loop, profitability of adoption is assumed
to vary with the number of earlier adopters. Profitability can vary in two directions: it may
jfocmM/» ("• incwao'.a»; firmi-.ar<>.lal«r.in.l)v».rmi'.ofjvl^ntótï .Th/vficsf .£il]iiyvjr/ifU« .icJik/j}"
if early adoption leads to above normal profits, but further diffusion of the innovation puts a
downward pressure on product prices. The second, rising profits, may occur if there are network
externalities connected to adoption. An example of the first is the work of Reinganum [Rein-
gunum (1981 )|. She models the user side of the market for an innovation and abstracts from the
producer side. The innovation is a cost-reducing, capital-embodied process innovation, ex ante
firms are homogeneous, and firms have perfect information. Like in the probit model, firms
adopt us soon us gains from adoption exceed costs, and costs of adoption are assumed to decrease
exogenously. The gain from adopting decreases as the firm is further down the adoption queue.
It can be shown that under specific conditions on the costs of adjustment, strategic behaviour
can lead rr<wif? identical firms to adopt a new technology sequentially. In effect, in every period
a number of firms adopts, until the gains in profit equal the costs of adoption. The remaining
firms wait until the next period, when costs have decreased. This model assumes an exogenous
propagator of the diffusion process on the supply side of the market, but explicitly models the
influence of adoption on the profits of all firms in the industry. Thus, the mechanism that stops
adoptions, before full diffusion has been reached, is endogenous. Firms take each others decisions
into account when deciding to adopt, thereby capturing an important part of the dynamics of
diffusion. Stoneman considers this work particularly Schumpeterian in spirit, a feature which
he describes as follows: "The conception is that an entrepreneur innovates and the attractiveness
of attaining a similarly increased profit and the pressures on the costs of the old technologies in
a new regime encourage others to imitate, this imitation representing a diffusion process."
(Stoneman (1986. section 2)). * ' * «.••*••"-- -•«
Another way of endogenizing the fall of profit rates leading to further adoptions of innovations
is to explicitly represent the role of the supply side in the diffusion process. Changes in the
interaction of demand and supply lead to changes in prices and profitability, which again induce
changes in quantities demanded and supplied. The papers of Metcalfe (1981). Bass (1978) and
Glaistcr (1974). Stoneman and Ireland (1983). David and Olsen (1986) and Ireland and Stoneman
(1986) explicitly deal with the supply side in diffusion. The supply curve of the innovation may37
shift over the course of the diffusion process, on the one hand, because it is likely that there arc
decreases in costs of producing the innovation, as the producing firm goes down the learning
curve, and on the other hand, because supply may well be concentrated at the start of the diffusion
process but the market structure is likely to change from monopoly or oligopoly towards
increased competition as the innovation spreads and the threat of entry increases. A description
of the supply of innovations has been combined with some form of the epidemic model for the
demand side by Glaister, by Bass and by Metcalfe. Glaister makes the diffusion speed parameter
in the logistic model dependent on the price of the innovation and Metcalfe makes the size of
the total population of potential adopters price dependent. Glaister shows that, when monopoly
supply is associated with an epidemic demand model, the predictions of the model change and
the logistic curve no longer appears. Metcalfe shows that in his model the logistic curve can be
retained, however, only at the expense of assuming rising costs of producing the innovation.
Melcalfe's model is rather mechanistic in the sense that capacity expansion is a fixed percentage
of returns and is not explained as the result of rational firm behaviour. David and Olson (1986)
considers a probit model, assuming competitive supply of the innovation and learning on the
part of the innovation suppliers. This latter feature causes an endogenous fall in the supply price
of the innovation, inducing diffusion to proceed. Sloneman and Ireland (1983) also adds a supply
side to probit models. They model both monopoly and oligopoly supply of the innovation. This
allows them to endogenize the sales price of the new product, using the assumptions of profit
maximising suppliers and cost reduction as experience accumulates.
Both exogenous and endogenous forces drive the model of Ireland and Stoneman (1986). in
which they explore different types of expectations formation within the context of the probit
model [Ireland and Stoneman (1986), see also Stoneman (1987)]. On top of the probit structure,
where firms adopt a new technology once some characteristic surpasses a critical threshold,
different expectations formation regimes are imposed. Following Rosenberg, they distinguish
between expectations on price and on technological performance. The latter concerns the
exogenously given chance of obsolescence of the innovation. The former type is modelled as
myopic and adaptive expectations, consistent over or under estimation and perfect foresight.
Thus the price of the innovation changes endogenously over the diffusion process. The
expectations on the price movements are predetermined in the case of perfect foresight and
develop endogenously in the other cases. Two types of supply side are added to the model,
monopolistic and oligopolistic supply. Differences in diffusion patterns and welfare implications
are derived.
In the models above, every next adoption of the innovation exerted a negative externality upon
the other firms in the industry, by putting profitability under pressure. In specific cases, however,
innovation adoptions confer positive externalities upon other adopters. In such cases, a slow
diffusion is explained by the relative unattractiveness to adopt early. The profitability of an
innovation increases with its use, if there are network externalities. Katz and Shapiro (1985)
distinguish between three possible sources of network externalities. Firstly, externalities may
be generated through a direct physical effect of the number of purchasers on the quality of the
product (e.g. telephone or communication systems). Secondly, externalities may be generated
through an indirect effect of the number of purchasers on the quality of the product. This phe-
nomenon may be present when a good (hardware) needs compatible complementary inputs
(software) to put it to use (e.g. the number of computer or cd-player users has an influence on
the availability and quality of software resp. compact discs). Thirdly, externalities may arise38
when the quality and availability of post-purchase service for the good depend on the experience
and size of the service network, which may in turn vary with the number of units of the goods
that have been sold (e.g. a particular brand of car).
An important factor influencing the size of a network, and thus the scope of the positive
externalities, is the extent of standardization. Illustrative cases of efficiency losses, due to lack
of standardization, are to be found in computer technology, video equipment and car telephones.
A number of authors have dealt with aspects of this problem. Arthur (1989) considers competing
technologies and the possibility of lock-in; David (1985) describes the history of the rather early
standardization of the typewriter keyboard, leading to lock-in; Katz and Shapiro (1985) consider
the effect of consumption externalities on competition and the form of the market equilibrium
and deal with the compatibility decision of the firm; Katz and Shapiro (1986) consider the
technology adoption decision of firms when there are two competing technologies.
Returning to the models of section 4, it may be noted that both the epidemic diffusion model
and the induced innovation model of Kamien and Schwartz are dynamic models, in the sense
that in both models the time path, the order of events and the speed of the process which is
described, is endogenously determined. In the epidemic model, there is a clear feedback from
adoptions to further adoptions. As more agents adopt the innovation, experience grows, infor-
mation spreads and uncertainty diminishes. The number of adoptions in any time period, or
equivalcntly, the chance that any one firm adopts in any period of time, is a function of earlier
adoptions. The reason for diffusion is usually assumed to be the information feedback from
further adoptions. In the Kamien and Schwartz model, there is a feedback loop of another type.
Every period there is investment in technical progress Af in a direction characterized by #(p)/p,
and the effect of this investment on capital and labour productivity is related to all progress in
the past on which it improves, and to all progress in the future for which it will be the basis.
Note that in the epidemic model, the feedback is an externality, whereas it is not in the Kamien
and Schwartz model. In this last model, the environment is stationary and the firm takes account
of all effects from future adoptions of innovations in its current planning.
2.5.4 Optimizing or following routines
Whether one regards diffusion as a disequilibrium process, in one of the senses distinguished
above, or not, may be related to how the underlying individual agent's economic behaviour is
understood. The decision about adoption or non-adoption of new technologies is a complicated
matter, in which many cognitive processes and procedures play a role (as has been elaborated
in section 2 above). What is needed for the construction of a model with a microeconomic
foundation is a representation of the basic elements of this choice process. Two stylized
representations figure in the economic literature: behaviour understood as optimizing and as
roulinized. Optimizing behaviour is assumed in the game theoretic and probit models described
above; institutionalized behaviour, though not necessarily non-optimizing behaviour, drives the
traditional logistic models of Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1968).
The distinction between optimizing and roulinized behaviour is stressed by evolutionary
theorists like Nelson and Winter (1982). The traditional assumption is that agents optimize under
constraints. The constraints may be many and restrictive, but even if we abstract from part of
them, it is assumed that we still end up with a good approximation of economic behaviour.
Evolutionary theory questions the appropriateness of optimizing behaviour as a stylized39
representation of decision making, especially when modelling processes of technological
change. It claims that the constraints on decision makers arc so binding and restrictive, due to
the complexity of technological pmgress, the fundamental uncertainty involved in this type of
decision making, and the limited capacities of agents to oversee the consequences of their
choices, that a description of behaviour as being guided by routines and rules, or by iriul-and-
error, comes closer to reality. From this perspective, the observed order at the aggregate level,
the regularity of the diffusion path, is not produced by order at the micro level, but is the result
of diversity at the micro level, of learning by individual agents, in combination with environ-
mental selection. An environmental selection mechanism takes care of eliminuting inefficient
choices through competition. Models in which these routines and decision rules figure ut the
micro level can easily produce disequilibrium features, but under some conditions they yield
robust patterns of development at the aggregate level.
The choice to describe decision behaviour as roulinized rather than optimizing can be thought
of as a matter of practical concern, and does not necessarily have to be a consequence of a
fundamental difference in view on how agents decide. At issue is how much one should be
concerned with modelling rational choice, if the subject is so restricted in his capacities to act
optimally that it is likely that decisions will be guided by rules of thumb and guesses on the
basis of experience. It might be more practical for purposes of description and prediction, not
to bother too much about the motivation of the agent and his marginal profit calculations, but
to model common strategies, vested routines and rules of thumb.
A diffusion model that models firm's behaviour as institutionalized along these lines is the
simulation model of Silverberg, Dosi and Orsenigo: "Decision-making is incorporated on the
one hand in certain robust rules of thumb (for the most part feedback rules dealing with oli-
gopolistic pricing and production policies) and 'animal spirits' in the form of decision rules
governing replacement policy (the payback period) and expansion of capacity ('estimates' or
'guesses' of future demand growth corrected by experience)." [Silverberg, Dosi and Orsenigo
(1988), p. 1037]. In their model a new technological trajectory is introduced. Firms differ in their
evaluation of the prospects of this trajectory, notably the profitability of the new techniques that
will be developed along this trajectory. To take advantage of the new technology in the future,
it is important to build up the required skill level now. Thus, given expectations, it can be rational
to invest in new technology before it satisfies the usual efficiency criteria. By means of computer
simulations it is shown that, given divergent expectations, a rather chaotic pattern of adoption
decisions and market share developments evolves, in which some firms win the competitive
struggle, despite the fact that they were by no means first movers, nor last movers, in adopting
the innovation. A remarkable feature of the model is that, despite the considerable range of
microeconomic diversity and disequilibrium, at the aggregate level the S-shaped form of the
diffusion curve stands out
2.5.5 Discrete technologies or continuous technical change
Technological progress appears in a large variety of models, of which diffusion models and
adoption models are but particular classes. Generally, diffusion models describe the diffusion
of a specific innovation over a range of potential adopters. This innovation can be a new capital
good, some new type of machinery which is acquired by purchase from some manufacturer, or
it can be a new method of production that is developed in house. In both cases, the technology
which appears in the model is discrete. It is an innovation, qualitatively different from earlier40 C/iap/er 2
methods of production, pieces of machinery, or other. The innovation emerges on the market
and in the industry as an alternative to the traditional technique. A recurrent theme in diffusion
literature is the observation that in reality this sharp distinction between the new and the old
does not exist [see e.g. Gold (1981), David and Olsen (1986), Dosi (1991), Silverberg (1991)].
Mostly a new technology is being developed further after its first launch on the market. The
adopter who adopts first acquires something different than adopter who adopts last. Moreover,
it is important to recognize that this process of incremental development of the innovation is
not independent of the diffusion of the innovation. Innovation and diffusion are mutually
dependent processes. Diffusion is a precondition for learning by doing and learning by using
[Rosenberg (1982) |, and thus contributes to the accumulation of experience necessary for further
incremental innovations. This common occurrence of post innovation incremental improve-
ments, the gradual development of a dominant design [ Abernathy (1974)], has some implications
for modelling diffusion. Firstly, there is no clear dichotomy between innovation and diffusion
(as argued also in section 3). Diffusion entails further innovation on the part of both developers
and users. Secondly, post innovation incremental improvements make that the ultimate scope
of diffusion changes over the course of the process. The range of applications of the novelty
grows over time, and therefore the number of potential adopters increases.
Whereas most diffusion models, amongst which the logistic model, assume a sharp qualitative
distinction between the old and the new technology, and therefore confront us with the difficulties
indicated, models which identify technology with factor productivity, like the models of induced
innovation, are unable to distinguish between qualitatively different techniques. Thus, on the
one hand, many diffusion models are restricted because they assume a simple dichotomy between
the old and the new technique, and do not account for the interaction of diffusion and incremental
innovation. On the other hand, production function models generally cannot illuminate adoption
of innovations, because there is no clear distinction between qualitatively different techniques,
no representation of qualitative barriers which have to be overcome when firms switch to a new
type of technology. There are drawbacks to both a discrete and a continuous representation of
technological advance. Attempts to find a solution to these can be found in Iwai (1984), Metcalfe
(1988). Soctc and Turner (1984) and in Diedcren «-J. a/. (1990). In these papers, a distribution
of firms over a range of techniques is assumed, which is transformed during the diffusion process.
2.6 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to set the stage for the modelling exercises in the chapters
to come. In the first part, a general representation of an economic system has been sketched,
stressing the distinction between the real sphere of activity and the control sphere. It was argued
that technological change is a product of cognitive activity, and to model technological change
it is important to elaborate a representation of the possibilities of and constraints to activities in
the control sphere. Limitations to cognitive capacity introduce bounded rationality and are a
source of uncertainty. These arc important determinants for the direction and speed of tech-
nological progress.
Furthermore, some aspects of the phenomena of innovation adoption and diffusion were
highlighted. It was pointed out that innovations can have different characteristics, that they may
be either disembodied or embodied in different forms, which leads to a variety in transfer
mechanisms. Transfer may be through market channels or through other communication
channels and may or may not be actively promoted.77i* o/r ricaV fcact^row/ui 41
In (his chapter, two models which deal with the introduction of new technology, each from a
different perspective, have been outlined: a model of induced innovation and the epidemic
diffusion model. These models have been presented, because they will be referred to in later
chapters. To put them in perspective, we reviewed a number of approaches towards the
explanation and modelling of innovation dissemination, centred around four themes which have
commanded an interest in recent literature. Firstly, diffusion can be qualified as an equilibrium
or as a disequilibrium process; secondly, it can be seen as propelled by exogenous or by
endogenous forces; thirdly, individual behaviour can be thought of as optimizing or as roulinized;
fourthly, innovations commonly undergo further development during their diffusion, and thanks
to their diffusion. It was argued that disequilibrium in diffusion, understood as mutual incon-
sistency of firms' plans and deviations of realized diffusion from earlier plans, may be an
important phenomenon, because of the interdependence of innovation adoptions and information
generation. Possibilities to catch the feature of unpredictability of this information generation
process in a model are limited, however. Furthermore, it was asserted that there are good
arguments for the case that diffusion is driven at least partly by endogenous causes. Finally, it
was argued that the choice to model economic behaviour as either optimizing or as routinized
behaviour is a matter which should be decided in connection to the purpose of the modelling
exercise. In matters of technology adoption, agents may be severely constrained in their attempts
to optimize, e.g. by lack of information and restrictions in the capacity to evaluate information,
such that their optimal decision rules work out to be rules of thumb and guesses on the basis of
experience. Model complexity may then be reduced without much loss of predictive capacity
if routines are assumed instead of optimization under constraints.
A recurrent theme has been the relationship between successive innovation adoptions: how and
to what extent does one adoption influence the next. In particular, the question is whether there
is something inherent to the process of diffusion that accounts for the empirical regularity of a
(more or less) sigmoid diffusion curve. Some diffusion models are built on the assumption that
the regularity of the diffusion curve is caused by factors exogenous to the diffusion process
itself, e.g. by a regular (bell shaped) distribution pattern of decisive firm characteristics. Most
models, however, allow for an element of feedback from early adoptions to later adoptions.
Adoptions at present can influence later adoptions in different ways. A current adoption may
help to release information, because its introduction starts a learning process and experience
with the new technology is being built up. Moreover, a current adoption may affect the profit-
ability of the innovation. Mostly the expected profitability of adopting is reduced as diffusion
proceeds, but if there are positive network externalities, profitability may well go up with
diffusion.
If the regularity of the diffusion curve is inherent to the diffusion process, because these feedback
loops have a dominant influence on the course of the process, then one may wonder how
important it is for understanding the aggregate pattern to model adoption at the firm level. Some
evolutionary economists hold that regularity at the aggregate level is likely to result in spite of
irregular and complex behaviour at the micro level, because competition functions as a selection
mechanism « po«, rewarding some behaviours and putting a penalty on others. If diffusion
along a specific pattern of curve is a robust phenomenon, compatible with different kinds of
micro behaviour, then this might call for a 'process theoretical' explanation of diffusion, rather
than a 'variance theoretical' explanation. An understanding of the probability mechanisms at
the aggregate level might be more illuminating for understanding diffusion than a description
of firm behaviour.42
3. A model of firm behaviour
5.7
3.2




It has been argued in the preceding chapters, that models of technological change developed
along traditional lines are often based on restrictive premises regarding the availability and the
costs of dealing with information. In particular, many models abstract from both genuine
uncertainly and costs of information gathering and processing. Costliness of information
gathering and processing implies that one cannot assume that all agents have the same infor-
mation at their disposal upon which to base their decisions, and that there are costs to the decision
making process itself.
It is likely that in the case of adoption of a new technology by a firm, abstracting from uncertainty
and the costs of dealing with information leads to distortions in the representation of economic
behaviour. The process of deciding on technological change is often lengthy and costly, and
there is a certain degree of uncertainty involved. The decision to implement a new technology
is typically taken stepwise, and involves costs along the way: costs of studies and pilot projects,
learning and training costs, costs of capital investments and adjustment costs. As stressed in the
vintage literature, firms do not change their production capital instantly, the moment a (quali-
tatively) new type of capital good becomes available. They gradually switch to the use of new
capital goods, by investing every year in a new vintage of the new type of capital, and by
scrapping some machinery of the old type. This means that the firm invests over many years in
the change from one technology to the next, and may even start switching to its successor, before
finishing the switch to a specific technology completely.
The models in this chapter describe the investment planning of a firm at a certain moment in
lime. A firm is assumed to maximize discounted future income, by using two instrument vari-
ables, si/e of investment and 'direction' of investment. The direction of investment is a measure
for the ratio of capital deepening and capital widening, the ratio of investment in productivity
gain and investmenl in capacity expansion. The firm is faced with constraints, which express
its production possibilities and opportunities for technological change, and its restrictions in
buying inputs and selling output. The solution to this maximization problem is a time path for
the two instrument variables. The values for period one of this planned time path determine ihe
current actions of the firm. The next period, the firm is assumed to repeat the same procedure,
and to adjust its plans if circumstances have changed.modW o//irrn (ytawr 4?
The firm cannot take events which are fundamentally uncertain into account in its planning, so
the models cannot account for this aspect of the information problem (one could assume,
however, a relationship between perceived degree of uncertainty and the discount rate). The
firm assumes in its planning a certain regularity in future developments. The aspect of costliness
of information, on the other hand, can be represented in models. It is supposed that the firm
operates at a certain moment in time in a specific way. and that without a decision to change
the present course, firm operations continue as before: the same production volumes will be
produced with the same techniques. A change in operations only occurs, i! the firm takes a
decision to change. To do this, it has to invest in changing current routines. Thus there is no
change without costs, and the larger the change, relative to the current practise, the higher the
costs.
Information which is used in the process of planning is represented in the models as price
information. The firm forms certain expectations about prices of in- and outputs, and draws up
its investment plans accordingly. Technical information is treated as a commodity, as something
that can be generated or bought and on which investment funds are spent. Thus, whereas current
price information is freely available, technical information is considered proprietary and has a
price. This is expressed by a sort of production function for technology. New technology is
expressed as a gain in productivity of the firm, and this productivity gain in itself has u cost
which is independent of the technology of competitors in the industry. This means that we
abstract from technology spill-overs, bandwagon effects, costless imitation and learning from
competitors. This is a limitation of the model, and implies a partial disregard of the interde-
pendence of the technology in use in different firms over time, of the endogenous character of
technical change in an industry. A representation of this aspect is deferred to chapter 6, where
the perspective is shifted and technology itself will be the focal point of analysis.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the next section some additional assumptions on firm
behaviour will be considered. The model of Kamien and Schwartz (1969), outlined in section
4.1 of chapter 2, will serve as point of reference. The assumptions upon which the Kamien and
Schwartz model is constructed are amended, to fit the general framework presented so far. In
the third section, the basic model of firm behaviour is introduced. This model differs from the
Kamien and Schwartz model in specification and interpretation, but less in form. In contrast to
Kamien and Schwartz, we shall assume that the firm is tied to its own history in determining
its production volume and its production technique, and continuously invests in improvements,
given its current starting point. The methods and instruments to examine the characteristics and
implications of the model, used by Kamien and Schwartz, can still be applied. In the rest of the
chapter, this altered model then serves as a tool, that will be gradually extended and used to
examine the implications of our main assumptions on firm investment behaviour, on technical
progress and on competition. First, the nature and effects of technical progress will be highlighted
by contrasting the basic model with a model in which technical progress is absent (section 4).
This contrast can be used to examine the effect of expectations concerning opportunities for
technical progress for investment planning. Secondly, the concept of a technological trajectory,
on which technical opportunities are gradually depleted as time progresses, will be incorporated
in the model (section 5). Thirdly, the assumption of perfect competition is dropped and the
possibility of rivalry on input and output markets, through a price mechanism, will be considered
(section 6). Both the demand for the final product and the supply of the variable inputs will be
assumed to have finite price elasticities. Finally the process of competition will be illustrated
with the help of a simulation model (section 7).44
3.2 Firm behaviour -••••>vs *is> «OP-OF-, : : n
We shall assume that the firm maximizes future discounted profits under constraints. This
assumption is both very common and very general, and it seems warranted to spend some effort
on finding a sensible interpretation. Various answers are possible in this context on questions
like: what is a firm, whose are the future profits, what kind of constraints are relevant to the firm
and what can a firm do to attain its objective.
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3.2.1 The description of the firm
Consider the following characterization of a firm. A firm is a coalition of agents, related to each
other on a contractual basis, with the purpose of producing for sale, and thereby to gain an
income. It is a type of organization which exists because of the benefits to be reaped from division
of labour in production. There are differenl types of agents involved in such an organization, of
which share holders, employees and managers are the most important groups. There is a specific
distribution of decision making power among the agents, which is largely regulated by contracts
and by law. Generally the firm owns a number of assets, like capital goods, company buildings,
brand names, patents, licences and so on. In any period of time, the firm buys additional inputs,
like raw materials, energy and intermediaries, and uses those in combination with the services
of its assets for production. Beside that, the firm can invest in its assets.
The inputs into production differ in several respects, but for company planning the degree of
'fixedness' or 'variableness' is an important dimension. For our purposes, an input is defined
as variable, if it can be bought and sold on a current basis, if it can be substituted for without
costs of disposal.' An input is defined as fixed, if it cannot be disposed of. Thus, in the present
context, a factor of production is regarded as fixed, if its costs are sunk costs to the firm.* For
our purposes we assume a strict separability of variable inputs and fixed factors of production.
In reality, factor inputs can be variable or fixed to different degrees. To what extent an input is
variable, depends on the lime period under consideration. What is (quasi-) fixed in the short
run. can be variable in the long run. The degree of 'variableness' of a factor of production
depends first of all on the costs that the firm would have to cover if it would change or dispose
of them. The costs of alteration or disposal of an input of production depend on a number of
factors. On the one hand, there are the adjustment costs in the usual sense, which depend on
technical determinants and the existence of markets: there are costs of dismantling and selling;
for dedicated equipment or production facilities there may be no market. On the other hand,
there are costs which are determined by contracts and legal rules: labour is often a fixed factor,
because of rights to tenure. A second, probably more important, determinant of the 'variableness'
of a production input is the system of management and control within the firm, and the system
of provision of information. A firm can be thought of as an organization in which the management
is paid to take decisions on inputs and outputs, on the basis of all relevant information, in the
interests of the shareholders. The interest of the shareholders would be the maximization of
discounted future profits. However, from theories of managerial behaviour, from principal agent
theory, it is known that managers may pursue a variety of goals beside profit maximization, and
1 Consider electricity as an example: what is bought is also used.
1 Since we abstract from (he notion to the firm to cease production activities altogether and exit, there is no need
ban 10 distinguish sunk costs frost fixed costs along the lines of Baumol f» <J/. (1982).45
that information available to decision makers may be biased by those who provide it [see Mueller
(1992) for an attack on the profit maximization hypothesis!. Also, as pointed out above, in
matters of strategy and technology choice, there is likely to be such an abundance of a-levant
information, that not all information can be considered. Thus, whether an input is fixed or variable
is not a technical datum, a given fact. Rather, managers (fcri</r which strategic options to consider,
which technological choices to evaluate in depth, in short, which inputs to consider variable and
which fixed.' They do this on the basis of imperfect and partial information, and maybe with
other objectives in mind beside profit maximization.
Thus, for the sake of analysing the process of planning of activities in a specific time period by
a firm, we shall describe a firm as an organization, endowed with a set of fixed factors of
production (of which the costs are sunk), that maximizes future discounted profits by renting
or buying variable factors for production: the firm i.r a set of fixed factors and u.vo variublc
factors. Which inputs are considered fixed for a certain period depends not only on adjustment
costs, but also on a choice which is based on necessarily partial and imperfect information. Hit-
idea, that the first step in the firm's decision making process is to determine what is considered
variable and what fixed, reflects the notion of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality can be
understood as the a priori restriction of the dimensions of the search for an optimal choice (cf.
section 2.1, chapter 2). Information gathering and evaluating has a cost, and the costs are likely
to rise as more variables enter the decision making problem. Therefore, decision making pro-
cesses may be described as proceeding in two stages. First, variables that will be taken into
consideration are determined, and then, within the confines set by this a priori choice, an objective
function is maximized.
Notice that, by considering the firm as made up out of fixed factors, it is put in historical time.
The decision problem of the firm is largely determined by the fixed factors that are handed over
from the past. The management does not so much decide on the amount of capital and labour
they are going to employ, but on the way they are going to manage the firm as it already exists
and use the capital and labour that they have got under their command. The capital outlays and
labour force handed over from the past embody the firm's earning capacity, its value. The costs
of these outlays are, under normal circumstances, sunk and do not enter the decision problem
of management. . ,, • •; . ;» . t.:n> •/•'••' " ••:••••-•.•,..* r-., > ,•;.,•
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3.2.2 Some remarks on other descriptions of the firm
The implications for model construction of identifying the difference between fixed and variable
inputs as the main distinction in inputs relevant for investment planning can be illuminated by
recalling e.g. the model of Kamien and Schwartz (1969). There are two aspects of interest. First
of all, some remarks can be made on the relevance of the capital labour distinction. In production
a variety of inputs is used: equipment, buildings, raw materials, intermediaries, labour, energy,
etc. Within this diverse group of inputs, a distinction can be made between 'primary factors'
and 'other inputs'/ Productive factors, like labour and equipment, contribute to the production
process and earn a wage or rent for rendering productive services. Other inputs, like raw
3 Machines, buildings, whole production plants including workforce, may be considered either fixed or variable,
depending on the circumstances Under the threat of bankruptcy variables otherwise fixed may be considered
variable.
4 Other inputs are flow variables; productive services of primary factors are also (lows; primary (actors are
stocks: the capital stock, the labour stock and other asset slocks.46
materials, intermediaries and energy, are included physically in the final product or used up in
the production process. They do not render services and do not earn an income, but are purchased
and disappear as such in the process of production.
Production in a firm can be represented either as production of output, using various inputs, or
as production of value added, using productive factors. In macroeconomic models of a closed
economy, even when there are intermediary deliveries, the two representations are equivalent:
if every input is produced somewhere in the economy, total production of final goods is equal
to total value added. Total value added is divided among factors that deliver productive services.
This is known as the circular flow: the total revenue of production is distributed among the
productive factors in the economy, all payments are income to somebody. If one models the
planning options of a single firm, however, the two representations are different. To the firm,
the category of inputs that are used up in the production process do matter. There can be sub-
stitution or technical progress in the use of these inputs, and therefore these inputs should appear
in the decision problem of the firm. If the inputs like raw materials, intermediaries and energy,
are treated as given, the production function is restricted to be a function of productive factors
only, and firm production is just modelled as value added, then one omits part of the (opport-
unities for) technical change.'
Within the category of productive factors, it is common to aggregate every factor into either the
labour or the capital category, like in the Kamien and Schwartz model. This is a fruitful cate-
gorization, if one analyses matters of income distribution. A dichotomy between capital or labour
is useful, if income from capital lands up with other agents, and is spent in another way, than
income from labour. From considering demand for capital relative to that for labour, one can
make inferences about the determination and the stability of the income distribution, the division
of revenue between workers and capital owners, and its effects on economic development. If
one models the investment planning of the firm, however, the distinction between capital and
labour may not be appropriate to explain the decisions of the firm. To the firm it is total costs
of inputs that matter for profits, not whether expenses are wages, interest payments or costs of
raw materials. By investing in changes of production, the firm attempts to economize on every
type of cost, irrespective of its source [compare Sailer (1966), pp. 43-44].° In summary, in a
model of a firm's investment planning, it is inappropriate to restrict production to mean value
added, such that only productive factors are considered as inputs, and it not obvious why the
firm would let its decisions be guided by aggregation of inputs into the two categories capital
and labour. .
A second point to be made here concerns the consequences of distinguishing fixed and variable
inputs for the flexibility of the firm. In the model of Kamien and Schwartz, the firm is pictured
as an organization with a large flexibility. Its only constraint is a production function, which
describes the minimum required combinations of the inputs capital and labour, to produce a
specific amount of output. The firm is in no way constrained to a certain amount of output or
input of some kind. Every moment in time, the firm rents the optimal volume of capital and
labour inputs, to produce the optimal amount of output. As prices change, the firm instantly and
S To assume implicitly, that these inputs can be included into either the labour or the capital category, seems
also unsatisfactory These other inputs can be a major pan of the costs of the firm and there is no reason lo
assume that they have prices that move in line with wages or with the rale of interest • >
A There is a distinction between an imr.tfmf*/. which is a payment or a commitment now, in exchange for pro-
ductive services over a prolonged period to come, and a regular <WJ. which is a current payment in exchange for
current productive services or inputs An investment can lead lo fixed costs in the future, and wages can often be
seen as regular costs, bui the two are by no means the same.cosilessly alters its operations. The firm is flexible in two senses: there is costless and immediate
a4/Mjrmfnr <>ƒ ica/f of operations and there is costless and immediate .fu/umurion between the
two inputs capital and labour along isoquanis. Using this assumption of flexibility of the firm,
the unconstrained substitution and changing of scale, it is generally difficult to explain inter
firm differences in size, a competitive market with increasing a*turns, and slow diffusion of
technology, without ad Jwc auxiliary assumptions. Identifying a considerable part of (he factors
of a firm as fixed assets implies that the flexibility of the firm is limited by its own past.
Adjustments in scale become costly, because changes in the capacity of the fixed factors are
required. Substitution between variable and fixed factors is only possible in one dirvction, fixed
for variable, and requires investment. Thus, in a model of a firm's investment planning, it may
be more appropriate to assume that the firm has limited room for manoeuvre with respect to
output growth, because it is lied to its past, and limited possibilities for substituting inputs,
because part of the inputs are fixed. Moreover, changes in scale of output or factor ratios require
investments, and therefore time. .•.-..;• -...,,.„.,..-*-,-,"-.-,„
Summarizing the argument, one can state that the profitable employment of the fixed factors is
the goal of the enterprise and the use of variable factors is instrumental to the attainment of this
goal. The distinction between fixed and variable factors of production seems to be a most relevant
categorisation of production inputs, because the firm treats these categories differently in
working out an investment plan. Fixed factors are given, as they result from past operations.
Variable factors are employed to help the (owners of the) fixed factors to an income. The
categorisation fixed versus variable is not parallel to the dichotomy capital versus labour, since:
1) the larger part of labour and capital usually fall in the same category: they are fixed; 2) the
larger part of the variable factors, raw materials, energy, intermediate goods, are not included
in either capital or labour; 3) consequently, costs of variable factors are not the same as the wage
sum and costs of fixed factors are not the same as interest payments; 4) fixed factors are con-
sidered fixed, in the sense that their costs are sunk. Therefore the firm cannot substitute variable
factors for fixed factors, only fixed for variable factors.
3.2.3 The instruments of the firm and the technical constraints
Given the above characterization of the objective of the firm, now consider the instruments at
its disposal. For simplicity, assume that there is a stock of fixed assets, which require a specific
amount of variable inputs to be fully employed in production. In other words, there are fixed
technical coefficients and there is a fixed production capacity. Assume that there is no
depreciation nor technical obsolescence, that the firm sticks to its single homogeneous product
and that there is no under-utilization of capacity.' Under these circumstances, the management
of the firm can only do two things to pursue its objective. It can augment the production capacity
of the firm or it can raise the productivity of the variable factors, thereby decreasing the variable
costs per unit of product. The firm can expand or rationalize, invest in capital widening or in
•• . - - ^..' /.:< ^ -'>i1*'
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7 There are no quantity restrictions on product and factor markets and tbe marginal costs of producing at full
capacity do not exceed (he output price.48
capital deepening. The application of both these instruments has its price in the form of
investment. Given an amount of investment, there is a trade-off between using it for expansion
and for rationalization. Any investment adds to the stock of fixed factors.'
Technical constraints determine the effects of investment expenditures. These constraints can
allow for technical progress. Technical change in production function models is usually
represented by a move <?ƒ the isoquants. Substitution is a move a/o«# an isoquant and scale
adjustment is a move/rom one isoquant to another. Kamien and Schwartz assume in their model
that the first move is costly and the last two are for free and occur instantaneously upon price
changes. If one assumes, that the firm's technical constraint is not a neoclassical production
function, and that substitution and expansion cannot be free of costs, then the distinction between
technical change and other activities that result in a larger production capacity or in changes in
technical coefficients needs to be defined otherwise. A definition of technological change is
required, other than'a shift of the isoquants'.
Both in a situation with and without technical change, the firm can expand production capacity
and raise variable factor productivity.' Without technical change, capacity can be expanded by
enlarging the capital stock, adding another production line of the same machinery that is already
there. Expansion means doing more of the same. By contrast, in a situation with technical change,
expansion of capacity tomorrow does not occur in the same way as it happens today. With
technical progress, expanding gels cheaper over time, e.g. because equipment decreases in price
relative to its performance. Technical change implies that there is learning, that there is a
cumulative effect. The starling point for the technology of next period is the technology, the
knowledge and the skills of this period.'" For the change in variable factor productivity, an
analogous story applies. Without technical change, variable factor productivity can be raised
by substituting fixed factors for variable factors, e.g. installing some device in a machine to
make it more fuel efficient. This investment might be repeated in the same way on all machines
the firm uses. With technical change, a cumulative effect comes in again: e.g. an energy saving
method of production is developed and used with all equipment in the firm. Thus investment
necessary to decrease variable factor requirements by the same volume would decrease over
time. The future replacement of variable factors is cheaper than the present.
8 This description of the flim is related to Porter's ideas on competitive behaviour: "In a static view of competi-
tion, a nation s factors of production are fixed Firms deploy them in the industries where they will produce toe
greatest return In actual competition, the essential character is innovation and change Instead of being limited
K> passively shifting rcsoua-es to where the returns are greatest, the real issue is how firms increase the returns
available through new products and processes. /n.t/cuJ r>/.wn/Wy /na.rimirw# Hi»/ii/iyitc</ con.tfrdmM, f Ac <juf J-
ftod is A<m /i/mv ajn #uw compedmr cjiAunM^c /rom rAdflgui# rA; ro/u/ruinrs. Instead of only deploying a
fixed pool of factors of production, a more important issue is how firms and nations improve trie quality of
factors, raise the productivity with which they are utilized, and create new ones " [Porter (1990a). p. 21. italics
added)
9 Consider the following as an image. Given technological opportunities, investment in technology generates
(disembodied) 'MiMyvw/j' for production improvements. As current production capacity is larger, opportunities
to exploit these blueprints is larger Thus there are economies of scale and a 'cumulative effect . Without tech-
nological opportunities, investment is in 'ifkJcAuirry' The extent to which the result of such investment can be
used is independent from already installed capacity Therefore there is no cumulative effect, there are no scale
economics to this type of investment
10 '1TH' point could also be made as follows, using common symbols: K = aAT. where K is production, a is capital
productivity and A' is capital 1*1 / be investment and a hat over a variable indicate a relative change Expansion
without technical progress is an ()^<>/nfr increase in the capital stock. K = «AC + /), and (capital augmenting)
technical change is a rWdrivt increase in capital productivity, )' = o« 1 + a)A'. Given a price of capital, expansion
through investment / in extra machines has a fixed price If a relative change in capital productivity a also has a
fixed price, then expansion in absolute volumes through technical change gets cheaper over tune. In the Kamien
and Schwartz model, labour augmenting and capital augmenting technical change both have a fixed price.modW o/^nn /v/wviour 49
In summary, both in an economy without and in one with technical change, investment is required
to arrive at a larger output capacity or at lower requirements of variable factors. The difference
between the two regimes is the occurrence of a cumulative effect, of dynamic economies of
scale. If there is no technical change, the technical constraints to the decision problem in the
next period are the same as in this penod (abstracting from the possibility that opportunities for
substitution can run out). If there is technological change, then capacity expansion and raising
of productivity get cheaper over time. This happens, because the current expansion of capacity
takes advantage of learning from previous expansions. Investment goes into a productivity rise
of the capital stock, putting the firm in a better position to realize future productivity rises.
Technological change is thus a learning process in time, that can proceed at different speeds,
but that takes a course in which no steps can be skipped. This characterization of technical
change implies that technical change is only a meaningful concept in a dynamic framework. In
a comparative static framework expansion and substitution in absence of technical change cannot
be distinguished from expansion and substitution involving technical change.
So altogether two different regimes can be distinguished in this context, stable and progressing
technology, and under each regime two different choice directions are open to the firm, econ-
omizing on variable input requirements per unit of output and expanding output capacity. Given
progressing technology, one can distinguish between fixed factor (or stock) augmenting
technical change and variable factor (or flow) saving technical change. Given stable technology,
one can distinguish between plain expansion and plain substitution.
3.2.4 Conclusion
The preceding discussion can be summarized in a number of statements:
1. For the analysis of the investment planning problem of the firm, the most relevant distinction
between groups of inputs is between fixed and variable inputs. No method has been proposed
above about the way total inputs are divided into these two categories, only some factors
which might be of influence have been indicated. Given this division, the firm is assumed
to optimize an objective function.
2. Abstracting from obsolescence and assuming positive profit opportunities at current output
levels, there are two courses of action open to the firm: expansion and rationalization.
3. For any change in present operations, be it the expansion of production or the decrease of
variable input requirements, investments are required.
4. If there is technical change, investments have a cumulative effect.
With these things in mind, we now turn to the Kamien and Schwartz model, presented in section
4.1 of chapter 2. Their model is specified in accordance with the fourth point: factor productivities
rise as a consequence of investment and this results in higher factor productivities to start with
in the next period. However, the model does not accord with the first three points. Firstly, the
difference between fixed and variable factors of production is not accounted for: in their model
all factors are variable. Secondly, the firm has also two basic instruments, but different ones
than those proposed here: the firm is principally occupied with dividing its resources between
producing a higher capital productivity and producing a higher labour productivity. Thirdly, the
firm expands, contracts and substitutes between capital and labour automatically, freely and at
once.50
3.3 A basic model of firm behaviour
Assume that there is a firm in existence at time / = 0. At this moment, the firm is characterized
by a certain output capacity K„ and variable factor requirement V„, determined by its present
stock of fixed factors and variable factor productivity. Assume that product prices and factor
prices are constant and given (this assumption will be relaxed in section 6 below). Given
opportunities for technical change, the management draws up a plan at time zero for future
investments in enlargement of capacity and in raising variable factor productivity.
A firm's plan can be biased in either direction. On the one hand, a plan can be geared pre-
dominantly toward capacity expansion through investments in new production equipment, which
embodies new technologies. These capital investments, given a certain variable factor
productivity, will in general require additional variable inputs to be purchased or hired. This
can require investments in training and reorganization, which are then complementary to the
instalment of new capital goods. On the other hand, a plan can be aimed mostly at saving variable
factors, by putting the accent on training of employees, streamlining of the organization, raising
efficiency in the use of resources. Investments in new tools and equipment are then instrumental
in attaining a higher variable factor productivity. Given real world technological opportunities,
expansion and rationalization usually go hand in hand. In general, any expenditure plan affects
both plant capacity and variable factor productivity, but all feasible plans will usually be biased
in either one or the other direction.
Let the size of total investment in value terms at lime f be M, (or equivalently, let the volume
bc M and the price be unity and constant over time) and let the function to(M,) determine the
effect of investment on expansion and variable factor productivity change. More investment
will generate larger effects, but the marginal effect of investment on expansion and efficiency
improvement is assumed to diminish. Thus we assume that /i (M) is upward sloping and concave
[compare the Kamien and Schwartz model in section 4.1 of chapter 2]:
) (1)
For convenience, the lime index r of these variables has been suppressed.
For every amount of investment, the firm can invest in both expansion of capacity and in
improvement of efficiency, such that a choice for more of one implies less of the other: there is
a trade-off between expansion and rationalization. We assume that this trade-off can be repre-
sented by a Kennedy-type technological progress frontier, a function g(P), such that for the
value of M for which /i(M) = 1, if the rate of expansion at time r would be chosen to be P,, the
maximum possible rate of productivity improvement would be #(p\). The ratio of g(P) and P,
of productivity improvement and expansion, can thus be called the direction of progress of the
firm. The restrictions on #(p) are the same as in the model of Kamien and Schwartz, i.e. #(P)
is downward sloping and concave:
p*0; j?(P)^O; s'(p)<0; *"(P)<0 (2)
Let production at time r be expressed by K, and variable factor demand at time r by V,. The price
of output is called />. the price of variable inputs *, and the constant discount or interest rate is
p. Assume that capital markets are perfect and that a constant interest rate is expected. Let the
present period be indicated by 0 and let the planning horizon of the firm be period 7". The problem51
of the firm is lo choose an optimal path for the amount and direction of investment, such that
the present value of future income is maximized. Future income equals future cash Hows, minus






The time index r is not suppressed as index to K, and V,, because these variables will be used
below at times with other indices. For the moment, all variables except prices are time dependent.
The variable y stands for variable factor productivity. The cost of a relative expansion of output
equals p/i (A/). The expression g (p)/i (M) stands for the rise in the productivity of variable factors
of production. Equations (4) and (5) can be combined to give:
(6)
Notice the differences with the model of Kamien and Schwartz in section 4.1 of chapter 2: capital
does not appear in the objective function and expansion of output is constrained by costs. The
same optimal control method of solving the model that was used by Kamnien and Schwartz can
again be employed (see appendix). This yields with respect to the direction of investment:
The numerator in the second term of the right hand side of equation (7) is the present value of
future output, and the denominator is the present value of future costs of variable inputs. Together
this term is some sort of intertemporal variable factor productivity. The slope of #(P) in the
optimum is negative, given that the present value of future output is larger than the present value
of future variable costs, i.e. given that the present value of the future cash flow is positive. The
larger future revenues, relative to future costs, the higher intertemporal variable factor
productivity, the higher the optimal P and the lower the optimal g(P), hence the more the firm
will invest in expansion. The lower intertemporal variable factor productivity, the more the firm
will invest in rationalization. The optimum must be the value for which is marginal revenue of
investment in expansion equals marginal revenue of investment in rationalization.
With respect to the amount of investment we find:•*>«»«** Oïapter J
(8)
Investment is expanded until the marginal revenue of investment (which is Ji'(Af) times the
denominator in the right hand side of equation (8) above) equals its marginal cost. The optimal
amount of present investment rises as the present value of future output rises. The effect of a
rise in present value of variable costs on the optimal amount of investment depends on the
difference between B and g(B). If in equilibrium B > g(B), then an increase of investment ra»»
total variable factor costs, because the rise in variable factor productivity cannot compensate
for the rise in variable factor demand due to expansion. If in equilibrium B<g(P), then an
increase of investment «frcrawM total variable factor costs, because the rise in variable factor
productivity more than compensates for the rise in variable factor demand due to expansion.
Therefore, if in equilibrium B > #(B) (i.e. the equilibrium direction of progress is biased toward
expansion), a rise in the price of the variable input would decrease the optimal amount of
investment, and if B < #((}) (i.e. progress is biased toward rationalization), it would increase the
optimal amount of investment.
.d
We trace the behaviour of the optimal path for B, taking the time derivatives of equation (7): f
,V.) •'"'-'" (9) 1
To determine the long term equilibrium value of p. we equate equation (9) to zero:
py (10)
O <> *'(p) lf
When the derivative #'(B) is constant, then B is also constant, and so must be the ratio of total
revenue PK, and variable costs * V,. This ratio is only constant, given that the firm invests
(Af > 0), when production K, and variable factors V, grow with the same growth rate:
(11)
0 f
In equilibrium there will be no investment any more in productivity increases, only in capacity
expansion. Proof of the stability of the above equilibrium solution is given in the appendix.
1
To see what happens to the budget for investment M,, consider the time derivative of equation
(8):
This expression can be used to trace the development of the optimal investment budget:5S
Let us consider the development when (} has reached its long run equilibrium value and # ((J) = 0.
Since /i'(A/) > 0 and /i"(Af) < 0, the condition for an ever growing budget Af in the long run is:
That this condition is always fulfilled, can be seen by considering the following inequality:
H-V.) """ (15)
The inequality holds because, since #(3) = 0, />K, -wV, grows over time. Thus, in long run
equilibrium, ever larger amounts are spent on capacity expansion, without improving variable
factor productivity any further.
This completes the outline of the reinterpreted model of Kamien and Schwartz, describing the
intertemporal decision problem of a firm, confronted with opportunities for technological
change. Given the restrictive assumptions of stable prices and fixed costs of technical progress,
a firm will invest progressively more in capacity expansion, both in relative and in absolute
terms.
3.4 Technical change as a cumulative phenomenon "
Both the result that in the long term it will be optimal to invest only in capacity expansion, not
in raising variable factor productivity, and the result that the optimal investment budget is ever
expanding, are in conflict with intuition about real world situations. They arise because we
assume, following Kamien and Schwartz, an extreme type of technological opportunity, in
combination with price rigidity. Expressions (4) and (6) say that a re/arive expansion of pro-
ductive capacity and a re/a«vf rise in variable factor productivity have a fixed price. Technical
change can be pursued indefinitely for the same price. Nonetheless, we assume that the firm is
a small agent in large and stationary markets, such that a decrease in production costs or an
increase in variable factor demands is not translated into lower product prices and higher input
prices.
In the next sections we shall adjust the specification of the model, to take account of these two
features, such that continued technical advance gets progressively more expensive and such that
prices react to changes in supply and demand. In this section, however, we shall retain the model
as it has been presented as a bench-mark, and use it to clarify the cumulative character of technical
change and to contrast technical progress with a situation of stationary technology.54
3.4.1 A model without technical change
In the model of section 3 the firm faces opportunities for improvements in technology into the
indefinite future. In this section, a model will be specified in which there is no technical progress,
in which investments have no cumulative effect. In this model, the firm's moves are restricted
to plain expansion and plain substitution, as defined in section 2. The actual possibilities of a
firm in a real world situation must be somewhere in the middle: there is always some scope for
introduction of improved technology but some investment will just go into doing more of the
same. Therefore management, in drawing up their investment plan for the future, will consider
these extreme models as bench-mark cases. Let us consider the decision problem for a firm,
assuming no technical progress whatsoever.
.. „ . -._ (16)
MaxZ Jo
subject to:
, . V'o (18)
V', = P. — - Voff(P)/i(M) = V„(P-£(P)Vi(M)
'0
The constants K,, and V,, take the place of the variables V, and V,. Equation (17) says no more
than that an expansion of output always has the same price. Equation (18) says that demand for
the variable factor of production changes by a constant times (P-^(P)Vi(M). Variable factor
requirements grow because of expansion and they additionally decline due to substitution. The
model can be solved along the same lines again (compare equations (7) and (8)), yielding:
/To 09)
Assuming the lime horizon 7 to be distant, then #'(P) and >i'(Af) are independent of time. The
investment budget is fixed and the ratio of expansion and substitution is constant over time.
Both depend on prices and constants only.
We can compare the two situations described above, the occurrence of technical change and
absence of technical change. First we will compare both models with respect to the ratio of
capacity expansion and change in variable factor requirements, then with respect to the budget.
We have seen that:A mode/ o//Jnn JwAovtour 55
(21)
f %
Here the index m stands for with technical progress and z stands for without. By comparing
these two expressions it can be seen that #'(p) with technical change is always smaller than
without technical change, because the integral in the denominator will at most grow just as fast
as the integral in the numerator. This is the case when P is at its maximum and #(p) is zero.
Starting at r =0, however, it is expected that for some time £(P) will be positive, and thus PK,
will grow faster than w V,. Since #'(P) < 0 and also #"(P) < 0. it follows that without technical
change p will always be smaller and #(p) be larger than with technical change.




As time goes to infinity, the investment budget of the firm faced with technological change will
rise indefinitely, as shown above. The investment budget of the firm without technical change
is (nearly) constant, independent of time. Therefore, in the long run the investment budget with
technical change will exceed the budget without. In the short term, under particular circum-
stances, the investment budget without technical change can exceed the budget with technical
change. Since /i'(A/) > 0 and /i"(M) < 0, it follows that as M grows /i'(A/) geLs smaller. The
condition for a larger A/ without technical change at time f is:
M,) <=> (23)
The inequality holds only if #(p) and prices /* and w would be such that e.g. for some time P = 0.
The fact that it holds under these conditions is due to the rigid specification of the possibilities
for substitution: the firm can substitute fixed factors indefinitely for variable factors, in exactly
the same way and for the same price. In section 5 we shall come back to this problem. In general,
however, the investment budget will be higher if there is technical progress, and in this section
it is assumed that this is permanently the case.
3.4.2 Technological expectations
In this section, the two models presented above will be used, one describing a situation with
technical progress and the other with a stable technology, to investigate the planning process of
the firm and its outcomes. The models describe the planning process of the management of a56 C/wpfcr 5
firm at time zero. The management decides on a path for the investment budget and on a path
for P and #(p), the mixture of expanding capacity and reducing variable inputs per unit of output.
The firm calculates its investment program and starts it at time zero. Suppose that, since changing
firm strategies and investment plans is a costly matter, the plan is recalculated only at the
beginning of lime r »0.
The management takes its decisions concerning (3 and A/ on the basis of its perception of the
slate of technology. If it is perceived that the firm is operating at the beginning of a technological
trajectory, then it is expected that investment can result in productivity rises, in lasting effects
through learning. Investment is supposed to have a cumulative effect. In this case the firm's
planning problem is more closely described by the model w/r/i technical change. If, on the
contrary, the management is pessimistic about the future of the present technological path, then
they do not expect to go down any learning curve or experience any cumulative effects. They
interpret the situation more alike the one described by the model w/7/iou; technical change.
The decisions of the management will be different, depending on how they judge the situation,
more alike the one or more alike the other version of model. As the management sees possibilities
for technical change, it will start to expand capacity at the expense of investing in variable factor
saving. As technological outlooks are favourable, firms do not want to miss any of the new
developments, because learning now is important for future performance. Variable factor saving,
however, gets much more emphasis when the technological outlooks are dim. In that case the
argument of learning does not apply. The firm tries to improve its margins by rationalizing, by
replacing variable by fixed factors of production. The increasing adjustment costs, expressed
by the concavity of/i(M), force the firm to proceed gradually, but by and by substitution lakes
place.
Expectations can be confirmed by experience or they can be disproved. In our context we can
distinguish between four situations: technological change is expected or not, and the manage-
ment's expectations turn out to be right or wrong. The situations can be grouped in a matrix.
For each situation we can find an expression of what happens to output, variable factor
requia-menLs, variable factor productivity and profits. Let us look at output at time r, where f is
such that the firm is still on its planned investment scheme initialed at time 0, and has not revised
its plans in the light of new information. In that case, for the four possible combinations
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It can easily be seen that technological change always results in higher output than no technical
change, whatever the expectations, since K, grows with technical change. Also, the expectation
of technological change always results in higher output, whether there is in fact technological
change or not, since both P and the budget M are higher when technological change is expected.
Next we look at variable factor requirements:
T«bk 2: Variable Input req«lrementi
t c no i c
LC expected V.+ f' V,(p, -* (p,)V»(Af,)Jj > V„ + V„ P(P, - J?(P,))A(M,WJ;
Jo Jo
V(A) V(A)
ic not expected .) f' V,<fc
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Technological change, whether expected or not, increases variable factor demand. The expec-
tation of technological change, whether right or wrong, in general increases variable input
demand also. Only if P, -g(P,) < 0 and /i(MJ »/i(M.), the expectation of technological change
could lead to lower variable factor demand. In other words, an expected progress in technology
will induce firms to expand their investment budgets and shift their efforts to a larger expansion
in output capacity, relative to economizing on variable inputs: p/#(P) rises. If, however, on
balance the firm would decrease variable input requirements in absolute terms, because P < # (P),
the higher investment budget when technical change is expected might over-compensate the
higher p/g (P) ratio. Given the assumptions about a stable environment, expressed in fixed prices,
the message is clear: optimistic expectations about technical progress boasts the economy, and
so does actual technical change. It stimulates production, variable factor demand and investment.
Now we turn to variable factor productivity K,/V, (see Table 3). In general, the ordering of the
numerator is the same as the ordering of the denominator. However, it is easy to see that if there
is technological change, whether it is expected or not, then output will grow faster than variable
factor requirements. Variable factor productivity increases if there is technical change. The
influence of expectations, on the contrary, is not clearly determined. In case there is no tech-
nological change (the right column), the condition under which productivity will grow faster if
technological change is not expected then when it is expected, is:
(24)
»*(&)* (M«)
This condition holds, given that the budget is larger and P is larger when technical progress is
expected. Determination of what happens when technological change does occur (the left
column) is impossible in general terms. There are effects and counter effects and it cannot be
determined in general what the outcome on balance will be. The situation can be such that the58
expectation of technical change leads to a higher variable factor productivity than if the technical
change comes as a surprise. Then, overlooking the whole matrix, it can be concluded that the
right expectation leads to higher variable factor productivity and wrong expectations depress
variable factor productivity. However, the situation can also be reversed. The circumstances
can be such that the expectation of technical change leads to a lower variable factor productivity
than if technical change comes as a surprise, since the expectation gears investments toward
expansion.
Table 3: Variable factor productivity
Lc. no t.c.
i.e. expected




Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the expectation of technical change, irrespective of whether
it is justified or not, could depress variable factor productivity. The prospect of technological
udvunce makes the firm willing to accept a more wasteful use of variable factors like energy,
raw materials, intermediaries and labour, than otherwise, in exchange for the chance to get
acquainted with new production techniques.
Finally, profits under the four different regimes could be ordered. It then turns out that, profits
an* higher with technical change than without, and they are higher with the right expectations
thun with the wrong ones.
In this section two models representing bench-mark cases were compared. The one model
portrays firm planning in times of relentless technological progress, the other model describes
firm planning in times of stationary technology. The models were then used to explore the effects
of technological expectations on production, variable factor demand and variable factor pro-
ductivity. The model shows that the expectation of technical progress can depress variable factor
productivity, first of all when technological progress is rightly expected, but even more so when
it is wrongly expected.
The above approach might help to interpret the investment policy of firms in sectors with
irregularly developing technology. An example might be found among firms in micro-elec-
tronics. In the semi-conductor industry there has been a shake out of producers and a wave of
reorganizations taking place in the recent past. It all started with high technological expectations:
chip technology was supposed to move very fast. This could be an argument to invest rather
massively in this technology. As in our model, it was assumed that the benefits of the investment
are in the learning effects, not in the immediate results: investment puts one in a better position
for the future. So, given technological expectations it is thoroughly rational to expand capacityo//inn
fast, although this could imply a relatively larger expansion of the variable factor requirements
and less economizing on their use. This keeps productivity below the level that would have been
attained when expectations were more moderate. In case the technological expectations happen
to be unjustified, the firm ends up in the least favourable corner of the matrix. Both variable
factor productivity and profits go down to the minimum values. Exaggerated expectations might
thus easily lead to falls in profits. The situation might even be aggravated, when price effects
would be included in the model. If many firms have optimistic expectations and expand rapidly,
overcapacity is bound to put prices under pressure, depleting profit margins further.
3.5 Depletion of technological opportunities
The firm model presented in section 3 suffers from its rather strong assumptions on the per-
sistence of technical progress. This leads to unlikely conclusions about developments in the
long term: ever larger amounts are invested, exclusively in capacity expansion. In this section,
the constraints describing technological progress will be modified, such that a decrease in the
perceived opportunities for technical progress, and finally even a limit to further exploitation
of a technological trajectory, are incorporated. The specification of the constraints as they stand,
is such that there are decreasing returns to scale of investments in technical change in time, at
some period /, but increasing returns to scale mrr time. This explains why it is mosl profitable
in the long term lo expand capacity only. The larger the gap between total revenues and total
variable costs, the more profitable it is to increase capacity at the expense of less increasing
variable factor productivity. But, the more expansion, the larger the gap. After a while the gap
between total revenue and variable costs gets so large, that a percentage expansion of capacity
is always more profitable than raising productivity, whatever the costs.
The assumption of a constant price for a relative improvement is in conflict with common
experience, as expressed in Wolffs Law. As Freeman notes: 'Wolff was a German economist
who in 1912 published four "laws of retardation of progress". Essentially, he argued that the
scope for improvement in any technology is limited, and that the cost of incremental
improvement increases as technology approaches its long run performance level.' |Freeman
1980, p.216 note 2], In general, technical improvements get progressively more expensive, as
easy solutions start to be exhausted. One can in this context recall the concept of a technological
trajectory. As a firm proceeds along a technological path, based on a specific basic innovation,
it gradually depletes the possibilities for further improvement Only when a new basic innovation
is launched, new profitable possibilities for advancement arise.
All this does not imply that technical change on the aggregate level also gets progressively more
expensive. In the economic system as a whole, new technological trajectories open up at irregular
and unpredictable intervals. The point is here that the appearance of any specific basic inno-
vations, necessary for the firm, is highly uncertain and cannot be planned by the firm. An analysis
of the problem is also provided by Evenson and Kislev [referred to by Binswanger, 1978, pp.
92-97], who describe research as a sampling process. Magat (1979) tries to improve upon the
Kamien and Schwartz model, arguing that' [..] the current values of the augmentation parameters,
A and B, summarise the past R&D expenditure pattern, and thus the position of the frontier
should depend upon their values.' The innovation-possibilities frontier is then made dependent
on factor augmentation parameters A and B in the following way (compare equation (4) in
chapter 2):»-u; Chapter J -AÜÖ»
Allowing for exhaustion of innovative opportunities can introduce a bias in the direction of
technical change. Magat's adjustments of the Kamien and Schwartz model are not completely
satisfactory, because they do not allow for an analytical solution of the model. In this section I
shall attempt to introduce an approximate expression of Wolffs Law in the model, which does
allow us to solve the model.
The age and the technological level of the present capital goods, as well as the history of expenses
on R&D are given for the firm at the time of decision making. They enter the formulation of
the decision problem of the firm through the constraints. The technological level inherited from
the past determines the possibilities in the future. A way to insert this into the model would be
to make the effectiveness of investment dependent upon the history of investments. We expand
the model as follows: ^ te;?it;>«t •*( ü;* - :, /{ Ij^-au!':-';,:J ro -•<.('!
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Assume that the firm pixxeeds on a technological trajectory, and progress becomes more
expensive as the limits of the trajectory are nearing. The variable t can then be an index for the
'technological level' of the firm, relative to its trajectory. As t rises, the distance of the firm to
the end of its current trajectory decreases. Thus the present 'technical position on the current
trajectory' t determines the effectiveness of investments in technical progress. A switch from
an old technological trajectory to a new one would be expressed by a quantum jump of t
downward. The index for the technical level itself must grow as the firm invests more in technical
advance. A measure for the advance in a certain period is the effectiveness of investment in that
period, expressed by the function A(M,T). Therefore this function is assumed to determine the
change in technical level.
An important question is, how exactly the technical index t determines the speed of technical
progress >i(A/,t). It can be argued, that at first there might be some increasing returns to
investment in innovation along a new technological path, but the longer innovation along the
same technological trajectory proceeds, the less effect investments have on productivity and
capacity. Thus the second derivative of A (Af. T) with respect to t must be negative. This condition
ensures that >t (A/. t) will decrease and approach zero as t increases, indicating the end of possible
progress along the current trajectory. When the model is being solved (see appendix), it turnse>//ïnn WumVwr 61
out that £ '(P) remains the same as in section 3, indicating that with this specification the direction
of technical progress is not influenced by depletion of technical opportunities. The derivative
of /i(M, T) with respect to A/ turns out to be:
,-* (30)
The change of this derivative in time is:
From this expression we can try to trace the development of the optimal investment budget:
The change of the slope of /i(W,t) over time is attributable to a change in the optimal budget
W and to a change in the position of the function /i due to increasing technical level t. The




Now assume, for mathematical convenience, that /i(A/,x) is a separable function:
/i(Af,x) = /»,(A/)/i2(x). In that case we can write:
* A = W» = **,*
Substitution of equation (35) reduces (34) to:
Like in the previous section we can substitute for A* and evaluate the inequality at #(P) = 0:
wV,) .-,.. ' 07)62
As the firm approaches the technological frontier, A, is negative, going to minus infinity, and
/i« is positive. A>K,-wV, is finite in finite time (and might only go to infinity as time goes to
infinity). Since /i, goes to minus infinity in finite time, as t approaches its border value, and A„
does not go to plus infinity before M equals zero, the denominator on the left hand side approaches
zero. Thus from some moment in time onward the inequality holds.
The speed of technical progress is measured by /»(M,x), which develops in time as:
Given that fc« and T are positive and, after a certain period of technical progress, both /?, and M
are negative, technical progress slows down in the long run.
In conclusion we can state that a firm will proceed along a technological path with variable
speed. At first M goes up as returns to innovative investments increase. The speed /i(Af,t)
increases. Then the effectiveness of these investments declines more and more. As /I(M,T)
declines because a higher technical level is reached, this induces the firm to decrease Af, such
that the speed of technical progress /i(A/, x) decreases even faster. The speed of innovation first
goes up slowly but eventually runs down quickly.
The model without technical progress, presented in section 4.2, suffers from a similar weakness
as the model with technical change. In that model it is assumed that substitution of variable
inputs by fixed investments can go on forever in the same way: the total requirement of variable
inputs is made up of the same units that can be replaced by the same units of fixed investments,
say every worker can be replaced by a similar machine. Obviously, the last worker cannot be
substituted like the first, since he has to control the machinery. A similar amendment proposed
for the model with technical change can be used in the model with stationary technology too,
introducing depletion of opportunities for substitution and replication.
Exhaustion of innovative opportunities for a firm operating on a specific technological trajectory
is one factor that is likely to influence the effectiveness of an amount of investment M. Another
factor, working in the opposite direction, is the possibility of technology spill-overs from firms
that are more advanced, further along the technological path. Firms can learn from their more
efficient competitors. This can be included in the model in a straightforward way: suppose the
technological level of the firm at the present technological frontier is 9, then the function
expressing the effectiveness of investment M, for a firm of technological level T, in an industry
where the highest level is 6, would be MA/,x,6), where 6 changes in the competitive struggle.
3.6 Endogenous!)* determined prices
In section 5 the basic model was extended to allow for depletion of technological opportunities.
In this section another restrictive assumption will be relaxed: instead of assuming constant prices,
we shall assume that they are determined by supply and demand. Gradually the model gains in
realism, which will allow some further inferences about the firm's decision making. By assuming
prices to respond to the firm's actions, an element of competition on the market is introduced:
the firm docs not operate in a void any more, since the production volume that competitors put
on the market influences the prices the firm can get for its products. For purposes of exposition,
it is assumed in the first part of this section that only the output price is flexible. The consequences63
of price flexibility are then discussed on an intuitive basis. In the second part, rivalry is also
introduced on the market for variable inputs and the preceding intuitive analysis is complemented
by a more rigourous treatment.
3.6.1 A downward sloping demand curve
The assumption that the firm operates in a competitive environment, where the demand side has
an infinite capacity to absorb the supply of output against the fixed price />, is now be replaced
by a more general representation of demand: it is assumed that the firm takes demand to follow
a demand curve characterized by a constant price elasticity. The inverse of this price elasticity
of demand is indicated by the parameter -n. Thus an increase of 1 * in industry output causes
a jtffc reduction in price. The production of output produced by other firms than the firm which









Solving this problem (see Appendix) yields the following equilibrium conditions for the changes
of the slope of #(p) and/i(A/) overtime:
(43)
(44)
These expressions differ only marginally from our results in section 3, equations (7) and (8): in
both expressions, 11 - Jtjrff I. which is 1 minus JI times the firm's market share at time 5, serves
as a weight of «•**/>, y,. The fact that the demand curve is downward sloping modifies the weight
of future revenues in equations (7) and (8), but not the weight of future variable costs. It can64
readily be seen that this model reduces to the fixed output price model of section 3, if either the
inverse price elasticity JC is zero, or the market share of the firm goes to zero, such that the firm
has no substantial influence on the equilibrium product price.
In equations (43) and (44), which determine the planned paths for the direction of development
# ((})/(} and the investment budget M, the future output of the rest of the industry Q,, appears as
an argument. Thus the firm has to formulate expectations on the future output growth of com-
petitors in the industry. Here two types of assumptions are possible. Expectations can either be
based on past or current observables like growth rates, or they can be based on a model of
strategic interaction (say rational expectations). The consequences of assuming one or the other
mechanism will not be explored here: it is merely supposed that the firm tow expectations, not
that they arc correct, nor that they are rational, nor that they are consistent with competitors'
expectations; it is only assumed that the firm thinks that competitors future plans are not
influenced by changes in its own plans." Nevertheless, the notion of limited information and
binding cognitive constraints would suggest that an expectations formation mechanisms of the
first type would be a more promising hypothesis if one aims at explaining empirical patterns of
competition.'* To see what conclusions can be drawn from this model concerning innovative
activity and competition, we analyse the last equations from two different angles. First we assume
a/ïr/n of a given size, and examine how its behaviour would change as the size of the market
would change; then we assume a maricrr of a given size and examine how firm behaviour would
differ as this market is split up among more or less firms.
First of all, consider what a firm of a specific size would do in a market of different sizes. Suppose
that output volume K„ of the firm at time 0 is given. For larger values of (2, in equation (44),
which is equivalent to a smaller market share of the firm, A '(M) gets smaller, which means that
since /i(M) is concave M grows. Thus the larger the aggregate production by competitors, the
more a firm will invests. Moreover, the investment will be directed more toward expansion than
toward rationalization: a larger (2, leads to a smaller (further negative) #'(($), according to
equation (43). which means that (J gets larger, since j?(P) is concave. This result is plausible, for
it says that when the firm is smaller relative to the total market, it has less influence on the output
price, and thus suffers less from the fact that growth of output leads to a fall in price. Therefore
it will expand more and put relatively less effort in reducing variable factor costs.
Alternatively, suppose there is a market of a certain size Q<, + ^o at time r = 0, in which a number
of n identical firms compete, and in which there is no exit nor threat of entry. Under these
conditions, the firm we model is a representative firm. Indicate the total market by n y, = 0,.
Each firm requires V, variable inputs and the total requirement at time f is n V, = X,. The market
share of each firm at all times /equals 1/n. Equations (43) and (44) can thus be written as follows:
11 Uke in Cournot competition, the firm treats its competitors' output supply and variable input demand deci-
sions for periods 0 to Tas given, ami plans an optima) response Bertrand competition is run explored here,
frWIMM il would not Tit to the assumption that present volume decisions are largely dependent on past volumes.
12 Attorning thai firms are able to form rational expectations in the context of this model would mean that firms
are supposed to be familiar with all current actions and future technological options of all their competitors, and
•bo with tbeir expectations concerning volumes, prices and interest rates.65
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From (46) it is clear that it depends on the price elasticity of demand 1/ir whether investment is
larger and whether output grows faster in a more or in a less concentrated market. If this elasticity
is Jwg/i (the demand curve is fiat), and thus it is close to zero in equation (46), then a large number
of firms causes each of them to invest a lower budget M than a monopolist would do. Thus each
of their output volumes would grow by a lower percentage than the output of the monopolist
would grow. Therefore the total of output would grow less than under monopoly. The monopolist
invests wore because he is larger than a firm with only a share of the total market (of which the
size is given), and therefore enjoys economies of scale in investment: a large firm can reap more
benefits from its investment than a smaller firm. The extent to which smaller firms would invest
less than the monopolist would do depends on the curvature of A(M). The more concave /i(M),
the less the difference between the investments of the monopolist and the firm with only part
of the market.
If, however, the elasticity is tow and Jt is not close to zero (a steep demand curve), the opposite
might come about. Then, as the denominator in equation (46) gets very small and approaches
zero, a monopolist or oligopolist might decide to invest not at all in expansion of output. If there
is any investment, it will be directed as much as possible toward variable input saving, as is
apparent from (45). Under these conditions the industry might grow faster, if there are more
rather than less competitors in the market. Here the monopolist invests /«5 because expansion
of output would result in a substantial decrease of the output price, which would undermine the
returns it earns at present scale of its operations. If Jt is large enough, if demand is sufficiently
inelastic, then for a low number of firms n (provided that p -#(P) is no too small) A'(Af) will
become non-positive and Af thus zero, indicating that it may be optimal not to invest at all.
3.6.2 Variable factor prices
Similarly, the model can be extended by assuming oligopolistic competition on factor markets.
Suppose that the supply curve for variable inputs is characterized by a constant price elasticity
1/<|>. The variable factor requirements by all the other producers in the industry are indicated by
X,. The model is now:
(47)






The model can be solved, yielding:
(52)
(53)
The analysis in the previous section already clarified the most important consequences of
assuming variable prices. Below the conclusions will be supplemented and elaborated in five
steps. We shall focus on the links between W<uririn» and investment planning, on «p?cwrio/jj
as determinants of investment, on the role of/inn 5/zf and mar**/ concenrrarion and the
Schumpetcrian hypotheses, and on the conditions for jtaa/y 5/aff
First of all, consider the effect of variation in the rbuft'c/ry para/niters jt and $ona firm's
investment plans. A more price inelastic supply of variable factors ($ large), other things equal,
has a similar effect on the direction of technical change as a price inelastic demand for output
(it large): investment will be more directed toward cost saving (#'(P) will be closer to zero and
£(P) will be large; see equation (52)). If the optimal direction of technical change will be such
that P< #(P). then a larger $ will lead to a larger investment budget A/. On the contrary, if
P > ju (p). then a larger <|> leads to a smaller budget A/.
Intuitively these results arc plausible: inelastic demand and supply curves mean that changes in
input and output quantities have large effects on prices. If these effects are large, then it is best
not to expand output loo much, in order to keep the output price high, and to economize on
inputs, in order to keep the input price low. If technical possibilities are such that it is relatively
easy and cheap to cut back variable input requirements per unit of output, leading to a decrease
in variable factor requirements in absolute terms (which depends on the shape of £(P» then
firms will expand their budget A/. If. however. #(p) has such a curvature that it remains optimal
to expand variable factor requirements in absolute terms, then firms will decrease their
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Secondly, let us look at the relationship between marter rontwrrarion and investment behaviour.
Consider once more a market of given size £>o at time 0. equally partitioned among n identical
firms. Each firm uses the same amount of inputs, which sum up to .¥„ at time 0. Given n equal
firms, equations (52) and (53) can be written as:
(54)
(35)
From equations (54) and (55) it is clear that a smaller number of firms n has the same
consequences as lower price elasticities: the effects of relative input and output changes on
prices have a larger impact on the individual firm. Thus firms put more effort in lowering input
demands and less in expanding output. It can be seen from equation (55), that if JI and 41 are
close to zero, the mort- firms are in the market, the /OVV<T the investment budget of each competitor
is. However, if JC is large, then an increase in the number of firms n may lead to /II^/KT investments
by fac/i of them. Furthermore, it can be shown using equation (54) that if output demand is
inelastic (n large), but input supply is elastic (0 small), an //jcTeajf in the number of competitors
n in the market may lead each of them to redirect investment toward expansion (see Appendix).
Thirdly, interpret the model as a representation of inve$/m<>nr/7/a/im>i£ of a firm in a competitive
market, where not all firms are of equal size at time 0 and where entry or exit might occur. The
expected actions of competitors enter the determination of the equilibrium p and M of the firm
through the expected future prices P, and w, and through the expected development of iLs market
shares y,/(Ö, + K,) and V,/(X, + V,). Suppose a firm expects the output of the rest of the industry
Ö, to grow by a rate v and the variable input demand of competitors to grow by a rate!;. Variation
in these values can be related to the threat of entry or to expectations with respect to competitors'
successes in innovation. The firm thus «pectó £?, = öo*** and *< = A!^, where öo and X„ are
oiwrv«/competing output supply and input demand at the moment it calculates its investment
plan.
It can be shown that the reaction of a firm to a perceived higher growth rate of competing output
supply depends on the elasticity parameter Jt and the firm's market share. On the one hand, if
the firm expects to have a forge share of the market and if it assumes that output demand is
inelastic, then the expectation of a/asfer g/wv/A o/ compef/Vig .rup/j/y will induce the firm to
i/icreasi its investments in expansion. The firm in this situation will engage in 'competitive
warfare', because the 'advantage' of a foreseen loss of market share outweighs the loss due to
a drop in prices. A loss of market share is an advantage here because it means that a price decrease
is less internalized; as the firm expects to have less market share, it considers the price drop to
a larger extent an externality. Formally, if for all periods s, where / £ 5 5 7", the firm expects
y, > Q,/JC (its own output larger than competing output times the price elasticity of demand).68
then */A/,/*/y > O (see Appendix). Similarly, if the firm expects competitors to decrease their
growth rate, it will cut down its own rate too. On the other hand, if the firm expects to have a
market share and if it assumes that demand is elastic, then the expectation of a /aster
comp?fin# ,fu/y?/;y will induce the firm to cur fjipanWo/uiry (>iv?50nf/ir. The firm now
backs down, calculating that the price drop justifies less expansion, while the loss of market
share docs not induce the firm much to increase expansion.
()n the input side matters arc less ambiguous: a larger expected increase of variable input demand
induces a firm to increase investment in rationalization and to cut down expenses on expansion
(see Appendix). As a larger input demand is expected, the firm expects both rising prices and
a fall in its share on the market for inputs. The inducement to step up investment spending in
rationalization upon an expected input price increase turns out always to outweigh the stimulus
to cut down investments because of a smaller market share. Finally, it may be noted that the
above conclusions do not depend on the cumulative effects of investment and therefore hold in
a model wir/i as well as w/r/iour technological opportunities (i.e. a model along the lines of
section 4.1, assuming variable prices though).
Fourthly, let us try to use the model to assess the issue of the relationship between the speed of
technological progress, «writ?» jfrucfurf and/irm siz?. and thereby shed some light on the so-
called Schumpctcriun hypotheses [see e.g. Kamicn and Schwartz (1982)]. These postulate a
positive relationship between the speed of technological progress and both market concentration
und firm size. In the above model, there are two forces which exert an influence on the speed
of technological progress: economies of scale and the degree of internalization of price decreases
on input and output markets. Economies of scale depend on firm size and the degree of inter-
nalization of a price decrease depend on market share, and thus market structure. The direction
of these two influences depends on the />•/><• of technological change. We argued that
technological progress in a firm can take two forms: improvement of the capital stock, which
leads to a higher production capacity, and improvement of the use of variable inputs, which
leads to a reduction in variable factor demand per unit of output.
Consider first the/<>rm*r type of technological progress, improvement of capital leading to extra
capacity. ()n the one hand, a large firm in a concentrated market takes more advantage of
economies of scale than a small firm in a market of the same size, and will therefore invest more
in capacity expanding technological progress. On the other hand, a firm with a large market
share internalizes the negative influence of a price decrease on industry revenues to a larger
extent, and therefore restricts investment in capacity expanding technological progress. This is
expressed by the /xuift'vr sign of K, in equations (52) and (53), and the nrga/iv* sign of
1V(C + K,). The influence of these two/>rm 5prri/ic factors is moderated by two factors which
are rtwiwon to the market: size K, is multiplied by output price /*, and market share K,/(ö, + ^)
is multiplied by elasticity parameter it. The higher the output price and the elasticity of demand,
the more attractive it is to invest in extra capacity for a// firms in the market
Equations (52) and (53) thus show that the dynamics of investment are related to changes over
time in/<>nr variables on the output side. As a market develops and the firm invests, the firm's
output f", rises. What happens to its market share depends on other firms' behaviour. As aggregate
output expands, the price P, falls (given a stable demand curve) and demand gets less price
elastic: x rises. As prices fall, the firm size effect on investment, inducing the firm to invest
more as it grows, loses strength. Simultaneously, due to a rise in x, the market share effect.69
inducing the firm to invest less as it has a larger market share, rises in strength. Firms are therefore
likely over the course of the development of a market or an industry first to raise investment in
expansion, reaping the advantages of scale economies related to their own growth, and then to
decrease investment, as the effects of a price squeeze get more severe.
Next consider the /au?r type of technological change, improvement of variable factor produc-
tivity. Here both tendencies work in the same direction. A large firm (in terms of V,) invests
more in rationalization, because it can reap more benefits due to economics of scale. In addition,
a large firm, if it exerts a large share of demand V,/(X, + V.) in the variable factor market, also
invests more, because it fully internalizes the beneficial effect of a drop in the unit costs of
variable factors. Thus in investments in rationalization large firms in concentrated markets may
progress fastest. Again the two factors are moderated by the relevant price w, and elasticity
parameter $, which are likely to change as the industry matures.
It follows from the present model that absolute size is positively related to the speed of tech-
nological progress, but relative size (market share) negatively. This disagrees with the
Schumpelerian hypotheses mentioned before, that claim a positive relationship in both instances.
There has been a fair deal of empirical research on the validity of the Schumpcterian hypotheses,
and the evidence is rather mixed, as noted in section 3.2 of chapter 2 |Scherer (19X0), Cohen
and Levin (1989)]. Reasons for the ambiguous and inconclusive nature of the empirical evidence
on these hypotheses which can be suggested on the basis of the present model are: 1) the fact
that there are good arguments for the conjecture that the second Schumpetcrian hypothesis is
(partly) wrong (as far as investment in progress generates extra output which pushes down the
price); 2) the fact that size and market share influence investment simultaneously and in opposing
directions, but are mostly severely correlated, hampering empirical testing; and 3) the fact that
the relative strength of the 'size factor" and the 'market structure factor' varies over the life-cycle
of the industry."
Finally, consider the issue of a long term steady sfate growtfi path. Our result in section 3,
assuming fixed prices on input and output markets, was that in the long term there is no steady
state growth: g(P) goes to zero, the budget M rises indefinitely and output grows explosively.
If prices are flexible, though, we saw that investments budgets may decrease over lime and go
(asymptotically) to zero, as firms internalize the negative effects on revenues of an output price
decrease. Investment decreases if demand is inelastic, if n is large. Demand tends to get inelastic,
as time progresses, markets expand and get saturated. When investment ceases, the technological
development comes to a standstill and capital moves to other investment opportunities. This is
a familiar situation in many markets.
13 One might object that Schumpeter, writing on innovation and technical change, had foremost qualitative
progress in output, product innovations, in mind (see e.g. Schumpeter (1943), chapter 7], where the model
assumes a homogeneous output. Tbe model may be reinterpreted, however, regarding output as the fulfilling of
a need (e.g. information, music, transport, etc.) by means of a product which can be improved over time.70
Let us consider, however, the more simple case in which elasticity parameters n and <|> remain
constant over time, and see whether a steady state growth path of the firm can be determined.'*
Call the steady state growth rate of output K,/y, = n and the steady state growth rate of variable
input demand V,/V, = v, the steady state growth of productivity being |i - v. Thus for output and
variable inputs we have: K, = IV*" and V, = VV. In steady state, market shares are constant and
therefore competing output Q, and variable factor demand X, also grow with rates |i and v. From
equations (50) and (51) it follows that prices in steady state are: P, = /V""" and w, = w^*".
Substituting these expressions in equations (52) and (53) we get:
(56)
«•" (57)
Taking the derivative of equation (56) with respect to time and setting the result equal to zero
yields (sec Appendix):
(l-K)H = (l+<t>)v (58)
The steady state direction of technical progress is therefore:
„ (59)
In steady state growth equilibrium, the direction of investment g(P)/p is the same for all firms
in the industry, and depends on elasticity parameters only. Note that it does not depend on the
number of firms in the industry. The higher ?t, the more rationalization. Next consider the budget
for investment M of a firm in an industry on a steady state growth path. The time derivative of
equation (57) can also be set to zero, resulting in (see Appendix):
14 Allmulivcly, what follows can be interpreted a> the planning pnvess of a firm that calculates its investment
plan assuming constant elasticities <in</ a constant nutrket share on markets for in- and outputs It is then ana-
lysed under which conditions the firm plans a constant growth rate of output, a constant growth rate of variable
input demand and thus a constant rate of productivity increase. It should be noted that planned steady state
growth only turns into real steady state growth if expectations are fulfilled, if plans and expectations of all firms
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Let us consider what these outcomes mean. The />Avtn?^ growth rate of the firm's output supply
and input demand depend on the outcome of the optimization problem of equations (47) lo (51).
These planned rates may be higher or lower than n and v. Here n could be called the required
or Varra/i W rate that would ensure a steady state growth of output and v the 'Hiirrumn/' rate
of input demand growth. Note that there is presently nothing in the model that ensures that the
actual rales move to the warranted rates or vür vtrui, e.g. through a movement of capital goods
or other prices or of the interest rale."
First consider the output side, making the assumption that on the input side the planned growth
rate of input demand equals the warranted rate. Equation (60) shows that the warranted growth
rate of output (i is ar fcaif as large as the interest (or discount) rate. Thus, if K is zero and firms
plan an optimal growth rate exactly equal to the interest rate p. then firms will plan a steady
slate growth path. In this case the marginal return of investment equals the interest rate at precisely
that growth rate of output that ensures that next period an equal investment is optimal. II the
optimal growth rate is below the warranted rate n, then optimal investment and output growth
are planned to decrease over the planning period, and if it is above, then investment and the
output growth rate are planned to increase (to see all this, refer to equations (52) and (53)). The
warranted rate n is thus an wuraMr equilibrium rale.
The warranted growth rate of output is determined by p and n. As the interest rate rises p. the
warranted rale n is higher. The firm's optimum growth path needs to be on a higher level, for
it to be profitable to keep up the same rate of growth. As TC is larger (demand being less elastic),
the warranted rate rises too, because growth must not only compensate for the costs of capital
at a certain level to stay attractive at a constant level, but also for the fall in the output price.
The closer TC gets to unity, the higher the planned equilibrium rate of the firm must be to equal
the warranted rate, and thus the more likely it is that firms will plan a decrease in expansionary
investment over time. If Jt £ 1, if the elasticity of output demand is smaller than unity, there can
be no steady state growth of output at all, implying (hat planned output growth will certainly be
slowing down to zero in the long run.
Now consider the input side, making the assumption that the output side is on the equilibrium
growth path. On the input side the warranted rate v is ar /WM/ equal to the interest rate. If $ is
high (the supply elasticity of variable inputs is low), the warranted rate is small. The consequences
of a planned growth rate exceeding the warranted rate v (something which will happen the more
easily as input supply is more inelastic) are twofold. A planned growth rate of input demand
that is larger than the warranted rate will induce firms to redirect investment toward rational-
ization (see equation (52)), and at the same time to reduce the total amount of investment (see
equation (53)), at least if |J > #((*). If the former outweighs the latter effect, and even more so
if P < g(P), the consequence for the planned growth rate of input demand is that, because more
investment in rationalization will depress the planned growth rate, it will move toward ihe
warranted rate v. The warranted rate v is thus a .stoWe equilibrium.
15 This is not Harrod-Domar. but there arc similarities; however, we are only considering a partial equilibrium
model, where the interest rate and the price of capital have an equilibrating function, but where interest and
capital price movements are exogenous.3.7 A model simulation of competition ... [
To illustrate the model of section 6.2 a simulation program has been written. With the help of
this program one can get an idea of the development of an economy where firms plan their
actions in the way described. A simple simulation experiment will be presented here, to illustrate
the general features of the model. The results of the simulation experiments are pictured in ten
graphs below.
3.7.1 The setup of the simulation experiments "> *><si
The complete model consists of equations (47) to (51). For the simulations below, the following
groups of assumptions were made:
}|.,, For the equations #(p) and /i(AZ) simple specifications have been chosen, which fulfil
requirements (2) and (1) respectively: g(P) = ao+<>jP'. where ag>0, a}<0, and
', where 8o,8, >0and8, < 1.™.*ii[r.yj>j uWctuiu ni«s*&; -•'-<• >«*r»&}iuivi.w
2. The firm is assumed to know the current value of the inverse price elasticities Jt, and
$,. which characterize the state of the markets for output and variable inputs at the
moment of planning r. These elasticities change over time, as total supply of output or
total factor demands change. This change of elasticities is derived from assuming a
Stable demand curve for output and a supply curve for variable inputs. The firms are
,£'' assumed not to 'know' the global shape of these demand and supply curves, only to
know the present values of the elasticities and use these as their expected values for the
future. If the demand for output is related to its price as ÖC) = Mo""Hi'*'''« where
• Ho, n,, m > 0, and the supply of variable factors is related to its price by X(w) = VQ + v, w"',
in.' where v,, Vj > 0, then it = ^'(MO/(H,P^)-I) and <t> =
Every firm makes its plans for future investments, given its expectations of actions of
the other firms. What is relevant to the firm is the future aggregate production of all
other firms and the future demand for inputs of all the others. For both the firm has to
formulate expectations. It is assumed here that every firm simply extrapolates the current
growth of both product supply and factor demand of the other firms into the future. The
firm is not assumed to have all the necessary information freely at its disposal, nor to
have the calculating capacity, to forecast simultaneously a mutually consistent set of
the optimal strategies of all its competitors, conditional upon each other. Rather we
assume that the firm applies a rule of thumb (a routine), making use of aggregate data
on the present growth of markets. The current growth rate of competing supply 0,/C,
and demand X,/X, are calculated and used to predict future growth of competing supply
and demand all the way to the planning horizon.
To concentrate on the dynamics of competition, the function A(M) has been left inde-
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6. mentioned in section 5 above. The consequences of introducing these effects to the
simulations are quite straightforward: a decrease in the speed of progress of the most
advanced firms and a technological catching up of firms lagging behind in technology.
5. The following parameters were assumed: for £ (P) we look Oo = 1. <ij = -1: for * (M) we
took ^ = .005,8, = .5. Furthermore, it was assumed that at the start of the process the
situation on the output market was characterized by x, = .2 (i.e. the output elasticity is
-5). and that the input market was characterized by <fc, = 2 (i.e. an input elasticity of 5).
This signifies that the market for this output is still very 'young', and (hut the firms in
the experiment are struggling to conquer this new market. Both the demand curve for
output and the supply curve for variable inputs were assumed to be linear: (J. = 1. v, = 1.
Given prices for output and inputs at the start, plus aggregate output and aggregate factor
demand at the start, the other parameters of the demand and supply curve can be
calculated. They are in fact only scale parameters, since the important shape char-
acteristics are determined by the four parameters above. Tbc result was:
.,=54;Vo = -378;v,=52.5. ertw.-..-. i-mwa.wu.tk-
6. These last parameters were calculated under the assumption that at the start of the process
'" ' the economy has the following features. At time 0 there are six firms, three large and
three small. The large firms each produce 20 and the small each 16 units per period.
The three firms of each scale operate with different variable factor productivities: 1,8/7
and 4/3 respectively. Thus we start out from the following situation: , j* ? ^- j
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The price of output at time 0 is f*o = 10 and the price of variable inputs w„ = 9. The
discount rate p = .15. Firms are assumed to plan twenty periods ahead and to replan
'- every period. Thus in every period, a new plan for twenty periods is drawn up and
immediately implemented. The simulation has run for 500 time periods. Over this time,
the industry has moved along the demand and supply curves, ending up wilh a
**„ = 5.236 and a 0*» = .058. ^-...., „*„„,„„, .^^ .^^
The simulation program optimizes firm's plans, using equations (52) and (53). For starting
values for time paths of P and A/ from the present period to the time horizon, using the above
assumptions for estimating the moves of the competition, time paths for the development of
production y and variable input requirements V are calculated. These are used to calculate the
expressions on the right hand side of (52) and (53). From these, values P and A/ for every period74
are calculated. In the optimum, these should be equal to the starting values of p and Af If they
are not, the cycle is repeated with the new time paths for fJ and Af as starting values, until
convergence is reached.
The parameters and starting values had to be chosen such that the simulation program would
easily converge to the optimal planning paths for the firms. The program tended not to converge
when values for /i '(Af) got too small. When /i '(A/) gets very small, small changes in this derivative
tend to go with large variations in investments A/, causing instability in the optimization routine.
To avoid this, the number of periods over which the simulation proceeds, 500 in total, has been
made rather long, but /»(M) has got parameters such that progress goes slowly. The curvature
of the investment function /»(A/) is rather sharp with 8, = .5, such that moderate progress is not
expensive but large leaps are (an investment of 1 can produce at most .5% growth, an investment
of 4 produces at most 1% growth, and so on). This makes larger firms divert not too fast from
smaller firms. The time horizon was set at 20 periods. A longer planning period would induce
firms to plan higher investments towards the end of the horizon, causing the instability in the
optimization routine. However, it is not the lime scale /?? r ,s<? that is of interest, but the movements
of firms relative to each other. These are adequately represented in the following graphs. Changes
in parameters tend to change slopes of curves, but not their position relative to each other. After
500 periods, as shown in the graphs below, the industry is close to a stationary path. Extension
of the lime period only appeared to lead to a further decline in investment and stabilization of
production and variable factor demand.
3.7.2 The results of the simulations
The results from the simulation experiment are depicted in Figures 1 to 10 below. Figure 1
illustrates the growth of production per enterprise. All firms grow over lime, to between two
and eight limes iheir size at the start. The largest absolute growth is accomplished by the largest
most efficient firm 3. Note that firm 3 grows fastest, but slops growing first. Since this firm has
the largest market share, it internalizes a price decrease following upon output expansion most:
its present revenues fall most as a consequence of a price drop. Therefore it is the first firm to
slop causing a decrease in output price. Smaller firms continue to expand after firm 3 has stopped
to grow. This causes firm 3 lo loose market share, but because the inverse price elasticity of
output K also increases further as other firms expand, firm 3 does not recommence expansion.
As lime continues, more firms stop to grow. The end of the process is a stable division of the
market between the six firms, with shares of unequal size (see Figure 2). Over the course of the
process, market shares have first diverged, but later converged again. The smaller firms have
lost somewhat in the end. and the largest, most efficient firm 3 has gained some, but firms 1 and
2 have not moved substantially.
The demand for variable inputs, pictured in Figure 3, at first decreases for all firms, as they try
lo increase productivity. Soon the more efficient firms start to expand production rapidly. Firms
3 and 6, which grow fastest, absorb an increasing share of the supply of inputs, such that they,
although being most efficient at the start, consume more inputs than their respective competitors
which were of the same size at the beginning. The share in the total of firm 3 increases to over
one and a half times its value at the start (sec Figure 4). As time progresses and firms stop to
expand, input demand decreases since firms redirect their investments again toward rational-
ization. Only the variable input requirements of the least efficient firm decreases from the
beginning. Because smaller firms expand longer and large firms invest more effectively in raising
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inout volumeefficient, such that the smaller firms absorb the largest shares on the market for variable inputs,
and the larger firms the smallest shares. From output and input data variable factor productivities
can be calculated, as depicted in Figure 7. Note that firm 2 surpasses firm 6 and firm 1 surpasses
firms 6 and 5 relatively quickly in productivity. Over 500 periods productivity grows to very
high levels, because no limits have been put to the effectiveness of investments.
Figures 5 and 6 show the directions and sizes of investment by the six firms that have brought
these developments about. Firm 1 is the biggest investor at the start, but invests predominantly
in rationalization (a low 3 and a high #(P)). This firm is quickly overtaken by firms 3 and 2,
which soon begin to invest in expansion. After initial rationalizations, all firms invest heavily
in output expansion, as long as the market for output is not yet saturated: (i's are growing. As
markets become flooded, firms gradually lower (} and increase g(P), directing their investment
streams, which are getting quickly smaller in volume now, toward rises in productivity. In the
first periods, the same things happen among the smaller firms as among the larger firms, but on
a smaller scale: firm 6 takes the same direction as 3, firm 5 follows 2 and firm 4 follows the
direction of 1. As the larger firms stop expanding, or just before, there is an inducement to the
smaller firms to redirect investment again toward expansion. This could be due to the expectation
formation mechanism of the model. As firms 3, 2 and 1 stop expanding so suddenly, firms 4,
5, and 6 readjust their a expectations of the growth of competing supply. They realize that, as
competing supply is not growing any more, their own supply can be profitably expanded further
than they planned some periods before. Towards the end of the 500 periods investment virtually
ceases. The advantages of expansion do not outweigh the disadvantage of a price drop any more
for any of the six firms, and a further increase in variable factor productivity does no longer
outweigh the costs. .», «- -.^.,;
The next graph. Figure 8, displays the realization of the objective of the firms: profits (these are
free profits, calculated as cash flow minus investments in that period)." As the market is con-
quered in the first periods, profits sharply diverge, and the largest and most efficient firm takes
most advantage of the opportunities. However, even fee/ore total output of the most efficient
firm reaches its peak, profits already start to drop. As expansion of the smaller firms brings
prices down further and profits of the largest firms erode, the gap between the firms becomes
smaller. Profits of the smallest firms even increase a little. By the time the industry has matured,
spectacular profit levels have been eliminated, and firms settle at profits which differ from each
other about as much as at the start of the process. „v - ,. ^^^ j •.
Finally there are two graphs, Figures 9 and 10, showing a number of aggregate variables. Figure
9 pictures aggregate production and aggregate variable input demand, the output price and the
input price. The output price drops sharply as aggregate output grows about fivefold, but because
the rise of productivity compensates for expansion of output, the price of the variable inputs
shows little variation. Note that the aggregate output curve is sigmoid. Thus the model gives a
diffusion curve of the final good which has the familiar S-shape. Figure 10 presents total revenue,
total expenditures on variable inputs, total profits and average variable factor productivity, and
once more aggregate production and aggregate variable input demand. Note again that profits
are highest before the market has reached its largest volume, and long before productivity is at
M bvoMBMett m ltaHy paid out of current cash flow. Therefore the remaining profits is tbe sum which can be
withdrawn without affecting the profits generated in the future It is the amount of revenue that can more pro-
fitably be put on a bank account against an interest of p then be reinvested in the firm AltcmaDvely one could
say that at the lime of investment, the firm makes a reservation of an amount W, to pay every period costs of
capital rM from interest revenuesA motif/ o//inn Muivitw 81
its lop. Average productivity increase accelerates when profits start to diminish. The pattern of
high profits preceding large volumes is reminiscent of the product life-cycle theory. According
to this theory, the largest profits are made during the stage of sharpest market growth, and the
largest volumes are sold as the product matures and low cost mass production prevails. The
overall patterns of investment in the experiment of industry development also accords with the
product life-cycle theory. The first part of the cycle is characterized by expansion of the industry,
and the last by rationalization of production, by increases in productivity.
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3.7.3 Evaluation
Some restrictive features of the simulation experiment and the findings need to be stressed. First
of all, it is assumed that technological opportunities arc never exhausted, and that firms can
accomplish the same growth rates for the same volume of investment at any moment in time.
In terms of the model, in the above experiment it is supposed that/i(M,t) = /i(M). Secondly, it
is assumed that there are no spill-overs of technological knowledge and skills from the most
advanced firms to the others. Relaxing these restrictions will cause the most advanced firms to
slow down their progress and the least advanced firms to catch up. This will change the lime
scale of the process, the distances between the firms, the speeds of change and adjustment.
However, the general pattern of the competitive struggle, the positions and moves of the firms
relative to the others, is not likely to be changed. A third limitation is the restriction on entry:
entry barriers are assumed to be effective from the very start of the process onward. Profits
remain in the end on positive levels, because there is no firm able to compete them away. Only
firms that would be able to enter with a smaller market share than the smallest of the firms
currently in the market would be willing toexpand output any further. It is not specified, however,
how and at what cost a firm could become established in the market, nor how incumbents would
react to the threat of entry. Conditions for entry and costs of entry are outside the scope of the
model. It is an empirical matter to what degree threat of entry is an important phenomenon on
developing markets and to what degree an effective entry barrier limits the descriptive power
of the model." Fourthly, there is the assumption that productive capacity has an infinite technical
lifetime. Relaxing this assumption would only introduce a downward trend in capacity, which
has to be compensated for by extra investment (maintenance), but is also not likely to change
the outcomes qualitatively.'* Fifthly, it is assumed that both the price of investment goods and
the interest rate are exogenously determined and constant, and that there are no liquidity con-
straints. Sixthly, the assumed expectations formation mechanism may be restrictive. Rational
expectations of competitors actions, given the current value of price elasticities, instead of the
above type of adaptive expectations, may alter the outcomes, but the consequences of introducing
this assumption are hard to predict. Maybe smaller firms will invest and expand more
aggressively at the start, maybe larger firms will pre-empt smaller firms. Multiple Nash equilibria
cannot be excluded. Finally, firms' expectations about, or knowledge of, the global shape of the
relevant demand and supply curves might affect the outcomes. The degree of realism of the
assumptions on the way firms evaluate their competitors' likely behaviour and the characteristics
17 Empirical studies suggest that there is a lot of entry in many markets, but little substantial post-entry market
penetration [Geroski. Gilbert and Jacquemin (1990)].
18 Economic lifetime and economic obsolescence, by the way, are not relevant concepts here: firms are
assumed to invest in the most profitable way. and whether this is by replacing obsolete equipment, by adding
new equipment or by rebuilding and improving old equipment, does not need to be specified, as long as the total
effectiveness of investment M can be captured by the function /i(W).82 Cfaipfe r i
of the demand side of the market can only be evaluated empirically. However, if information
is incomplete and costly, and if evaluation is ledious, then the above assumptions might approach
common practice rather closely.
Given the limitations of the scope of the experiment, the main conclusions may now be sum-
marized. The simulations show how a number of firms of different size and efficiency struggle
to conquer a new market. The following features stand out:
1. ()ver the process of competing over this market, output soars and the price of the product
falls, but, due to technological progress, aggregate input demand and the input price
change far less.
2. Market shares at first diverge, but later converge again, because the largest firms stop
to grow while the smaller firms still keep on expanding. In this model, inertia on the
part of large firms can be rational, when output is price-inelastic.
3. Like market shares, profits also first diverge and later converge again. In market shares
and profits, there is falling behind and catching up. In productivity, however, lost
grounds never lend to be made up for.
4. Small firms compete most effectively with large firms when markets start to be saturated,
because large firms can only rely on rationalization to protect their profit levels, whereas
small firms can still expand profitably.
5. Investment halts because profitable investment opportunities have been eroded, despite
the fact that profits are positive. Even without retaliatory action of other participants in
the market being expected, it is not profitable for any of the firms to expand any further.
Thus the industry moves to a status quo, in which production continues unaltered ad
infinilum, and in which firms keep on being different in market share, efficiency and
profitability.
6. The time paths of the aggregate variables, describing the development of the industry
are in accordance with elements from the product life-cycle theory. It has been found
thut the industry moves from an expansionary stage to a stage of rationalization, and
that the largest profits are made in the periods of sharpest market growth.
7. The model generates a sigmoid diffusion curve. At first firms expand supply at an
increasing rate, as they increasingly exploit scale economies; later, as markets saturate
and price drops start to exert an increasingly negative influence on profits, firms increase
supply at a decreasing rate.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we developed a model of firm planning behaviour, assuming that a firm maximizes
the present value of future profits, given a number of constraints. The most important constraint
is the fact that the firm has to start out at the beginning of next period from where it will end up
at the end of this period: the firm is tied to its own history. The firm is already established, with
its managers and workers, its capital stock, bank credits, distribution channels, technological
assets, etc.. and any further move starts from this point. The firm is inflexible, in the sense that
any change in its operations has a price. Change is costly to the firm, because it involves
information gathering, research, discovery and learning, decision making, communication and
persuasion, material investment, product development, technical adjustment and overcoming
inertia, building up new routines and mastering new skills. All these processes are costly, in
terms of money, but most importantly, in terms of time.83
The firm makes a distinction between variable and fixed inputs. It can invest, add to the fixed
inputs, to realize both capacity growth and growth of productivity of the variable inputs.
Possibilities are limited by the nature of technological progress: there are decreasing returns to
investment in any period. Depending on the stage of development of the technological trajectory
that the firm exploits, there can be increasing or decreasing returns to investment over time. The
firm's possibilities are also limited by supply of variable inputs and by demand for its output.
The firm accounts for this in drawing up its plans, through its estimation of price elasticities on
relevant markets, and by forecasting its competitors moves. Thus the firm plans its course of
development with one eye on the market, taking account of input and output price elasticities
and the likely development of its market share, and with the other eye on its production possi-
bilities, its options for expansion and rationalization through the introduction of new technology.
This model of the firm leaves a number of relationships unspecified. To arrive at a description
of a specific firm, more precise hypotheses have to be added to the present framework. First of
all, one needs to specify which inputs are variable, and what their price is. Then the shape of
#((}), the innovation possibility frontier for given an amount of investment, and the nature of
the investment function A (A/, T) must be specified. Technology spill-overs may be added. Finally,
the firm's perceptions of its competitors, its expectations formation mechanisms, must be
clarified. Firms form expectations on the inverse elasticities n and (p. and on the growth of supply
of the final good and the demand for variable factors by competitors, £) and X respectively. The
latter include expectations on entry and exit. These issues have been left open here and the
analysis has concentrated on the general features of the model. The conclusions reached therefore
hold for a fairly wide range of specific models.
First of all, this model was used to analyse the process of investment planning of the firm. One
finding is that, if input and output markets are perfectly competitive, firms tend to plan an amount
of investment which is permanently growing over time and tend to direct their investment ever
less toward factor productivity improvements and ever more toward capacity expansion. Returns
to investment in productivity growth erode, because variable factors of production constitute a
decreasing share of total costs of production." By contrast, returns to investment in expansion
increase, because of the cumulative effect of technical change: the same investment produces
an ever larger expansion of output. However, when markets are not perfectly competitive (ex-
pressed by falling price elasticities as markets mature), this conclusion no longer holds: firms
will decrease investments in the long term, if the demand elasticity of output rises. On the one
hand, returns to investment in productivity erode, for the same reason as before. On the other
hand, returns to investment in expansion also erode, because expansion of output forces prices
down. Expansion of output proceeds until extra revenue from more sales cannot compensate
any more for the loss of revenue from the current level of sales, due to the drop in output prices.
There is an intermediate case, where the price elasticity of output demand takes on a constant
value, larger than unity. If that is the case, there is a direction of investment # (P)/0 and an amount
of investment A/, that could sustain a steady state growth of output and input demand. The steady
state growth rates of firm's output supply and input demand are functions of the interest rate
and the elasticity of output demand and input supply respectively. There is no mechanism
specified, however, that leads firms toward the steady state path and in addition this path, once
attained, turns out to be unstable.
19 This is not related to the Marxian idea of the tendency of the tale of profil to fall. There is no equivalent in
(be model above to Marx' assumption of a constant degree of exploitation of variable factors of production,
which is at the basis of his theorem84
Another finding concerns the firm's investment planning and technological expectations. By
definition technological change occurs if an investment has a cumulative effect, in the sense
(hat the consequence of an investment now is that an investment of the same size in the next
period has a larger effect. Firm planning was considered under four different assumptions: a)
technical opportunities are such that investment has a cumulative effect ant/ the firm also expects
its investments to lead to technical progress; b) there are no opportunities for technical progress.
/?u/ the firm expects its investments to lead to technical change; c) there are opportunities, fcur
the firm does not expect them; d) there are no opportunities ami they are not expected either. It
was shown that technological change, expected or not, always leads to higher output, higher
variable factor requirements and higher variable factor productivity. Also it turned out that
expecting technological change leads to higher output and variable factor requirements than
expecting no technological change, whether it actually occurs or not. Variable factor produc-
tivity, however, may be fawr when technological change is expected than when it is not. This
occurs when firms expecting technical progress expand too much, as they count on learning
effects, on reaping dynamic economies of scale in future technical progress.
Beside expectations about technological opportunities, firms form expectations of competitor
behaviour. The reaction of a firm expecting a higher growth in competing output supply depends
on the price elasticity of demand for output and the firm's market share. Firms will plan retaliatory
expunsion if they expect output demand to be inelastic and to have a large share of the market
in the future; they will plan to limit their expansion if demand for output is elastic and the
expected market share is small. A critical size above which firms retaliate was derived as a
function of the elasticity of demand and the size of competing supply.
Secondly, the model was used to analyse the process of competition within an industry, both
analytically and by means of simulation techniques. It may be noted that the model provides a
framework which can accommodate for a wide range of real world phenomena, that demand
more ad hoc assumptions in other frameworks. An industry with firms that act along the lines
of the model does not necessarily end up in monopoly, if increasing returns over time are
prominent. Different market structures, industries made up out of small and large firms, are not
only possible as transitory phenomena, but can be stable over prolonged periods. New technology
does not diffuse immediately, small firms do not necessarily loose in the competitive struggle,
nor do technologically backward firms necessarily go bankrupt. There is a long term tendency
to direct investments in technical change toward productivity growth, but in the short term firms
may move away from this direction. Investments in the exploitation of a specific technological
paradigm will cease in the end, but in the short term they can decrease as well as increase. The
model of the firm is a general building block to build various types of economic structures with
it. This is the case, even though firms, given their access to information, plan rationally, with
an infinite time horizon, though they operate in a deterministic world, and though technological
opportunities, as expressed by #(P) and fc(Af ,x), are the same for all firms.
A result from the analysis are the qualifications that can be put forward, concerning the trade
off between static and dynamic efficiency. Standard analysis holds, that within a static context,
perfect competition leads to optimal allocation of resources. However, it is also often stated [see
e.g. Scherer (1980), Kamien and Schwartz (1982)). that perfect or nearly perfect competition is
detrimental to innovative effort and technical progress, and thus leads to dynamic suboptimality,
if intertemporal efficiency is considered. A debate centres around the relative merits of monopoly
versus some monopolistic or oligopolistic form of competition for aggregate growth. Within
the confines of the model analysed above, it has been shown that, even in a dynamic framework,
more competition can be superior to /r« competition. If a market of given size is assumed tofrrAavtour 85
be divided among a number of identical firms, the sign of the relationship between market
concentration and the amount of investment of each firm separately depends on the elasticity
of output demand. If demand iselastic. the more firms are in the market, the lower the investment
budget of each competitor is. However, if output demand is inelastic, then an increase in the
number of firms may induce each of them to invest more. A sufficient condition for investment
to grow with the number of competitors was derived above.
This result can be understood as follows. Suppose that the industry currently produces a given
volume of output and that the demand curve for output is fixed and relatively inelastic. If the
total costs of expansion of the market would be the same for either one monopolist or for n
competing firms, the monopolist would lend to expand less than the n competitors. This occurs,
because the monopolist takes the full repercussions of the decrease in price on his decisions into
account; the effect of the price decrease is fully internalized. For competitors that have a smaller
share of the market, however, the price decrease is only partly caused by the firm' s own expansion
of output, and for the rest it is an externality, produced collectively by all other firms in the
market. Due to this externality, the resulting price is not optimal for the collective of competitors;
if the competitors would collude and coordinate their actions, they would restrict output
expansion to support the price. However, because they compete, they are caught in a type of
prisoner's dilemma, since without coordination, it is rational for each of them to cxpund output
further than would happen with coordination. The consumer side benefits from competition, not
only in a static but also in a dynamic world.
Another result of the analysis of competition was the light shed upon the relationship between
technological change, market structure and firm size in a dynamic context (the Schumpeteriun
hypotheses). Firm size (absolute size) and market share (relative size) were shown to influence
investment in growth simultaneously but in opposing directions: firm size positively and market
share negatively. Although these two variables are usually highly correlated, their influence on
investment behaviour should not be considered in isolation. The importance of firm size and
market structure as determinants of the speed of progress varies over the life-cycle of the market
or industry. As the output price falls and the elasticity of demand rises, the dominance of the
firm size factor decreases and the influence of the market share argument increases: in a
developing market firm size dominates market structure, in a mature market vise
A next result worth mentioning, is that the model sheds some light on investment activities in
relationship to the life cycle development of a product, or on a higher level of aggregation, to
the maturity of the industry. As products are longer on the market and go through different stages
of the life cycle, as gradually industries mature, markets get increasingly saturated. This causes
the price elasticity of output to decline: a percentage increase of output supply causes a larger
percentage fall in the price. Similarly, if firms buy their inputs in a mature market, relative
changes in input requirements elicit larger relative changes in factor prices. Firms recognizing
this will calculate their investment plans in an emerging market or industry, assuming elastic
in- and output markets (a low n and <)>) and in a mature market or industry, assuming inelastic
markets (a high JC and $). Therefore, firms will invest a larger share of their cash flow in an
emerging industry and direct investment relatively more toward expansion. Conversely, firms
will invest modestly in a mature industry and strive predominantly for rationalization, for
bringing down the costs of production. Thus the beginning of the life cycle is characterized by
expansion, possibly supported by product differentiation, whereas competition in the later stages
of the product life cycle is characterized by price competition. Furthermore, simulations showedthat not only investment in the model develops according to a frequently observed and char-
acteristic pattern over the life cycle, but also industry profits: aggregate profits increase as the
market develops, but start to decline before output volumes reach their maximum. Profits rise
in the model as long as output expansion compensates for price falls, and then start to fall.
A final result to mention is that the model generates a sigmoid diffusion curve of output. As a
market opens up, first firms expand supply at an increasing rate, as they increasingly exploit
scale economics. As the market saturates and the output price falls, thereby putting profits
increasingly under pressure, firms increase supply at a decreasing rate. In summary, it may be
noted that there are a number of aggregate phenomena produced by the model in the simulation
experiment, that resemble regular patterns well-known from empirical research. The fact that
the simulations, which represent the interactions of units modelled at the micro level only,
generate familiar aggregate phenomena may be taken as support for the assumptions that are at
the basis of the micromodel.
This completes the theoretical exposition of the model of firm planning. The model comes close
to the criteria formulated for a model of economic development in section 2.2 of chapter 2: the
firm invests in the production of technology, in the determination of its own production con-
straints. In the framework represented in Table 1 of chapter I, this model may be situated
somewhere in the middle between mainstream and evolutionary thought. In terms of this table,
the following characteristics are important. First of all, technological change is a main
determinant of the development of the firm and the industry. Technology changes endogenously,
but only incrementally. Secondly, although the firm optimizes an objective function, its objective
is closely tied to its present situation: investment is the price of a change of existing routines.
Thirdly, there is no uncertainty, but the fact that the firm is tied to its past technology and scale
expresses that change is complex and costly. One reason why change is costly is because to find
and use information on how to change is costly. Fourthly, given available information, the firm
takes optimal decisions, but these are not necessarily consistent nor inconsistent with the
decisions of other firms in the market. Finally the development of the firm is evidently path
dependent.
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Mathematical appendix „* ,1 ^ „<-,<
Derivations section 3 ^ > A :*% n VA fsOA
We calculate the Hamiltonian and take derivatives to the instruments P and M, and to the variables
K, and V,.
Differentiating yields: ! '"•'* "''•""
Sff X,K (A2)
Xl'*(Af) + XV(l'(p»fc(Af) O '(P) 1+^
(A3)
= -,-.(Xyp^v(p-,(P))v,'(A/) = o « *w,-^_^^-_
The change in the costate variables can be obtained by differentiating the Hamillonian with
respect to K, and V,.
This can be written as:
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These equations can be integrated, taking account of the condition that X, (7) = X,(7) = 0, which
says that the shadow prices of changes in output or variable input demand at the planning horizon
(or beyond) equal zero:
' ' - ' ;- 'L -
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We can substitute equations (A8) and (A9) in (A2) and (A3) respectively. Solution values of p






Since by construction #"(P) < 0, we have from equation (9) a value of $ > 0 if:
PK (A13)
0 ~ '(P)<l
That this is always the case follows from (A10) and:
/•r IT wV,
The inequality holds because the first expression is the ratio of total revenue and total variable
costs when the firm follows an optimizing strategy and the second expression is the same ratio
in case the firm takes no action. The optimizing strategy is always at least as profitable as doing
nothing. Thus the firm will always end up spending all its investments on capacity expansion.
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From the Hamiltonian. five first order conditions can be derived:A mod?/ o/^nn fcfaivioMr 89
Differentiating yields as before:
5H ,„ X,K, (A16)
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From (A17) and (A20) we can deduce:
This can be integrated to give:
As before we can integrate (A18) and (A19) and substitute the result into (A16) to arrive at an
expression from which we can evaluate the direction of technical progress. .'''.'. ~ ™ * ''
(A23)
T
This expression is the same as in the original model, indicating that under this formulation the
planned direction of technical change is not influenced by the history of investment, by the
expenses on technical change in the past. Furthermore we can substitute (A22) and the integrals
of(A18) and (A19) into (A17) to arrive at: _ ^
,-p- (A24)Derivations section 6
,4/ia/ysü o/(A* morfW ifi/A a varyi/i^pncf/or flulpuf:
The Hamiltonian of this problem is:
(A25)
Differentiating yields: . „ *
fitf X,K, V,f K, ^ (A26)
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From the last two conditions we can derive:
(!i;f<-MA} tK(fi>'>*'A; s«:rjjoi R*'J- (A31)
^ ™ ~ J, '
The last expression can be used to handle the derivative of the Hamiltonian to K,:
(A32)
This expression can be integrated: '*' " ••-—-. - f-~-^morfW o//ïrm Miavioiir 91
(A34)
Manipulation of the last equation yields:
The expressions for X,K„ XjV, and X,/*, can be substituted in the formulas for #'(p) and A'(Af).
Some terms appear to cancel out and we get:
«-*(A37)
Derivation of the more general result of section 2 goes along the same lines.
Ana/ysis o/(Ae reto/ions/iip Aefween iruirAef concentra/jo/i and ;ro>f{A.-
Write equaüons (54) and (55) as follows: ., ,^,.^i
(l_^| ^ .... _... (A38)
=l--l—Ï4 where c,«f%^/»,ë/fa and
To trace the effect of a change in the number of firms n on the direction of investment g(P)/p,
consider equation (A38). Remember that ^-'< 0 implies that #(p)/p changes negatively with
n. The derivative with respect to n is:*
U 1
20 Strictly the following expressions are an approximation, leaving out second round effects. Second round
effects appear because as investment reacts to changes in n, there are changes in future growth of output and
variable factor demand, which may induce further changes in investment budgets In particular it LS assumed
here that the derivatives of K, and V,, where / £ J S 7", with respect to the number of firms « is negligible. This
would bold e.g. if the planning horizon is relatively short. If this is not the case, then 'perverse' effects or cycli-
cal movements cannot be excluded.92 <»««•«
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This condition is more likely to be fulfilled as elasticity parameter it is large and <p is small. If
the condition holds, if output demand is price inelastic and input supply is price elastic, then an
increase in the number of firms will make firms redirect investment toward expansion.
To derive the effect of a change in the number of firms n on the size of the investment budget
M, consider equation (A39) and note thal^jf > 0 «* ^-jp < 0. The derivative of/i '(Af) with respect
to the number of firms n is: • ' ^ y
:; ;- '. .'.-;(. !:•'.=
Therefore:
Hen Cj/c, < 1 if cash flow is to be positive. The condition is more likely to be fulfilled, if it is
large, if the optimal direction of investment is toward expansion ((} large) and n is small. Then
u growth in the number of firms will induce an increase in investment Af
<>ƒ f/i« rracrio/i «ƒ /A* /irm /<> farid/ion in
Insert O^öo*"*" •" equation (53), take account of the fact that the firm assumes that
Pi = (Gi + W". anJ consider the effect of a marginal change in the growth rate \y of the expected
volume of competing output C, on the volume of investment A/. It follows that:
t/y </y </y
After taking derivatives, the last condition can be rewritten as:
•'jol• >-=' (A44)
A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is:mod;/ <>ƒ/inn fcfaiWou r 93
It can be shown by applying a similar procedure to equation (52) that a sufficient condition for
the redirecting of investment toward expansion, in reaction to an increase in the expectation of
competing supply, is the same. Thus there is a threshold size of the firm, K = Q/x, below which
it backs out upon the threat of increased competition, decreasing investment and moving towards
rationalization, and above which ii retaliates by stepping up investment, especially in expansion.
Similarly consider the effect of a change in the expected growth rate of variable input demand
on the volume and direction of investment: .y ^KSACOJ ?J <ii% t«*.<4 ülvh -<<•
0 •'^'-"•^^ (A46)
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Clearly these inequalities always hold, because Vf £ 5 £ 7":
Setting the derivative of equation (56) with respect to time equal to zero and simplifying, we
get:
^W-Ofc •',' V- ,!%'•'.- •• -V.'.v."••=• (A47)
...... where £, s(l-Ji)|x-p and
Solving yields: = •
v-o ,)___J__f v-o
This condition holds for all 0 ^ f ^ 7 if ^ = C2 <=> (1 - Jt)n = (1 + <>)v.
Setting the time derivative of equation (57) equal to zero, we find:
where c, • p| 1 -"77—7 ro^o and Cj a (p-«(p))| 1 +<J>XTT17 K^>
Simplifying gives:94
Using the equilibrium condition found above, £, = £j * £, the last equation can now be reduced
to:
(A51)
The right hand side is constant. The condition holds for all 0 £ f £ 7 if
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4.1 Introduction
For many centuries technological change has had a profound impact on industrial production.
The phenomenon that technical progress also affects the services sector is of a relatively recent
date. Over the last decades it can he seen that, thanks to the development of computer and
telecommunications technology, the service sectors have been able to broaden their scope of
operations and their product range, and that marked rises in productivity have taken place. This
has contributed to a gradual process of structural change in most western economies: a growth
of services at the expense of industrial activity. Beside that, introduction of computer and
telecommunication technologies, together called information technologies, has facilitated
standardization and diversification of production. Mass production of standardized types of
services for large markets has developed. Information technology also facilitates decentraliz-
ation, a process which can have a profound impact on the division of labour, within and between
organizations, and on patterns of employment, like part-time and self employment. Thus, in a
number of respects the services sector has been affected by the emergence of information
technology.
One of the sectors where these trends have been strongest is the banking industry. Computers
have been introduced in banks on a massive scale at a relatively early date, and telecommuni-
cations networks have been set up in the recent past. These developments in information
technology have led to a range of new banking products, an enormous rise in output and a
spectacular drop in costs over the last decades. A set of data on banking activities in The
Netherlands was available. For the reasons mentioned, it seemed to be of interest to use them
for the empirical testing of the foregoing models. The first part of this chapter is devoted to a
general description of banking in The Netherlands. The second part deals with a description of
the data set that will be used for model analyses.
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4.2 Banking in The Netherlands: an overview' |v
The banking and insurances sector is one of the larger sectors in the Dutch economy. In 1987,
it produced one and a half times more gross value added than the largest industrial sector, and
employed more people than any industrial sector, except for the sector of metal products and
optical products. It produced in this year 6% of the total gross value added of the private sector
and employed 4.5% of total labour in ihe private sector. For services as a whole, these figures
arc 57% and 60% respectively.
The banking industry is a conglomerate of many different financial services firms, most of which
carry out several functions. According to the International Standard Industrial Classification
(ICIC), the Dutch banking industry can be divided into four branches. The first branch consists
of the Central Bank and general commercial banks (wholesale, retail, trading and investment
banks); the second branch comprises cooperatively organized (agricultural) banks, postal giro
.services and savings banks; the third consists of other credit and financial institutions like
building societies and brokers; finally, the fourth contains complementary financial firms like
commission-agents in bonds and stocks and financial administrative firms. The larger part of
the banking industry falls under the first two headings, general commercial banks, cooperatively
organized banks, postal giro services and savings banks. In The Netherlands, these branches are
presently dominated by six large banking organizations, accounting for at least between 80%
and 90% of the banking industry's economic output and more than 90% of its employment.
The banking industry has four functions. Firstly, we mention its intermediating function in the
payment system. Secondly, "assets management' is important, by which banks are directing the
composition of the assets side of the balance sheet. Activities rated among this function are
participations and financing (loans, credits, mortgages and the like). The third function consists
of activities directed towards the acquiring of financial means like savings and (demand and
time) deposits, classified as 'liabilities management', indicating its effects on the liabilities side
of the balance sheet. Finally, banks perform a number of other financial services like issuing
shares and stock-jobbing on the one hand, and services originally not belonging to the banking
profession, like acting as an agent on behalf of insurance companies and travel-agencies, on the
other hand. Technological change in banking has mainly affected the first function mentioned,
the intermediary function in the payment system. The six largest Dutch banks take care of the
payment system in The Netherlands. -.,«,:. «j,.,-,,^
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4.2.1 Main developments '
Until the early sixties the hanking world was relatively quiet. Traditionally, the different banks
were strongly specialized and their activities were restricted to their own territory. The former
postal giro services look care of the mass payment traffic of wage earners and consumers. The
trading banks (general commercial banks) financed loans and credits for trade and manufacturing
and accepted money deposits and savings from the same economic sectors as well as from the
wealthy. Cooperatively organized agricultural banks financed activities and acquired savings
in the agricultural sector while labourers had their accounts at a savings banks or with the postal
giro service.
t This section and the next draw party on the work of De WU.in 77i* Afclfcc-riamfr 97
Since the mid-sixties, however, the situation changed dramatically. The prosperous economic
growth of the whole economy led to a great demand for loans and credits. This resulted, on the
one hand, in a series of mergers among the banks and. on the other hand, in the penetration of
each other's markets through product differentiation. Wholesale banks started to operate on the
retail market with the objective of acquiring savings to finance industrial loans and credits.
Conversely, cooperatively organized banks with huge savings balances entered the wholesale
market to sell loans and credits. Thus, beside the process of concentration, a process of branch
blurring started and competition increased. <• •••• - •• •
While the number of independent banks decreased dramatically, the number of offices in the
country increased until the beginning of the eighties. Since then a reversal of the trend can be
seen, a decrease of the number of offices. The total number of offices grew steadily from 7520
in 1971 to more than 8600 in 1981. and then decreased until 8232 in 1986. In 1986 the number
of inhabitants per bank office can be estimated at 2616. or at 1765 if post offices arc included.
Internationally comparable figures are 2310 in the United States and 1524 in France.
The trends in the beginning of the 1990's are dominated by processes of reorganization and
strategic reorienlation. Partly this is happening in anticipation of (he establishment of the single
European market after 1992. Take-overs, mergers and strategic alliances across European
borders enable banks to offer services on a European or world-wide scale, and to diversify and
expand their range of financial products. This dynamism in the branch has lead to heightened
competition and a pressing need to decrease costs. More attention than before is devoted to
difficult matters of cost calculation and adequate pricing of different services. The restructuring
of employment that has started in the eighties continues: more and more administrative jobs
disappear and ever more commercial jobs are being created. These trends are visible in the local
branch office networks of the banks. Mergers and the exploitation of economies of scale may
well lead to the closing down of local offices. After a period of steady growth, employment is
expected to decrease slightly in the early nineties.
4.2.2 Economic indicators
Table 1 gives an indication of the growth of banking in comparison to the market sector as a
whole. It gives an overview of gross value-added in 1980 prices for the period 1971-1986.
Table 1: Economic growth of banking and the market sector at large (amounts in Dutch guilders x 10*; prices
of 1980).
banking industry whole market sector
value index annual value index annual






























Sources: CBS. Statistical Yearbooks 1971-1987;
CPB, Central Economic Plans 1971-1987.98
The figures indicate that the banking industry, compared to the whole market sector, flourished
during that time period. Average annual growth rates in each period of five years were well
above the comparable growth rates of the market sector at large, with an average annual growth
rate over the last fifteen years of 5.9% versus 2.1 % for the whole market sector.
As mentioned, the banking sector carries out different functions, the payment function, the
'assets' and the 'liabilities' management and other financial services. In Table 2 we present
some indicators referring to the first three functions. The indicators do not represent value added
but the aggregated balances figures at the end of the year. Although they therefore do not represent
the development of economic output, they give us a rough idea of how total production volumes
of different hanking activities have been developing.
The average annual growth rate of payment transactions of more than 25% is striking. The
highest growth rates, however, occurred in the beginning of the seventies (an average annual
rate of 75%), while the growth rates during the last ten years varied between 5% and 6%. The
banking industry has only been capable of processing these huge volumes because it changed
to an automated payment system.
The other two functions have been developing more or less parallel to the banking industry as
a whole, growing at about 6% per annum. Retail functions both at the 'assets' (consumers credit
and mortgages) and at the 'liabilities' side (savings balances) have experienced lower growth
rates thun wholesale activities like loans and debtors balances at the 'assets' side and near money
at the 'liabilities' side.
Tablt 2i Dtvclopment of different hanking functions (Index numbers 1971*100; average annual growth
rate* 1971-1986).
lunc- Pay- Assets Management Liabilities
lion menl Management
Yew Value Trans- Loans Mort- Cons. Debt. Savings Near




























71/86 5.9» 23,3% 5.5% 4.8% 3.9% 6.2% 3.2% 7.7%
Source: CBS. Statistical Yearbooks 1971-1987
4.3 Technological developments
Technological developments in the banking industry started in the field of the payment system.
One may distinguish between countries that might be characterized as having a 'cheque' payment
system and others having a "giro" payment system. Table 3 shows clearly that The Netherlands
has developed a 'giro' payment system.
The banking industry's path of technological development, its technological trajectory, differs
according to tho pa«vailing payment system. Technological developments in countries like The
Netherlands with a 'giro' payment system started with the automation of. firstly, records of the
account of clients in the sixties and. secondly, of giro transfers. This was accomplished by
investments in big mainframe computer systems in connection with the development and
introduction of new 'regular' payment instruments like giro salary accounts and automated&vixvi£ in 7n? A/<T>icr/umM






























debits and credits. In 'cheque' countries, however, one was less able to develop comparable
automated instruments for periodical payments like salaries, mortgages payments and monthly
rents. Consequently, payers were forced to continue writing cheques periodically. Technological
developments in countries like the USA, the UK and France were mainly directed at the auto-
mation of the labour intensive processing of cheques.
The automation of payment transactions began after World War 11, when the economic revival
induced a strong growth of the payment traffic. Mechanical bookkeeping machines were
introduced in the fifties. The first mainframe computer, combined with the punched card, made
it possible in the beginning of the sixties to automate financial mutations in the account records
of the administrations at the central offices of the banks. This process of central automation was
reinforced by the establishment of a so-called automated clearing house. The decentralization
of computer and communication technology started with the automation of local offices and
banks and was intensified by the establishment of information networks. Consequently, the
following phases of technological development can be distinguished:
1. Central automation
a. at the head offices of individual banks (1960-1970);
b. of clearing houses and external integration with business clients (1970-1980);
2. Decentralized automation
a. of local branches' back offices and front offices (1980-1990);
b. of information networks as the merger of computer and communication technologies
(1990-..).
Both stages of central automation took place at only a few production centres of commercial
banks and clearing centres. Its applications concern the centralized registration of the loans,
savings and securities accounts, but above all the central administration of current and salary
accounts, as well as the payment transactions involving debiting and crediting these accounts.
The effect of this process of technological development mainly was a strong increase in the
labour productivity associated with the central processing of the payment transactions.
We now witness, in the phases of decentralized automation, as opposed to the period of central
automation, a process of technological development in which certain offices of local banks could
be qualified as early adopters and others as laggards regarding the adoption of computers and
communication technology. In other words, the process of diffusion of technologies through
the branch network of banks is paramount. Moreover, the effects on employment will not be100
restricted to a small group of production workers at clearing centres and production centres at
the head offices, but will apply to the majority of bank employees, about two-thirds of which
are working at local banks' offices throughout the country. -
4J.I Local banks and offices ' ...•,".••'
The technological development at branches and local banks can be divided into five stages; the
first (wo interact with the phases l(a) and Kb) of central automation and the last three are a
further differentiation of phase 2(a) and phase 2(b) as distinguished above. ^, ,^,.,
It Manual production process making use of mechanical bookkeeping machines
(1960-1970); ,-,.,; i----*'••-
Ib ' Optical character recognition (OCR) equipment (1970-1980); ' , . ,,,
2a(i) Mini-computer system with back-office terminals (1980-1985); ,
2a(ii) Counter terminals in front office (1980-1990); ^. ^ „",.'.,
2b Installation of ATM's( 1985-..).
During phu.se 1 of central automation, until the early seventies, the technological developments
ut local banks and offices were restricted to the use of mechanical bookkeeping machines. From
(he beginning of the seventies onwards, OCR equipment came into use. The equipment was
used for typing the payment orders of clients on 'counting-slips' which could be read optically
by the mainframe computers at (he central head offices of (he banks. Most machines were
equipped with controlling functions correcting simple mistakes and producing a cleaner input
at (he mainframes. Up to this stage there were no major differences regarding technological
developments at the local offices between the organizations involved.
The Mart of computer and communication systems at local banks and offices, stage 2a(i), can
be daled around the middle to late seventies. This led to a productivity increase in back-office
work. This had little consequences for employment, however, due to an increase in output The
next stage of technological development at local banks was the installation of terminals at the
bank's counter and so-called quick-cash terminals, stage 2a(ii). These counter terminals are
'smarter', having more in-built functions. The possible effects on employment and the organ-
ization of work arc more pronounced. In particular, much of the work of cashiers and counter
clerks is now being automated. Since the end of the eighties, banks are installing cash dispensers
or automatic teller machines (ATM's) on a large scale, stage 2(b), thereby displacing even larger
parts of labour at the counter. These systems require not only automated account management,
but also a communication network between local offices and the central computer system.
The adoption of more advanced information-technology-based production techniques has
consequences for commercial policy: before the introduction of off-line counter terminals the
commercial policy could be qualified as product oriented, implying that employees were spe-
cialized in certain products, for instance, cash payments, insurances, consumer credits or
business loans. With the introduction of counter terminals in the eighties, commercial policy
changed into some type of 'integrated client management'. This kind of management implied
that clients were in principle served the whole range of banking products by a 'personal hanker'
who was assisted by some counter clerks. This meant on average that the commercial employees
were expected to have a higher education and more skills, but at the same time that they also
had to fulfil routine activities and tasks in which they were not so well trained.in 7V
Banks are currently in a stage of establishing, implementing and expanding information net-
works, stage 2b. An information network originates when the management at offices and local
banks can retrieve data (about accounts and characteristics of clients as well as external financial
data) from the central or local computer systems, use the data with the aim of gathering infor-
mation for management purposes and possibly send the newly processed information back to
the central computer systems or to clients. The actual applications of the networks are considered
to mature in the nineties. ... • - . —^ ^ » ,...„„,, , .,
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4JJ Banking product and process development
In banking, it is not so easy to distinguish between process innovation, on the one hand, and
product innovation, on the other. Usually, the two develop hand in hand. For instance, the process
of central automation at head offices of banks and clearing centres could not have been realized
without a simultaneous introduction of new products like the salary and current accounts,
automated debits and credits, and giro-cards inviting payment. The fast increase in the number
of machine readable payment instructions at the automated clearing house (from 5.8 million in
1970 until 278 million in 1985) illustrates the growth of the bank's new payment products.
Diffusion of new process technology is reflected in the gradual introduction of new product
innovations.
Asset management is relatively unaffected by information technology so Tar. The contracting
of loans still predominantly consists of face-to-face negotiations and an analysis of the client's
financial data. The use of personal computers for financial analysis, the recording of the client's
financial details, the word-processing of standard financial contracts as well as the associated
administration, have only just started. Applications in the field of mortgages are a little bit more
advanced, in the sense that it is possible to produce standard offers; however, it is felt that the
applications do not go much further than a qualitative support of the negotiations with the client.
In the case of insurances and travelling, some use is made of on-line communication when
processing the contract for an insurance policy or the booking of a journey.
Finally, some remarks should be made regarding cash dispensers, point-of-sale and electronic
banking terminals. These products were mainly developed in the United States. In Europe,
'cheque' countries like the United Kingdom and France followed soon. The developments in
'giro' countries like The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany started much later,
because originally no action against unsecured cheques was needed. Nowadays high labour
costs of teller transactions and pressures from retailers and petrol companies accelerate the
diffusion of cash dispensers.
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Some aspects of the developments described in the foregoing sections of this chapter will be
explored quantitatively further on. This will be done using a data set collected by a large
cooperative banking organization, with over 900 affiliated banks. These affiliated banks are
legally independent, but cooperate in a larger organizational structure. With regards to invest-
ments in new technology, they are off course restricted by their membership of the cooperative
in their decisions on the systems and the standards for which they opt. Nevertheless, they have
considerable autonomy in deciding on the speed of their technological progress: they can choose102
to adopt early or late. There may have been some centrally imposed constraints also with regards
to the speed of adoption, e.g. an ultimate day of compliance to certain standards, but information
on this is not available. From these 900-plus banks, a representative sample of about one hundred
banks is engaged in a yearly internal efficiency monitoring project. The earliest data from 1979
are rather sparse, but as time proceeds available information gets more detailed. The last
observations available were from 1987. Unfortunately, the registered sample changes somewhat
every year and the system of registration of data has been revised in 1985, making the data set
a bit fragmentary and not fully consistent. Nevertheless, information is rather detailed and a
closer look is warranted.
There are a number of data types that are contained in different data sources:
1. Automation data: investments in six types of automation equipment, of 119 banks, over
the years 1979 to 1987.
2. Cost data: costs per bank, per year (1985, 1986, 1987). per product, per cost type, for
close to one hundred banks per year.
3. Employment data: detailed data on employees per bank, concerning profession, salaries
and education.
4. General data: about 30 figures per bank on production volumes, aggregate costs,
depreciations and the like, for 1984 to 1987, for the same banks as mentioned under 2.
We shall consider data on automation, on the level of activities and on costs in some detail.
4.4.1 Automation data
These data give a quantitative and aqualitative indication of the spread of information technology
among local banks. Not only the amounts spent on automation equipment, but also the types of
machinery bought, are registered. There are figures on investments in six types of automation
equipment, by 119 banks, over a period of eight years. The six categories of investments are:
1) front office automation equipment; 2) either back or front office automation equipment
(undifferenlialed);' 3) personal computers and networks; 4) rapid cash registers; 5) automatic
teller machines; 6) a system for travel bookings. From these data we can make inferences about
the technological level of a bank.
Investments in automation equipment on the local bank level have increased considerably over
the last decade. Looking at investment streams in automation over the period 1979 to 1987
(Figures 1 and 2), we notice that there has been a marked upsurge in 1984 and 1985. The bulk
of these investments went into front office automation programs. Since then there has been a
slight decline in automation expenditures. Investments in personal computers is a relatively
constant stream over this period. Investments in rapid cash terminals have peaked around 1985.
and investments in automatic teller machines are taking off towards the end of the period under
consideration.
2 There is equipment dut an be used both by banks that have an automated front office and by banks thai only
have MI automated back office From investments in the.se type of machines no inferences about the precise
technical level of the bank can be made This type of equipment is contained in the second category The first
category contains all equipment that can only be used to automate the front office.üi 103
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rap-cuhInvestments in automation equipment are generally depreciated over a five year period. Figure
3 shows average nominal investment, cumulated over five years, between 1983 and 1987. This
gives an impression of the average rise in the size of the stock of automation equipment in banks.
Over the years 1983 to 1987 the average total stock has almost tripled, indicating that the average
bank indeed witnessed some major expansion in this respect during our sampling period.
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Most banks have installed back office automation equipment at a rather early stage. In most
cases, front office automation has equipment been added to this a few years later. Front office
automation is thus an extension, not a replacement, of back office automation. Automation of
the front office demands relatively large investments and usually requires a far-reaching
restructuring of operations and training of personnel. Although back office automation and front
office automation are not two distinct 'techniques' in banking, in the sense that the latter replaces
the former, one can say thai a bank having an automated front office is on a higher technological
level than a bank with only back office automation.
In our data set it is not indicated explicitly at what moment the front office has been automated.
However, thea* are some systems that are characteristic and necessary for front office auto-
mation, and we assume that from the moment onward that a bank has invested in such a system,
it has an automated front office at its disposal. However, the bank's expenses on office automation
systems from that moment onward do not have to be restricted to front office equipment, but
can also include further investments in automating the back office. Conversely, we assume thatin 105
as long as a bank has not invested in the characteristic front office automation machinery, its
automation expenditures that do not fall in any of the other categories are for the automation of
the back office.
Using the dales of the first investments of a bank in a certain category of equipment, we can
construct a graph that illustrates the diffusion of types of automation equipment, and thus of
certain production techniques. Figure 4 shows for eight years how many banks from the sample
of 119 possessed a certain system. The curves indicate that both back and front office automation
diffused over a period of approximately five years. The use of personal computers and networks
diffused slower. The diffusion of rapid cash terminals slowed down alter the introduction of
front office automation and automatic teller machines. The diffusion speed of ATMs increases
after 1986. The curves follow the sigmoid shape familiar from diffusion literature: the rate of
adoption of systems at first increases and later decreases. The similarity in shape and slope of
the curve of back office automation and the curve of front office automation is remarkable.
Figure 4
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As mentioned, it is more correct to think of different banks as operating on a different techno-
logical level, rather than as operating distinct techniques. Thus we distinguish at the local branch
office between the first level, on which banking operations are still not automated, the second
level, on which only the back office is automated, and the third level, on which both the back
and the front office are automated. Investments in back and front office automation constitute
by far the largest components of the automation budget, but there are data on a number of smaller
expenses available. A closer look reveals that, as far as the timing is concerned, back office
automation investments precede all other expenses. Banks automate the back office before106
investing in front office equipment, rapid cash terminals, personal computers and network
facilities. Investments in automatic teller machines in general follow as the latest developments.
The coming to maturity the last category falls outside the scope of the data set, but here also
major investments in machinery and network connections are required. The cash dispenser is a
more advanced alternative for many counter operations and for the rapid cash terminal. Therefore
we distinguish a fourth level of technological progress, for which the automatic teller machine




Considering the similarity of the diffusion patterns of back office automation and front office
automation, one may wonder whether the banks that are first to automate the back office are
also the first to automate the front office. Figure 6, presenting the number of years between the
introduction of back office automation and of front office automation equipment, reveals that
this is generally not the case. It seems that among the banks in the sample there is not a clear
division between first movers and laggards.107
FlgBR*

















I i l PV7
345678S
laginyw»
4.4.2 Firm size data
Beside data on investments in automation equipment, there are two other important categories
of information available: data on activity levels and data on costs. Together these two categories
yield a picture of scale, inputs and outputs of a bank. In this section we shall deal with data on
levels of activity, in the next with data on costs.
Differences in the scale of operations or in size of a bank can be factors that lead to differences
in technical capabilities, in the ability to exploit economies of scale, the ability to finance large
investments or the willingness to run financial risks. These differences may cause differential
speeds of technical progress or of times of adoption of new technology. Scale of operation can
be measured by looking at inputs, at outputs or both. Given that we are after the relationship
between inputs, outputs and technological progress, the main inputs of interest arc labour and
investments in high technology equipment. The main outputs are the outputs produced using
information technology, which are connected mainly with maintenance and monitoring of
accounts, transfers of payments, and the like. For 1987, we have information on these variables
for 82 banks.
On the output side, the following categories are distinguished: 1) current accounts, 2) savings
accounts, 3) loans, and 4) mortgages. Concerning these four output categories several data are
registered per bank:MS
1. The number of current accounts, savings accounts loans and mortgages;
2. The tola! value on savings accounts, in loans and in mortgages;
3. The number of mutations in current accounts, saving accounts, loans and mortgages.
(X the total number of accounts, 62.5% are savings accounts, 26% are current private accounts
without credit, 5.H% are loans, and 5.6% are current and private accounts with credit. Of the
total number of registered mutations in current and savings accounts and loans, 92.5% are in
current accounts, 5.5% are in savings accounts and 2% are in loans. The ratio of the value in
































































































legenda: mca: number of mutations of current account; awe: accounts with credit; asc: accounts without credit;
msu: mutations savings accounts, nsa number of savings accounts; asa: amounts on savings accounts; mln:
mutations in loans, nln: number of loans; aln: amounts in loans; nmo: number of mortgages; amo: amounts in
Table 4 shows that current account activities and savings activities are highly correlated, but
that those two are less correlated with loan activities and even less so with mortgages. Mutations
in current accounts, numbers of current and private accounts without credit, numbers and
mutations of savings accounts, and amounts on savings accounts are all highly correlated. The
number of loans is highly correlated with savings activities and the number of accounts without
credit. The amount of loans is highly correlated with the amount of savings. Only mortgage
activity seems to be rather independent of the other variables. Thus, Table 4 indicates that a
number of variables can serve well to represent a sort of general output measure of the activities
of the bank. An aggregate output measure will be rather robust against changes in the weights
of the components.
Concerning input data we have to rely mostly on cost data, except for data on labour inputs,
which are in volume terms (number of employees weighted by numbers of days worked per
year). Table 5 shows that labour volumes are highly correlated with output. This suggests that
at the aggregate level labour productivity is rather stable, despite differences in technology.
lab
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Labour is highly correlated with current account and savings variables, and less with loans and
mortgages. Assuming that the size of the workforce is a good measure for the size of the bank,
we can plot a distribution over bank-sizes (see Figure 7). The distribution is heavily skewed to
the left: there are a lot of small banks, but only a few large ones. Plotting a distribution using
other size indicators gives a similar impression (see Figures 11 and 12 in the appendix to this
chapter).
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Regression of adoption dates on size indicators shows that on average large firms adopt new
technology earlier. More specifically, regression of 'years of back office automation' on the
logarithm of mutations in current accounts and number of workers gives the following result:
dependent:













Regression of 'years of front office automation in 1988' on the logarithm of changes in current
accounts and number of workers yields:
dependent:
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Size seems an important factor indeed in the explanation of the date of adoption of a new
technique, but on its own this factor only explains for about a third to one half the variation in
adoption times. This is also illustrated by Figures 8,9 and 10 below, where Firm size is displayed
on the horizontal axis and the number of years a bank has a certain system in use on the vertical
axis. The general impression is that, whereas most large banks innovate early, not all the small
banks adopt late. In other words, late adopters are generally small, but early movers are not
always big. »*»»'-'• ••''•'.'•.••HMÜH^VÜ.IW,'.'»".;»-- • •• •• •'•••• ••• •••
4.4.3 Costdata '"I ' --
A problem in analyzing data sets that are as differentiated as these, both in types of inputs and
in types of outputs, is to distinguish between the various parallel production processes that link
the different outputs to their specific inputs. A bank produces a number of outputs with the same
inputs, making it difficult to assign costs to products. At the construction of the present database,
attempts have been made to tackle this problem at the source and to register inputs together with
their destination. Therefore the cost information has a rather elaborate structure. -, .
Nine broad but rather unequal categories of costs are distinguished in our data set. More than
half of the costs are wage costs. The other half is divided into eight cost types. Administration
and office costs constitute about one sixth of the total; automation costs are only about 6% on
average; the other categories are rather minor. Their percentages in total costs are as follows:114
Table II: Dtatribation of carts I over product*
type I; in %
management cottt
administration cotts




















Payment transfer operations are still relatively labour intensive, despite automation. Depreci-
ation of equipment is a minor cost factor, only one twelfth of the total. Clearly, loans are the
most labour intensive products of the three.
•«-'•/
Table III Dtatribution of cart* II over product*
type II; in %
commercial costs




















Indirect co*U account for about one third of the costs of all these products Important differences
are in commercial costs, which are important mainly in financing operations, and in cash, counter
and processing costs, which are the bulk of costs in payment transfers and, to a lesser extent
however, in savings.
4.4.4 Scale economies ' ,
Given these detailed data on costs and our measures for firm size, one can try to determine
whether scale economies are important to the banks in the data sample. There are economies of
scale, if an x% increase in siw leads to a less than x% increase in costs, and there are diseconomies
of scale if the increase in costs exceeds x%. To determine this size elasticity of costs, the logarithm
of costs has been regressed on the logarithm of size, plus a constant For size two proxies have
been selected: number of mutations in current accounts and total labour input. For costs 14
measures have been tried: total costs, a subdivision of total costs in 9 type I items, and another
subdivision of total costs in 4 type II components. The results are displayed in the following
table. Only estimated elasticities are given. T-statistics indicate that all estimated coefficients
arc significant and that mostly the constant, which is sometimes positive sometimes negative,
is also significant. The first two columns give results of estimations with all banks in the sample;
in the last two columns the banks without front office automation have been left out, to get a
more homogeneous sample.
In Table 13 the estimated labour input elasticities of different types of costs, the second column,
are given in ascending order per sub-category. If we would order using the first column as key,
the table would change only marginally. Thus, as far as the ordering is concerned, the two
measures of size yield approximately the same results. However, the elasticities in terms of
mutations of current accounts are generally lower than in terms of labour inputs. Scale economies
are more pronounced if we look at this highly standardized output than if we look at labour in
general.in IIS
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total costs 0.94» 0.99 0.92» 0.99
Coefficients that are significantly different from 1 at the 5* level are Indicated by a *.
.1 ;
The coefficients obtained for total costs indicate that there arc slight overall economies of scale.
Scale economies are most pronounced in costs of management, public relations and study and
training, but also in automation costs. Remarkably there are virtually no scale economies
observed in costs of administration. Scale economies can neither be shown in overall labour
costs. However, if we consider components of type II which consist to a large extent of labour,
there seem to be counteracting movements which balance out. Larger banks seem to be able to
save on processing and indirect costs, but spend extra on cashier and counter work. Different
reasons could be advanced for this last finding: larger banks offer more products at their counters;
customers with more complicated demands go to larger banks; counter work is a category in
the time administration in which everything not administered otherwise ends up, and in large
banks there is more undefined use of time and structural overcapacity. '"'•;** '"
Furthermore, it is remarkable that there are scale economies in training costs, but diseconomies
in labour costs. An explanation for this finding could be that larger banks have on average more
expensive employees, e.g. more experts, but spend less on training them. The the second column,
in which labour inputs are used as size indicator, shows diseconomies of scale if we look at
costs of administration, of labour, housing, telecommunication, commercial activities and
counter services. This also seems to indicate that as banks get larger, they employ relatively
more expensive personnel, although less management personnel, and put more work into counter
service and commercial service.
It might be that what appear to be scale economies above, are in fact the effects of the earlier
adoption of new technology by larger banks: larger banks produce more efficiently, because
they apply more efficient techniques. To account for this effect, the equations have been
re-estimated, leaving out the banks that have not installed front office automation equipment
yet. From the table it is clear that the earlier impression of scale effects is reinforced, rather than
diminished. This is especially apparent, if we consider the results obtained with mutations in
current accounts (column 3). All coefficients here are below the overall estimates. It thus seems116
that new technology compensates for diseconomies of scale in the earlier technique. The
coefficients obtained from equations with labour inputs as the dependent variable point in the
same direction, although the evidence is less decisive.
The overall picture points out that there are certain economies of scale, especially in the pro-
duction of standardized outputs. These scale economies are obtained through lower processing
costs. Scale economies, however, are hardly translated into lower overall costs, because the
extra margins seem to be invested in personnel doing commercial work and especially delivering
counter services.
4.5 Selection of data for model testing
The data presented above will be used in the next chapter to test some aspects of the models in
chapter 3. These models of the firm mainly relate three key variables to each other: output,
variable factors of production and investment. The model is built on the assumption that output
u sold on (he market against the current market price, that variable inputs are rented on a short
term basis and involve no long term commitments, and that investments are long term com-
mitments, aimed at expanding production capacity and at reducing the need for variable inputs.
The effectiveness of investment might be dependent on the technological level of the firm. In
(his section we shall attempt to find reasonable data from the data set, as proxies for these
variables in the model.
First of all. consider output capacity. In the model, output is assumed to be homogeneous and
of constant quality over lime. The output of a bank, however, is far from homogeneous. One
can look at a bank's output from different perspectives. Above we considered the functions of
the bank: it acts as intermediary in paymeni transactions, as creditor, as debtor, as financial
adviser and so on. Thus the bank guards deposits, grants credits and loans, gives advise, and
transfers money. One can also look at the product of banking in a more 'physical' sense of the
word. Seen from this perspective, the product of a bank is largely administrative output: the
bank produces accounts, updates on account figures, mutations in accounts and transfers of
money, calculations of interest, things in your mailbox. This type of administrative output is
produced in a highly standardized way, mainly by a labour force consisting of cashiers and
counter personnel, administrative personnel in the back office and data typists. Production of
this type of banking product is progressively automated by the introduction of back office
automation, front office automation, automatic teller machines, optical character recognition
equipment, tclcbanking. etc. Beside this rather physical mass product, the bank produces also
less standardized output, like business credits, mortgages and financial advice. These products
are more customer tailored and more labour intensive in production. Here service plays a larger
role and more expertise is required. Labour generates more value added here than in the pro-
duction of the standardized output. These latter activities can only be automated to a very limited
extent.
The model we to want test describes the development of a firm producing a standardized type
of output, which is produced with limited fixed and lots of variable factors of production, but
which could be produced moa> efficiently if there were investment in technical progress. If this
model is to describe the activities of a bank, we should disregard the output of financial advice,
credit grants and loans. What the model might describe accurately, is the development of thein
production of the administrative product. Margins on this product arc low. volumes are large
and have been growing over the last decades. There is ample room for automation by introducing
computer and telecommunication technologies. The introduction of these technologies is a
lengthy process of experimenting, learning, improving and expanding. Computer equipment
replaces low qualified labour which gels progressively more expensive due to rising labour
costs. This type of labour is a relatively variable factor, because there is a fairly large natural
turnover and no large investments in human capital have to be depreciated/ All this accords
well with the assumptions of the model.
There are two categories of data series in the data set that could serve as indicators for the volume
of a bank's production of this standard output: there is information on payment traffic and there
is information on savings activities. These two categories capture most of the standardised
business of banks. Payment traffic is clearly the more voluminous output of the two. Looking
at total costs, almost one half is attributable to payment traffic and about one seventh to savings
(see Table 14). Between one third and half of the costs of labour are attributable to payment
traffic and around one twelfth to savings.
TaMe 14: Costs of payments and saving* as share In total costs and labour costs
percentage costs payment traffic savings
as share of total cows 1985 43 1 15.7
1986 42.8 14 1
1987 45.6 12.9
as share of labour costs 1985 44.1 8.9
"••• 1986 41.2 9.1
1987 43.0 8.6
The level of activity connected with payment traffic has developed differently from the level of
activity concerned with savings. Whereas the former shows an increase in virtually every bank,
measuring activity both in terms of numbers of accounts and in terms of account mutations, the
latter shows a slight drop in about half of the total number of banks in the sample, going from
1985 to 1986. Going from 1986 to 1987, the number of savings accounts drops in almost every
bank in the sample, but the number of mutations decreases in 12% of the banks. The model of
chapter 3 describes growth of production, due to capacity increase, given an expanding or stable
market. In its basic form, it does not describe contraction. It seems that in the period under
consideration, the savings product of the bank was underpressure, probably due to factors outside
the realm of elements which are accounted for in the model, like changes in savings conditions
or interest rates offered. Because, on the one hand, payment traffic is a more important product
of the bank, in volume and cost terms, than savings, and on the other hand, payment traffic
activity grows over the period we consider, whereas savings activity declines, it seems most
appropriate to apply the model to data on payment activities.
Information on payment traffic consists of data on the total number of current accounts and the
number of mutations of accounts. Numbers of accounts give an impression of the size of a bank,
maybe of the extent of fixed activities connected with monitoring. Mutations in accounts give
an impression of the fluctuating activity of the bank. Since it is the actual production activity
3 In cbe hank for which we have data, the turnover rates in the latter pan of the seventies were above 12% and far
first half of the eighties between 7* and 11 *. The average job tenure of administrative personnel, desk clerks,
data typists and secretaries was around five to seven years.118
of the bank that we want to capture, it seems that mutations in accounts, which is a flow variable,
would be a more appropriate scries to use as proxy for production volume than numbers of
accounts, which has more the feature of a stock variable. On the other hand, numbers of accounts
may give more an impression of the capacity to produce than mutations. One option to construct
a measure for output would be to use a weighted sum of the two series. Because no clue as to
the right relative weights of mutations and of numbers of accounts is available, both series will
not be aggregated but will be used separately. The number of mutations in current accounts of
bank j will henceforth be indicated by K, and the total number of current accounts registered
with bank j will be indicated as K,.
It should be kept in mind that, although any of the indicators proposed might approximate output
satisfactorily, it is possible that none correlates highly with production capacity. The model
describes the development of output capacity, which might develop differently from output
idelf, if there are large variations in the rates of capacity utilization. By taking output data as
proxies for capacity, we assume that there is a stable relationship between capacity and pro-
duction. If the firm raises capacity, it is assumed to be able to sell its additional output. Demand
is assumed to be more or less price clastic, but markets are not saturated. Possible fluctuations
in capacity utilization rates arc not accounted for in the model. In the particular case of banking
operations, this assumption is questionable: banks do not charge explicit prices for mutations
of accounts. Therefore, the decision on the part of the customer to use this service of the bank
is based on different arguments than the price or cost of transfer of money. Accounts are changed
whenever there are payment obligations, need for cash, interest differences, and so on, but
demand can hardly be assumed a function of price.
Secondly, consider variable factors of production. This is a variable for which it is even more
difficult then for production capacity to select a data series to represent it. The problem is that
almost any factor is variable at the margin, but, considering time periods of one year, is to a
large extent fixed. A bank can decrease the necessary input of counter work or data input work,
of mailing or paper or housing or cleaning, of management or administration. This it can do by
investing in an increase of factor productivity. However, it is impossible to do away with counter
work, data input work or management all together. Thus, in every category of factors that is
registered, we can expect that there is some part expendable and a large part fixed. This means
that to take any series as data for variable inputs introduces a measuring error, and to leave out
any series introduces an error as well.
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that some inputs are more variable than others. Labour could
be more variable than other inputs. Although labour contracts do not allow much flexibility on
a short term basis, a high job turnover rate introduces some dynamics. Highly qualified personnel,
like experts, managers and board, can be considered less variable than low qualified labour, like
data typists and desk clerks. The higher job turnover rates of the last group arc an indication
which support this intuition. The low qualified labour produces the standardized output of the
bank. Thus, if we model the production of a standardized banking product, there is something
to be said for taking specific types of labour as a proxy for variable factors: administrative work,
data input work, cashier and counter work. An alternative would be to consider total labour
input. Although specific types of labour, say administrative labour, fits the concept of variable
input more than total labour, it is also more prone to measurement errors and flaws in the
registration. Therefore we use three alternative data sets for the estimations below. By V„, we&vt*in£ in
designate the total labour employed by bank j. This has been measured by dividing total labour
costs in a specific year by the appropriate price index. Furthermore, by V, we designate total
labour, used by bank j as input to the production of payment traffic, and by Vj data input work,
cashiers work and counter work used for payment traffic. Thus Vj is equal to V, minus the
categories commercial and indirect costs of payment transfers. V, is about 70* of total the data
processing, cashier's and counter work.
On the one hand, there are data in the data set on numbers of employees and. on the other hand,
there are data on costs of certain types of labour for the production of certain types of output.
Since most employees perform different tasks in the organization, and our interest is in specific
types of work as inputs to the production process, we lake data from the files of costs of certain
types of labour inputs.
Next, consider the choice of a series for the investment in progress. This seems relatively
straightforward: investment in automation equipment is explicitly aimed at raising the pro-
ductivity of the variable factors of production, and at raising production capacity. Most auto-
mation equipment is installed for the facilitation of payment traffic. A difficulty is presented by
the fact that investments in automation tend to have a lumpy character. These investmenls tend
to take place at large and irregular intervals and do not yield a smooth data scries. One conse-
quence of these bulky investments is that utilization rates will not be stable. Right after the
completion of the investment project there will be overcapacity, which will be filled up gradually
as the firm expands output. Another consequence of lumpy investments is that it takes a large
effort of the organization to accommodate to the new way of producing. There is a considerable
learning period, before the investment results in the aimed productivity rises. For modelling,
this means that, first of all, production and capacity tend to diverge, and therefore production
might not be a good proxy for capacity, and, secondly, that an investment at some period will
have delayed effects on productivity in later periods. To account for the delayed effects of
investments, we take a accumulation of investments over a number of years 6, with weights £,
as our measure for investment: A/, = X £J*.
' t-(-8 '
For investment, there are data for nine years, 1979 to 1987. Investment series W have to be
cumulated over a period of at least three or four years to get a reasonably smooth investment
series. Cumulating over more than five years seems inappropriate, because a lot of this equipment
is depreciated over a five year period, which indicates that banks count on replacement of this
equipment after a five year period. It would not be suitable to assume an influence on productivity
and capacity of investments that are likely to have been already scrapped. Probably the estimates
are only moderately sensitive for additions of investments further back since the volume of this
type of investments has grown quite considerably since the beginning of the eighties. Weighting
investments from different years is problematic, because it should not only account for the large
price drops in automation equipment, but also for price changes in application software, other
office equipment and refurnishing, for the existence of learning effects over a number of periods
and for scrapping. Reliable price indices for this type of investments are not available. There is
thus no way a priori to determine an accurate scheme of weights. However, some experimenting
with different schemes of weights, assuming a deflation per year of rates between 0% and 20%
(on the assumption that the deflationary tendencies outweigh their inflationary counterparts),120
showed a very high rate of correlation between investment series weighed in different ways.
Since the relative ordering of banks in the series seemed to be robust vis a v/s these trans-
formations, it was decided to take the unweighted sum of investments in automation equipment
over five years as a measure for M.
Finally, some indicators for the technological level of a bank will be needed. Obvious candidates
arc the number of years a bank already uses a certain system in a specific years r. We shall use
the number of years a bank uses back office automation equipment in 1988 and the number of
years it uses front office automation equipment in 1988. In addition, an indicator has been
constructed to express how long ago on average investments in automation equipment were
done, the average investment lag, defined as to^r = X fA*r-i H £ Af^_, . If two banks have
V-i A'-' /
invested the same amount, then this indicator will be higher for the bank that has invested first
and is thus supposed to be on a more advanced technological level, due to learning effects.
Summing up, it seems most proper to use data series representing payment traffic as a measure
for output. We use two scries for output, mutations in current accounts K, and numbers of current
accounts K,. Variable inputs are represented by three alternatives, total labour V„, total labour
input in payment traffic V,, and total cashier's, counter and data processing labour input in
puyment traffic Vj. The last measure is probably more accurate, but the first might suffer less
from errors of measurement. Investments arc represented by a five year accumulation of series
of investments in automation equipment A/,. For output and labour input, there are data for three
years, 1985 to 1987, and for investment there are data for nine years, 1979 to 1987. All three
our data series suffer from their particular deficiency. The proxy for capacity does not account
lor changes in utilization rate, the proxy for variable factor demand is total demand for one
factor, instead of marginal demand for all factors, and the investment proxy is limited to
investment in automation equipment and suffers from obscurities in the lag structure.
All together there are 58 banks for which there are data for all three years, 15 banks for which
only dula for 1985 and 1986 arc available and 17 banks for which only data for 1986 and 1987
are in the data set. Thus there are all together 148 observations of changes of y, and V, from
one year to the next. There are two observations of large decreases in production output y,.
These have been left out of the sample, because here it is likely that mechanisms of contraction
of business are operative which are not captured by the model.
The sire distribution of the banks is asymmetric. There are many small banks and about three
very large banks in the sample (see Figure 7). Moreover, there is one bank that has invested
disproportionately in automation equipment, even in relation to its size, and a bank that has not
invested in automation between 1984 and 1986. These latter two banks have also been deleted
from the sample.
The relationships between the variables chosen in this section are illustrated in a number of
graphs in the appendix to this chapter. The first four graphs picture the variation in the data
series for capacity and variable factor productivity; the next two illustrate the differences between
various measures of capacity and variable inputs: the next six graphs represent the relationshipin 7%r AfctA?rfcvufr 121
between the key variables of the model, growth in production capacity and in variable factor
productivity, and investment; the last six graphs illustrate the relationships between investment,
on the one hand, and size and productivity, on the other hand.
4.6 Conclusion < , i
The banking industry is one of the parts of the services sector that is most affected by the
development of information technologies. The introduction of computer equipment in Dutch
banks started already about three decades ago, but has gained momentum in the lust ten years.
Automation takes no longer place exclusively at bank's headquarters, but proliferates to local
branch offices. The construction of networks for data exchange has facilitated and stimulated
this trend toward decentralized automation. This trend has many consequences, not only for
labour and productivity, but also for the product range, product quality, management and
organization of the bank.
Part of this trend is reflected in our data set. The data cover some important steps in the automation
of local branch offices of banks: automation of data processing, first at the back office and later
at the front office. We presented figures on the introduction and diffusion of a number of systems,
of which the most important were back office automation equipment, front office automation
equipment and automatic teller machines. The diffusion of these systems seems to follow a well
known pattern: an S-shaped diffusvon curve. Beside data on technology adoption, we considered
data on firm sizes and on costs. The distribution over firm sizes is heavily skewed to the left:
there are many small firms and few large. Regression of innovation dates on size indicated that
firm size in itself can only partly explain the date of adoption of back office automation or front
office automation equipment. In particular, there are almost no large banks that adopt late, but
there are quite some small banks that adopt early. Cost data showed that labour costs account
for more that half of the total, and automation costs for less than 6% on average in 1987. Almost
half of all costs are made in taking care of transfers of payments and administering payment
accounts. Finally, the data were analysed to see whether there are economies of scale in banking.
We found that on average there might be slight economies of scale. Looking at cost components,
it turned out that there are economies of scale in a number of activities, like management, public
relations, training, automation and mail. However, considering the costs of labour, especially
of cashiers and counter clerks, there could be some diseconomies of scale.
The introduction of new technology is bound to have an influence on output and on both the
quantity of employment and the quality of work. Figures do not adequately reflect changes in
the quality of work or of production, nor do they say much about diversification of the product
range. They might, however, contain some information on developments in labour productivity
and output volume, in relation to investments in new technology, along the lines described by
the models of chapter 3. From the data reviewed here, some series were selected to be used for
testing these models. These series will serve as proxies for production capacity K, for variable
factor inputs V, for investments W, and for technological level t. In the next chapter these data
will be used to analyse the mechanics of technical change in banking. This is an hazardous
venture. First of all, it is notoriously difficult in banking to calculate costs of products. Some
services, like domestic payment transfers, are not even priced, but seen as a by-product of other
operations. Under these circumstances one cannot expect bankers to calculate their odds as sharp
as the industrialists in our models, when the marginal returns on investment are at slake.122
Uncertainties about cosLs and benefits of in vestments in automation are substantial, which creates
room for other arguments than financial return when decisions have to be taken. Rational decision
making might take different forms in banking than in other sectors.
Secondly, banking in The Netherlands is dominated by a very small number of competitors that
do not seem to engage in cut throat competition, although profits are not high to international
standards. To approach the introduction of technology purely from the perspective of a firm
struggling in a competitive market might be oversimplified. Maybe decisions concerning the
speed of automation of banks are not taken solely at the level of the local bank, but also at a
higher level. There might be a component of strategic behaviour at the level of the banking
organization that does not show in the data.
Thirdly, technological change is a long term issue. Long term trends on the supply side are
blurred by short term fluctuations on the demand side. Demand for banking products is volatile
and largely independent of the pricing and the technology of the bank. The bank charges an
interest margin to cover its costs, but the price of a banking product like a credit is largely
determined by the cost of necessary raw materials: savings. These interest rates do not move
under the control of the bank. Unfortunately, our lime series are very brief and demand shifts
might introduce some noise in the data.
Whatever the hazards may be, the attraction of the venture lies in the fact that the data set in
itself has u large degree of detail, and in the notion that the introduction of information tech-
nologies gradually revolutionizes business in the banking industry, and the services sector at
large, beyond recognition.
Appendix: some graphs illustrating the data to be used for model testing
Figures 11 and 12 show the output distribution of banks in 1986, measured in two ways, by
number of mutations in current accounts K, and by total number of current accounts Kj
respectively. From both graphs, like from graph 6. it can be seen that the differences between
banks are large: the largest bank is about ten limes the size of the smallest bank. The graphs
also show clearly that the size distribution is rather skewed: there are many small banks and a
small number of relatively large banks.
Figures 13 and 14 show the distribution of variable factor productivity, first measured as number
of mutations in current accounts K, per volume of processing, cashier and counter work Vj, and
then measured as number of numbers of current accounts Kj per volume of processing, cashier
and counter work Vj. The graphs have the shape one might expect: a bell shaped distribution
of productivity. The figures indicate that there are large differences in productivity between
banks: the banks with the highest productivity arc nearly 2.5 times as productive in producing
mutations in accounts as the least productive banks. These large differences in productivity
might be caused by differences in production technique, such that some banks use much more
labour intensive techniques than others. Alternatively they might be caused by heterogeneity of
output or labour inputs. Finally, they might be caused by errors of measurement, e.g. because
banks register labour input into processing of payments in a different way.I/I 77if AfcrArrbvu& 123
Figures 15 and 16 show the relationships between the two proxies of output. K, and K,, and
between different proxies of variable factors of production, on the one hand V, and V,. and on
the other hand V„ and Vj. The growth rates of mutations are on average about 3 to 4* higher
than the gmwth rates of the numbers of accounts. Growth rates of numbers and mutations of
accounts show only a weakly positive relationship to each other. The measures of labour input
V„ and Vj are only weakly correlated, but the measures V, and V, arc strongly correlated.
Figures 17 and 18 thereafter plot growth in output versus growth in variable factor productivity,
again measured in two ways. These are in fact the graphs that the model tries to explain. Output
is measured as K, and K, respectively, and growth in variable factor productivity is measured
as relative growth in output minus relative growth in variable inputs Vj. Clearly there is a large
variation in combinations of expansion and productivity increase. Both graphs show many
negative values for productivity growth. The fact that a large number of banks saw productivity
drop is probably due to a slack in demand and thus underutilization of capacity. Such a fall in
productivity is a feature that is not covered by the model of chapter 3.
Figures 19 to 22 illustrate the relationship between explanandum and explanans. The first two
graphs show investment in automation equipment, cumulated over the years 1982 to 19K6. and
growth in output volume over 1986-1987, measured in two ways. The last two graphs show
investment and growth in labour productivity over 1986-1987, where productivity equals output,
here too measured in two ways, divided by variable factor productivity, using Vj as a proxy.
These graphs do not reveal strong partial correlations between the independent variable M and
either of the dependent variables Kor K/V.
Figures 23 to 26, relate investment between 1982 and 1986 to size in 1986, and investment
between 1982 and 1986 to productivity in 1986. Investment precedes the measurement of size
and productivity. There is a clear relationship between investment and size, but not between
investment and productivity.
Figures 27 to 30, finally, picture the reversed relationship between investment and size and
productivity: investment is measured in periods following the measurement of size and pro-
ductivity. Investment is cumulated over the years 1985 to 1987, size is measured in 1985, by
K, and K2 respectively, and so is productivity in the year 1985, measured by K, /Vj and K2 /Vj.
Changes in capacity and productivity and investment may be mutually dependent. Growth in
capacity and productivity are caused by investment, but differences in capacity and productivity
on their turn are likely to cause differences in investment. The relationship between size and
subsequent investment is positive. Between productivity and subsequent investment there seems
to be no relationship. Maybe the fact that investments could be cumulated over three years only
is of influence here.Ftgnrcll
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Figure 18 expansion vs. rationalization
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Figure 30 productivity vs. investment
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In this chapter, the data set described in chapter 4 will be analysed with the help of the models
of chapter 3. The models developed in chapter 3 describe the development of one single firm
over a long period of time. The data set. however, comprises only short lime series, but contains
a lot of cross section information. This restricts the extent to which the model can be put to the
test. Model predictions cannot be compared to actual long term developments. What can be
done with cross section data, is to see to whether firms at one moment in lime behave according
to a pattern which can be predicted by a two-period version of the model. Firms proceed along
their path of development, and one can try to discover whether there are common elements to
these paths, and whether some firms are further along a common path than others.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Before turning to the data, we take some time to reconsider
and simplify the model. A number of hypotheses are developed that can be tested with the
available short data scries. This is done by abandoning the long term planning horizon and
receding to the assumption of myopia. Using this simplified model, we analyse how inter firm
differences in characteristics would work out in terms of inter firm differences in development
of production capacity and productivity. Then we tackle the data and follow a strategy of testing
ever less restrictive assumptions on the similarity of the development paths of firms. In a sense,
we start out from testing the idea of a representative firm and proceed to allow for an increasing
number of differences between firms, in order to find out to what extent all firms follow the
same path.
5.2 A two-period model * ' .f
In chapter 3, we considered the investment planning over time of a firm. The firm aims both at
expansion and at rationalization. Two bench-mark states of the world were considered, one in
which technology was unchanging, the other in which technical progress was pervasive, in the
sense that every investment had a strong cumulative effect on productivity. To derive some
hypotheses about the relationship between differences in firm characteristics and differences in
behaviour, we reduce the general model to a two-period model, in which only one decision about
a one time investment is taken. At the same time we introduce a more general specification of
technical change, of which the two bench-marks mentioned above are special cases. The more
general specification for the technical constraints allows not only for stationary technology and
pervasive technical progress, but also for forms in between and for asymmetric technological
progress, in which there is more technological opportunity to augment fixed factors than to save133
on vtriable factors, or ró* versa. The starting point is once more the basic model of chapter 3.
section 3. Depletion of technological opportunity and variation in prices are not considered. The
model, reformulated for the myopic firm, is: ,„ - ^ .-.„.,,„ „..„...,,., „,„,-.,.,,
subject to:
In this chapter, a dot over a variable with index r indicates the change in this variable from period
/ to the next: *, = JC,», -jr,. This convention keeps the notation here comparable to the notation
in chapter 3, although we have moved from continuous to discrete time. The formulation of the
technical constraints above encompasses both the bench-mark cases of chapter 3, sections 3 and
4. If a, = otj = 0, there is no technical change, and if a, = Oj = 1. there is pervasive technical
change. Intermediate values describe a mixture of technical change and plain expansion and
substitution. We shall call the difference between a, and a, the bias in technological r>/>/*>rrMniiy,
not to be confused with the direction of or the bias in technical c/ia/i^, which depends on the
firm's choice of #(P)/p, given price ratios, a, and a,. If a, > Oj, then the current course of
technological development gives more possibilities for technical progress in expansion of the
production, than for decreasing variable factor requirements. Technological opportunity is thus
biased towards augmentation of the capital stock. Conversely, if a, < a?, technological
opportunity is biased towards saving on the variable input flows. Finally, if a, = otj, technological
opportunity is neutral. r ; ,- , '
The characterization of technical change hinges on the presence of a cumulative effect, a learning
effect. This cumulative effect cannot be discerned, if only two periods are considered. In a sense,
however, the cumulative effect is being slipped into the model, by making the effect of
investments on y, and V,, on growth of capacity and variable factor demand, a function of
capacity K, and variable factor demand V,, which are determined by firms' actions in the past.
It is assumed that there is no obsolescence. Therefore the objective function can be written as:
wV,-wV,-H'V,-H'V',-rM, (4)
Since prices are assumed constant, a number of the terms in the objective function drop out,
because they are constant or zero. Substituting the constraints in the objective function, gives
(suppressing time indices of (J and Af):
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Wc write c, • Ko""' and Cj • Vo""*. where c, and Cj are both positive constants. Solving and
writing y, = K,/V, for variable factor productivity yields: -jMyiym «f; r:i f>ar>Uj?sr. ."'iai J-ih;m
«. p ,Ww,v«- (6)
*'(*#)
Equation (6) indicates that the optimal direction of the investment depends on the bias in
technological opportunity, the difference between a, and o^. A higher a, and a lower o^ boasts
P and curbs investment towards expansion. Equation (7) says that optimal total investment in
progress grows with technological opportunities for expansion a,. It depends on the sign of
P - #((}). whether larger opportunities in variable input saving otj lead to a higher budget: if g(P)
exceeds p, investments rise when a, rises. Like in chapter 3 (see equations (1) and (2) there),
we impose some restrictions on the trade-off function #(P) and on the investment function /i (A/).
The trade-off function is downward sloping (#'(P) < 0), and the investment function is upward
sloping (A '(A/) >0).
..'-. rfvrt • : -ni 's -fiJ '; •<••.(• j "-d <••: i>.=
By analyzing equations (6) and (7), differences in firm behaviour can be traced, as a function
of technical possibilities and differences in firm characteristics, notably in size y, and variable
factor productivity y,. Taking the derivatives of equations (6) and (7) with respect to K, and y,,
we consider the differences in slope of #((}) and fc(M) in the optimum, for different firm sizes
and variable factor productivities. First consider the derivative of #'(P) with respect to pro-
duction:
tf technological opponunity is biased, then a larger scale of production causes investments to
be more curbed in the direction of the bias:
oil ""i ' • .• •'
The optimal direction of investment changes as scale of production increases. The direction of
the change, however, depends on the bias in technological opportunities: if there is more
opponunity for 'variable factor saving technical change' than for 'capital stock augmenting
technical change' (a, < a,), then the larger the firm, the larger the share of investment that will
be directed towards variable input saving, given equal variable factor productivity y,. If the bias
is in the opposite direction (a, > a,), then the larger the firm, the more investment will be directed£>>V>inciii ««I 137
towards fixed factor augmentation. In general, the iarj??r the firm, the ww Maw/ technical
change. The result holds, because larger firms can reap more profits from the cumulative effects
of technical change. They are more able to take advantage of the cumulative effect of investment.
Secondly, take the derivative of #'((}) with respect to variable factor productivity. The higher a
firm's variable factor productivity, the more it will direct investment towards expansion. More
efficient firms grow faster.
Inequality (10) holds for all permitted values of a, and a,.
Thirdly, consider the derivative of A'(M) with respect to production capacity:
_""1
A larger firm will spend a higher investment budget under the following condition:
This condition is fulfilled, if it is optimal to direct investment more towards variable input flow
saving, #(p) > p, because in that case the left hand side is positive and the right hand side is
negative. The condition can also be fulfilled, if g(p) < P, but then it is less straightforward to
determine (and interpret) the necessary conditions, because the model is not invariant to changes
in the split of value terms into a volume and a price component.
Finally, take the derivative of/i'(Af) to variable factor productivity: "••••• •< •'••
The condition fora larger investment budget as productivity grows is: ' :"'•' *•' '• '>*• *i i •
If it is optimal to spend resources relatively more on expansion than on rationalization, then the
higher a firm's variable factor productivity, the more it will invest. If, by contrast, it is optimal
to spend resources more on rationalization, then the higher a firm's variable factor productivity,
the less it will invest. The conclusions are summarized in Table 1.Tabfe 1: Tbc relationships between changes in size and productivity, and amount and direction of investment.
_ _ _ __
ff^,; " • '..lÜni.c UA^A "P"/„,
Table 1 shows that the direction of technical progress changes monotonously with size and with
productivity. The investment budget, however, does not necessarily display a monotonous
pattern, because the sign of the derivatives of fc'(Af) depends on size and productivity, as well
as on the direction of technical progress.
First consider the bottom row of Table 1. If productivity goes up, firms direct their investments
more toward expansion. Moreover, as firms are more productive they invest more, provided
that the optimal direction of investment is toward expansion. By contrast, as firms are more
productive they invest less, if the optimal direction of investment is toward rationalization. If
firms differ in productivity only, and if low productivity firms invest in rationalization (p < £(P))
and high productivity firms invest in expansion (P > #(P)h the relationship between productivity
and amount of investment may be downward sloping up to the value of productivity for which
in the optimum P = #(P), and upward sloping after.
Now consider the top row of Table 1. Larger firms direct their investments more in the direction
of the bias of technological opportunities. It is easy to see that for large firms of a certain
productivity the amount of investment varies positively with size. If a, > Oj, there is a specific
size above which the upper condition holds. If a, < Oj. there is a specific size above which
P < #(p). and thus the lower condition is violated. The relationship between size and investment
at lower levels of size is indeterminate and may be not monotonous.
Leaving the theoretical possibility of a locally negative relationship between investment and
size for what it is, but restricting ourselves to the more usual pattern, we can summarize our
findings in four hypotheses:
1. Large firms invest in a more biased direction than small firms. ^-..
2. Large firms generally spend more on investment.
3. Firms with more output per unit of variable input invest more in expansion.
4. Firms with more output per unit of variable input invest more, if it is optimal to invest
relatively more in expansion and less in rationalization.finpmco/ f«tt 139
5J Hypotheses and tests
The models of chapter 3 and of the previous section describe how rational firms act in an
environment that is characterized by a possibility for a trade off between expanding production
capacity and increasing variable factor productivity. The firm is assumed to choose an optimal
mix of expansion and rationalization of production, taking factor prices into account, and to
choose an optimal level of progress, depending on the marginal productivity of investment.
Assume there are different firms y to which the model applies. The general specification of the
technical constraints that firm ; faces at time r is:
- - • • .
• •!•• •• !-•!«!•; "V" ,r '.iiUisVI, ".ft RJ..1. ;V?!j ^'Jf ?i f.' VS.* - • •
,,[,,(P,^(P,)yi,(M,) ^ 3 ' .^<;;! :; w:^f«ai ?w>;;* nfHUA
The technical constraints of firm; are determined by two functions, #/(}) and Ay(M). and the
parameters a, and Oj. Every firm; makes a choice for the value of its instruments p, and M,.
The choices py and My of different firms; result in capacity growth and variable factor increase.
If a, and a, were equal to one, then these would be reflected in Figures (17) and (18) of chapter
4above. With respect to the function fy(My)and the optimal choice My, one out of four possibilities
has to apply: ,..
1. Every single firm faces the same technical constraint function: fy(M) = /i(M). At the
same time, every firm is faced with the same choice problem, the same parameters,
•* prices and possibilities. Therefore all firms take the same decision. The variation in the
outcomes which is apparent from Figures (17) and (18) in the last chapter is due to some
process which is independent of the determination of My, such that My = M + Cy, where
the Ey is a random disturbance. In view of the outcomes of section 2 it is unlikely that
the banks in our data set have all made the same choices. It was shown above that firms
of different size or variable factor productivity will choose different values My.
2. Every firm faces the same constraint function: fcy(M) = /»(M), but despite of that firms
make different choices My. Figures (17) and (18) are not the result of one optimal choice,
with some random disturbances, but results from a range of optimal choices. Underlying
this choice process, however, there is one stable technical constraint.
<•• Firms can be expected to choose a different M,, although the constraint function /i (M)
is the same for all firms, if there are differences in current output capacity or productivity,
as has been shown in section 2. Firms will also choose differently if they face different
-' prices or expect different price developments.
If the function /i(M) looks the same for all firms, but different firms choose different
values My, then, on the one hand, it must be possible to find the outlines of the function
. ... /i (M), on which every firm chooses one point. On the other hand, it might be possible
to detect which differences in firm characteristics account for observed differences in
choice M,.tt»
3. Firms each face a different function A/Af). and therefore make different choices A/,.
Every firm may act as described by the model, and for each firm the constraint function
fy(M) may be stable over time. The shape of this function, however, can differ across
Firms. Thus firms make different choices, despite of the fact that they all choose
rationally.
One important reason why the shape of Ay(A/) would differ over firms was advanced in
section S of chapter 3: /i,(M) could be dependent on the present technological level of
the firm, on technical abilities and on perceived opportunities, represented there by the
,,., variable t.
,. • Because only cross section data are available, we cannot test for stability of any function
/»,(AZ) for firm; over time, but only for similarity across firms. If the constraint function
would differ across firms, then it might be possible to relate this variation to variety in
firm characteristics which mirror technological level, e.g. by specifying
4. A last possibility is that the model does not describe the choice process of the firm to
any reasonable extent. Investment is not related to expansion and rationalization as
subsumed in the model. Other mechanisms dominate the course of developments.
Similarly, with respect to the function #,(0, )and Ihe optimal choice p,, one out of four possibilities
has to apply.
i. Every single firm faces the same technical constraint function: #y(P) = #((}). Also the
other parameters of the choice problem are the same, and thus all firms take the same
decision: P, = P + 6y. Again, it is unlikely that all firms make the same choice, if they
differ in size or in variable factor productivity. All firms would invest in the same
direction, only if #(p) were non-differentiable (have a corner, where both P,g(P) > 0).
we*.
2. Every firm faces the same constraint function. £y(P) = #(P). but firms make different
choices Py. Referring again to section 2, it was shown that differences in current output
-•'•&• capacity or productivity can lead to different choices py. If the function g (P) is the same
for all firms, but different firms choose different values Py, we might find the outlines
"'"••• of this function #(P). Also, it might be possible to detect what differences in firm
-' • characteristics account for observed differences in choice Py.
3. Firms each face a different function #,(P), and therefore make different choices Py. Also
here differences in level of technological development might be of influence.
4» Finally, it could be that the model does not describe the choice process of the firm
w accurately enough and that other mechanisms dominate the course of developments.
There is one more dimension that could be considered: it could be assumed that all firms face
the same parameters a, and a,, or that the a's would be different for all firms. Because the a's
mainly affect the amount of technical progress which results from an investment M by a firm,
it is natural to consider them together with the function /i(A/). Summarizing the above, one candistinguish between two functions that determine the technical constraints of any firm, and to
each of these, one out of four descriptions must apply. Together this makes 16 possible states
of the world that could provide the background to Figures (17) and (18). These possibilities can
be summarized in a matrix:
Table 2: Poeaible extent of rimilartty of different nVm! "~
same/i(M).a,«Klo%^_^} difr.A(W). noA(M)
-"VOJ
same choice M din* choice M din* choice M noM
i
same choice p la Ib Ic Id
sane constr. ƒ (p) ^
din* choice P 2a 2b 2c 2d ^
diff. consu j(P) difr choice P 3a 3b 3c 3d '"
>v
nog(P) noj 4a 4b 4c 4d _^
It follows from our theoretical analysis (see Table 1 above) (hat some states are more likely to
occur than others. Given different sizes and productivities of firms, we expect different choices
for the instruments P and W. Given different levels of technological development we expect the
shapes of the functions #(p) and /i(M) to be firm dependent. However, we do not know u priori
whether the differences between firms will be substantial, and whether these differences in firm
characteristics can be related explicitly to differences in constraints and in choices.
What can/ior be tested with our data base, is the validity of the model as a description of the
development of a single firm over time, and thereby the accuracy of the assumptions about the
operative decision mechanisms. For this, time series are required. What we can test, given these
data, is similarity of choices and of constraints across firms. It is worthwhile to lest for this
similarity of constraints and decisions over firms, because it adds to the usefulness of the model,
maybe even to its value as a tool for forecasting, if it appears that constraints and choices show
some robustness across firms.
In the remainder of this section, we shall move systematically through Table 2, analysing the
various combinations of hypotheses. We start on the left side of the matrix (column 1) with the
most restrictive hypothesis concerning the amount of investment, and on the top (row a) with
the most restrictive hypothesis concerning the direction of progress. As any of these hypotheses
has to be rejected, we move either down or to the right. Thus we evaluate the hypothesis of a
constant amount of investment A/, similar for all banks, against the hypothesis of a varying
amount of investment My. If the hypothesis of a fixed amount M is not supported by the evidence,
the first column in the matrix can be discarded and we move to column 2. Then we consider the
hypothesis of a choice of direction p, similar for each bank, which is tested against the hypothesis
of a varying P^. If this hypothesis is not in line with the evidence, the first row can be skipped
and we go to row b. In this way one can continue in the direction of the lower right hand corner.142
5 J.I Same constraints, same decisions
The most restrictive hypothesis on the amount of investment is represented in the first column:
the choice for the amount of investment A/ is the same for each and every bank, except for an
error term. This implies that there is a common function /»(Af), and that a, and a, do not vary
over firms. Furthermore it is assumed that the variation in A/ that we see from the data is a
random disturbance which could be due to measurement errors and other factors not system-
atically represented in the data.
On the basis of our analysis, we expect the choice of investment to vary with size: large firms,
given a common variable factor productivity, should spend more on investment, because they
reap more benefits from investment due to scale economies. We also expect investment to vary
with variable factor productivity: firms with a higher variable factor productivity, given a certain
size, should invest more if expansion is more profitable than rationalization, P > g(f3), and vice
versa when rationalization is more profitable, p <#((}). Because it was also shown that a higher
variable factor productivity increases the profitability of expansion P. the first case is more likely
to prevail for high productivity firms than the second case. If systematic variation in investment
can be demonstrated, we are able to reject the cells in the first column and move to the right.
To analyse the relationships between size and investment, we need investment figures from a
date not earlier than (he period from which we have size and productivity figures. Our earliest
1985. 1986 and 1987, data for K, and K^ from 1985. and data for V,., V, and Vj also from 1985.
We run the following regression:
,«7 •-• r, (17)
I W,=t„ + fc,y,+fc,^ « = 1,2 * =0,1,2
I.IMS '' ' ' 'V^
The results of this regression are listed in Table 3 below. It was clear from Figures (27) and (28)
in chapter 4 that size is a fairly accurate predictor of investment. This is confirmed by the
outcomes of the regressions: size is highly significant. Contrary to expectations, however, most
of the regressions indicate that investment does not vary systematically with our measures of
productivity, except for the fifth one reported. If there is any systematic relationship between
investment and productivity, the regression results indicate that it is more likely to be negative
than positive: a higher productivity leads to less investment in automation equipment. From
Table 1, section 2, one can see that this could occur in our model, if P would on average be
about equal to. or only slightly smaller than, g(p").
Since investment shows systematic variation, we drop the hypothesis of the first column in the
matrix of Table 2, and move to the right. Now consider the first row. The hypotheses represented
here say that there is a common function #(P). and a common choice of direction 0. Thus the
variation in direction of progress would be random. To analyse these hypotheses on the rela-
tionship between the growth of productivity and the growth of variable factor productivity, we
cannot go about in the same way as above. The problem is that the direction of technical change
cannot be measured independently, without knowing the values of a, and Oj.143

















































Number of observations: 73; l-stabsucs in parentheses
The theoretical analysis in section 2 suggests that the direction of technical progress ,
should vary with size and productivity, under the condition that #(P) is concave and downward
sloping. There is no guarantee that this condition is fulfilled, or that there would not be other
constraints operative. A number of hypotheses concerning the direction of technical progress
could be introduced and translated into extra constraints. Consider the following four which are
selected because they have a straightforward economic interpretation:
1. The function g(P) is concave and downward sloping, and can be locally approximated
by a second degree polynomial: #(P) = a„ + a,P + ajP'- This specification is chosen for
mathematical convenience. The main restriction is that aj < 0. The function # (P) should
be concave for all relevant values of p. For all positive P, #(p) is certainly concave, if
a, < 0, but if a, > 0, the function is also concave for all p larger than some critical value.
If a, is estimated to be positive, it should be checked whether the estimated P's are in
the concave part of the function. In equilibrium, #'(P)= 1 ~(P/H')(c,/C2)(y^/V°'), as is
shown in section 2.
2. The function ^(p) is non-differentiable in one point: it is kinked. This would mean that
technical progress has a fixed direction, independent of price movements, size and
productivity: #(P)/P = c.
3. The rate of expansion is constrained for some exogenous reason (say as a strategic
objective): y/y = c.
4. The rate of productivity increase is constrained or determined exogenously:
y/y - V7V = c (e.g. because the wage rate increases exogenously).144
The function At (Af) should be upward sloping and concave. To pursue the analysis any further,
it cannot be avoided to introduce a specification for Ai(A/). Assume that/i(Af) = A/ , where 8, < 1
(a scale parameter is already included in the expressions specifying the direction of progress).
Given these four alternative assumptions on the direction of technical change, and the assumption
on the specification of /i(AZ), we end up with four possible models of firm behaviour. The
objective function of the firm is always the same (dropping time indices):
MaxZ-PÏ'-H'V-rA/ v» ••*•*•* . (18)
The constraints that were assumed so far were: ,,, •>•
<:•• (20)
The first extra constraint is: n »•- .;•& -*f; !;,.-•• , ••• v-; - s .•»!?->• ft: *.*vV<>/i'
/.(M)-Ar =i..^,...w. ;••• ; •••/•.•.-.. j.-:.-..^i-- ,:.- ^,.,-. .v- ••..•!«. ".f
The four possible second extra constraints are: '
(22)
-,J^.,,,T,-.. ,,:,,..
•"•'•-•"•''• -'"' -• -• "^'' (23)
3. f "' ^™-'^---v^^'•••'••;•• •;'•'•'•"'';;•"••'_•',•;^;''"•'• (24)
4. ? ^ . ;«-:s.-^r.rfr (25)
These constraints can be substituted into the original problem. The results in terms of f and V'
are listed below (they can be easily derived). Maximization of the objective function, given
these four constraint sets, gives four expressions for equilibrium investment A/" which are also
listed. Here or, and x, are parameters, different ones in every case. " " " " •'" '* '
For the/in/set of constraints: ••!,-.•'"•; .•^" ,^;-, V''^;-,''•/'.,•;••;• '
»,. vM . (26)£ffV>iricai rrm MS
For the 5^conJ set of constraints:
V = V XjM
For the t/iirc/ set of constraints:
For the/owrf/i set of constraints:
4a J w c, y








In addition, an expression for equilibrium growth and equilibrium change of variable factor
demand can be derived for each model, by substituting equilibrium investment into the constraint
equations. We then get the equilibrium development of the firm as function in terms of its state
variables y and V only.146
Consider first models 3 and 4. The basic hypothesis is that firms aim at a certain growth in output
and a certain growth in productivity respectively. If it can be demonstrated that growth of output
differs systematically over firms, model 3 can be rejected; if it can be shown that productivity
growth varies systematically over firms, this invalidates model 4. We test for systematic variation
in output growth (model 3) as follows. First the data are ordered according to some criterion,
e.g. according to size K. Then we regress output growth on a vector of constants. If output growth
would vary systematically with the criterion variable, here size K, we are bound to find first
order autocorrelation. By testing for autocorrelation, we thus test for systematic variation in the
data. This test has been performed with two data sets for size: output represented by K, and >V
Variable factor inputs were represented by V„, V, and Vj respectively. Data have been ordered
according to seven different criteria: size K,, with ii = 1,2, three measures of productivity J^/Vy,
withy' = 0,1,2. investment divided by size A//K,, average investment lag (as defined in section
5 of chapter 4), and an indicator derived from the number of years of use of front office automation
and back office automation. Together this gives 14 regressions to be estimated, and 14
Durbin-Watson statistics as tests on first order autocorrelation. For model 3, the outcomes are
reported in Table 4.
























Significance points at the 5% level for the Durbin-Watson statistic, when the number of
observations is more than 100. and there is one regressor are: <^ = 1.65, <fy = 1.69. Significance
points at the 1% level are: rfi = 1.52. </„ = 1.56. The D-W statistic is insignificant in all cases
where production capacity is measured by mutations of current accounts K,. Thus the growth
in the number of mutations in current accounts does not seem to be related to size, productivity
or technological level. Maybe this proxy for production capacity is too much determined by
fluctuations in effective demand, and suffers from the fact that in banking the utilization rate of
the capacity to produce account mutations is not likely to be constant When capacity is measured
by the number of current accounts Kj, the D-W statistic is significant in two instances. It seems
that productivity could influence growth, although the evidence is not very strong, but evenEmpinca/ /Mö 147
more so that investment per unit of capacity correlates with growth of output, a feature present
in models 1, 2 and 4, but not in model 3. More investment seems to go together with higher
growth rates. All together it appears that the evidence on the basis of which model 3 could be
rejected is rather weak and not consistent over different measures of output. However, there is
an indication that relative expansion correlates with investment per unit of output, which in
principle should suffice to reject model 3.'
Model 4 can be tested in a similar way. Again we order the data according to mounting output
K, labour productivity y/V, investment per unit of output M/y. investment lag. and years of use
of automation equipment. Using two measures for f and three for V, we arrive at six data sets
to evaluate the model. The results are reported in Table 5.
The evidence of systematic variation in the data, although not entirely consistent either, is more
convincing here than in the case of model 3. Again stronger results surface when numbers of
current accounts K^ are used as capacity measure, then when mutations in current accounts K,
are used. Furthermore, it seems that changes in productivity correlate most with investments
per unit of output, which would be in accordance with mcxlels 1 to 3, and with years of use of
back and front office automation equipment. Strangely, we see more systematic variation, if we
consider total labour costs than if narrower measures for costs of labour are considered. The
evidence against model 4 seems to constitute some ground for rejecting it. more consistent than
the evidence that there is against model 3.
This brings us to model two. To test this model against a more general model, like e.g. model
1, we proceed in a similar vein as above. First add random terms e, to the equations for f and
e, to the equations for V above. Then take, for model 1 and 2, the ratio of these two equations.
We get expressions of the following general type:
(38)
In case model 1 is appropriate, the function F is a complicated function of productivity (and
other variables); in case model 2 is right, F does not vary with productivity. The data have been
ordered according to increasing productivity K/V. The function F has been replaced by a constant
and the equation has been estimated. If autocorrelation would be found, this would indicate that
the disturbances correlate with productivity K/V, which would necessitate us to reject model
two. Estimation of equation (38) as it stands, using non-linear methods, proved impossible due
to severe multicollinearity of output /and labour demand V. Taking the subsample of banks for
which both y, and V, are positive, equation (38) has been estimated in loglinear terms, using
ordinary least squares. The fact that a non-random subsample is used for the regressions does
not invalidate the test, unless there would be reasons to assume that banks that decrease labour
demand would be structurally different from those that increase labour demand. If it can be
1 The coming across one single black swan is sufficient proof against (be claim that all swans are white, on [he
condition thai the perception thai this swan is of black colour does not depend on the disputable quality of ones
spectacles.148





















































proved for a restricted sample that model 2 does not represent the data adequately, it follows
that the model will also be unable to represent the full data set adequately. The results of the
exercise are listed in Table 6.
The standard deviations in the estimates of the a's are large and none of the estimates is sig-
nificantly different from one at the 5% level, nor from zero. Multicollinearity of log(V) and
log( K) could account for the fact that estimates for a, and <Xj are rather similar in every regression,
but vary quite substantially over the regressions. All Durbin-Watson statistics clearly point in
the direction of first order autocorrclation. The ratio of the change in output and the change in149
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Standard errors in parentheses.
labour demand, and thus according to the model the direction of technical change. Is positively
correlated with the ratio of output and labour demand. We can thus conclude that model 2 does
not provide an accurate representation of technical change in banking, as reflected in the data.
So far we have considered three models, in which the direction of technical progress was
restricted in some specific way: model 2. in which there is a fixed direction of technical progress,
model 3, in which there is a fixed output growth, and model 4, in which labour productivity
growth is fixed. Assessing the relative merits of these models, one can conclude on the basis of
the evidence collected that the case against model 2 is strongest. It seems that banks of different
productivity invest in different directions of technical change. The evidence against model 4 is
less strong, but still valid: productivity growth varies over banks, both with present levels of
productivity and with current technological levels. The case against model 3 is weakest, but this
could be a consequence of the disparity between the capacity growth which is modelled and the
growth of output which is measured. Thus rejecting models 2, 3 and 4, we continue with the
more general model 1, according to which the direction of progress can vary over firms.
We can now return to our question about the similarity of decisions concerning the instruments
of progress p and Af over all banks. The overall conclusion is, first of all, that banks of different
size choose different amounts of investment, but that no relationship between productivity and
amount of investment has been detected, and, secondly, that banks do not seem to choose the
same direction of technical progress #(P)/p, in particular, that banks with different productivity
choose different directions of technical progress.
5.3.2 Same constraints, different decisions
The preliminary conclusion of the analysis so far is that the observed variation in py and A/, is
not random, but systematically dependent on firm characteristics. The hypotheses that there is
a fixed growth of productivity, that there is a fixed growth of capacity, and that there is a fixed
(technologically predetermined) direction of technological change could all be rejected on
empirical grounds. It seems that banks' choices of values for their instruments P and A/ areJ§0 Owptór.5
determined by firm characteristics, and that they therefore attain different rates of expansion
and productivity growth. Now assume that there is a common investment function /i(Af) and a
common trade off function #(f)). If banks choose different investment amounts and different
directions of progress, they choose different points on /i(M) and on g(|J). If this assumption is
right, then the data must be able to tell us more about the parameters of these functions /J(A/)
In this section we start out from cell 3b in Table 2: let us assume that there is one common
function #((3) which is the same for every bank, and likewise that there is one common function
/i(A/,T|.. .xj which expresses that the rate of progress not only depends on investment, but also
on the technological level, indicated by technology proxies T,...T„ of the bank. Assume, like
above in model 1, that #((}) is downward sloping and concave, and can be approximated by a
second degree polynomial, and that /t(Af,!,...?„). which must be sloping upward and concave
for given values of T,, is well represented by M • ü V•' *
Three variables have been used to represent the technology variable: the number of years that
a firm disposes over back office automation equipment, the number of years it disposes over
front office equipment, and the average number of years back that the firm invested in new
technology. Table 7 gives correlation coefficients between these indicators and investment,
capacity and productivity.
Table 7: Coefficient* of correlation between indicators of the technological level of banks, investment, size
and productivity.
























The three indicators for technological level are only weakly correlated. It is remarkable that the
correlation coefficient between the investment lag and the number of years that front office
equipment has been installed is so weak, given that automating the front office entails such
major expenses. The investment lag is negatively correlated with cumulated investment per unit
of output, suggesting that firms that have been investing later on average have been investing
larger amounts per unit of capacity. There seems to be a positive correlation between the
investment lag and productivity, indicating that firms that invested longer ago are more
productive, which could point at a learning effect. One should interpret this figure with care,
because it does not take account of the total size of investment, only its average point in time.
2 Using this formulation, in which the technology vanaNes appear as a muluplicative factor, one could interpret
the model also as representing either cell 2c or 3c in Table 2, saying that technological level influences the
choice of direction of progress151
There is a positive correlation between the total size of investment per unit of output and the
years of back office and front office automation, as could be expected. Contrary to expectations,
there is a negative correlation between investment per unit of output and labour productivity.
Each bank chooses a combination ({J,, Af,), given its technological level represented by its values
t,. This results in a change of output and variable factor demand. Assume that there is an additive
residual term. The model for fumy now looks as follows:
Note that the model is not scale invariant. This does not pose a problem here, because a change
of scale of measurement of output and/or labour will not affect our parameter estimates of a,,
04 and 5,. Nor will it affect the estimates of the standard deviation of the above parameters, or
the sign of the parameter a,. The effect of a change in scale would be fully absorbed by the order
of magnitude of the weighted price ratio (/V,)/(>vc-2) and the parameters ÖO, a, and a,. Probably,
a change in scale would affect the significance of the estimates of the parameters <J„. <i, and «1,.
This implies that the significance of these parameters could be manipulated, and conversely,
that insignificance of the estimates of these parameters should not bother us.
The system consisting of equations (39) and (40) has been estimated with non-linear least squares
methods, using both mutations in current accounts K, and numbers of current accounts Kj as
measures for output, and total labour V„, total labour input into payment traffic V, and input of
cashier, counter and processing work into payment traffic Vj as proxies for variable factor
demand. There are no data available for the ratio of the output price /* and the price of the variable
inputs w, but since the data cover only two periods, the price ratio has been assumed constant
over time. It was not always possible to estimate the ratio (/>c,)/(tvcj) as a parameter. Using the
data K, in combination with V2, and Kj together with V„, estimates of the price ratio were obtained,
but for the combination of K, and V, this turned out impossible, due to singularity of the data.
For y, together with V, and Vj, the estimates of the other parameters turned out to be insensitive
to variation in a-priori values for the price ratio. Therefore (/V,)/(»vc2) has been set to one in all
but two estimations. Moreover, it turned out to be impossible to find least squares solutions for
the variant where capacity is K, and labour demand is V„; the estimation results appear to be
rather unstable, probably also due to mulucollinearity of the independent variables. .-,-;,..,
The results of the estimation procedures are reported in Tables 8 and 9. In the first table there
are results of four estimations using K, and V^, and four estimations using Kj and V, respectively.
In the first estimation, no technology variable x was included (which would correspond to cell132
2b in Table 2). In the second, tj, the average age of investment in automation equipment, was
included. In the third, the variables t, and T<. years of use of back office automation equipment
and front office automation equipment were inserted. The fourth estimation contained all three
technology variables. To get an impression of the robustness of the results when other data series
are used, the Table 8 can be compared to the Table 9. In this table, similar estimations were run
using the broader proxies for labour demand: V, and Vo- The data were ordered per period, and
within every period approximately according to firm size. In Table 10, the Durbin-Watson























































































































































Standard errors in parentheses.
I igciuln: system I to 4 data K, and V, (143 obs.); system 5 to 8: data K, and Vj (136 obs.);
X,: average investment lag, T, years of hack office automation, V years of front office automation;
*: significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level.
First consider Table 8. The most consistent and robust result is the significance of the parameter
a,. It turns out that this parameter is significantly positive in every regression. At the same time
the value turns out to be significantly below one. The order of magnitude of the estimate, however,
shows some variation. If capacity is measured by mutations in current accounts K,, the point
estimate is about three to four times as large as when number of current accounts K^ is used. The
results for the parameter a, are far less robust: a, is significantly positive, when mutations in
current accounts K, is used as capacity proxy, but is insignificant, often with the wrong sign,
when numbers of accounts K, is used. The estimates are all significantly below one. In the cases
where a, is significant, the point estimate for this parameter lies marginally below the estimate
for a,. This could be interpreted as an indication that the opportunities for technological change
in the period which we analyse were neutral, maybe slightly biased in the direction of expansion
(see section 2 above).1 S3
Another rather robust result is the significance of the parameter 5, which captures the effect of
prior investment on capacity growth and productivity improvement. It is remarkable that the
parameter estimates are consistently below .3. which indicates that the investment function is
strongly concave. This would mean that there arc no s/aric economies of scale. (>n the contrary,
the effect of a marginal increase in investment at any moment in lime, in terms of extra capacity
or growth in productivity, seems to decline rather rapidly. This does not imply anything about
the existence of dynamic economies of scale. Dynamic economies of scale are expressed in (he
model through the a, parameters. The higher those are, the stronger the intertemporal effects of
investments, the more prominent the dynamic scale economies. In the case of dynamic scale
economies, it is difficult to draw a conclusion on their prominence, because the point estimates
of the a,'s vary quite substantially over the different data sets.
A necessary condition for a concave downward sloping function j?(P) is a negative value a,. If
a, is negative, then ^(P) is concave all over the permitted domain of P; if a, is positive, however,
the second degree polynomial which we use to approximate #((}) has a convex and a concave
part. In this case, one would have to check whether the polynomial is actually concave in the
region where it approximates the function #(P). Unfortunately, of the parameters tij, a, and «„.
the sign cannot be determined in any of the regressions with a 90'* probability of correctness.
Nevertheless, from the tables it appears that the sign of the point estimates of <Jj is always
negative, and that the sign oft;, is negative when K, is the capacity proxy.
Finally there are the parameters 83, 5, and 84 which should capture the effect of differences in
technological level on the effect of investment on growth and productivity. Evidence here is
consistent as far as the signs of the parameters is concerned. Almost all point estimates of all
8,'s are negative. This indicates that firms that have invested comparatively long ago, or have
had certain systems of automation already for a longer lime, reap less benefits from investment
than firms that have started to invest at a later date. One might interpret this as evidence that
banks that have invested earlier, have gone further down the learning curve and are closer to
the technological frontier, and are therefore less able to realize improvements with a given
amount of investment, than banks that have started their automation program at a later date. An
alternative explanation would be that prices of automation equipment have decreased to such
an extent that late investors have got more value for their money, or better quality, and were
thus able to realize more progress for the same amount of investment. As far as the significance
of the parameters is concerned, it turns out that none of the technology parameters is significantly
different from zero at the 10% level, if capacity is represented by K,. If capacity is approximated
by Kj, however, it seems that the number of years that a bank has an automated back office is a
significant factor in the determination of present expansion and rationalization. The longer the
bank uses back office automation, the less expansion and the less change in labour demand,
e?r<-r/j paribiw. It is surprising that, whereas the years of using back office automation is of
significant influence, the years of using front office automation is not.
Comparing Table 8 to Table 9, it appears that there are no big changes in outcomes when using
V, instead of Vj. However, using V„ yields some different outcomes. Estimates for a, are above



























































































































































































































Standard emirs in parentheses.
I.egenda: system 9 to 12: duui K, and V, (143 obs ); system 13 to 16 data K, and V, (136 obs.);
system 17 to 20: data >', and V„ (136 obs.);
T,: average investment lag, t, years of back office automation; v years of front office automation;
*: significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level.
of /J/>V in both tables arc caused by differences in units of measurement of the different proxies
of the capacity and variable input variables. Table 10 indicates that there could be some auto-
correlation in the residuals, which would mean that the residuals would be somehow correlated
with size, despite the fact that the size variable and the labour demand variable appear on the
right hand side of both equations of the system. Adjusted R-squares show that the fit of the first
equation of the system is considerably better than the fit of the second.
Taking all evidence together, then it may be concluded that a, is likely to be positive and above
.2, but that a, may be anything between zero and one. This indicates that it is likely that there
are some dynamic economies of scale, that there is technological progress and learning by doing,
but that its extent is difficult to quantify. Referring back to the matrix of Table 2. it seems that
we end up in the area of cells 2b, 2c. 3b and 3c. Firms make different choices on matters of size
of investment M, and on direction of progress # (p,)/(},. They do this because they have a number
of different characteristics at the moment of decision making, notably size and variable factor
productivity. This has been shown in the first part of this section. They also might choose
differently, because the shape of the technical constraint functions A,(M,) and #,((},) vary with155









































































































the technological level Ty of the firm. Evidence here is less strong, but it seems that those banks
that embarked earlier on the path of automation get less returns from their present investments
than firms that moved later. This would re-assert claims that catching-up goes with lower costs
than moving first, and that for firms operating at the technological frontier progress is more
costly. Concerning the shape of the constraint functions, we found support for the assumption
that g(P) is concave. Furthermore, we saw that /i(M) is likely to display strongly decreasing
returns to investment at any moment in time, and thus that there is no indication of static
economies of scale of investment.
The aspects of the model that have been tested so far are mainly concerned with the validity of
the technical constraints. A complementary way to test the model, especially with respect to its
assumptions on the rationality of investment behaviour, would be to estimate equation (28)
above, which expresses the optimal amount of investment for a firm of size K, and productivity
K/Vy. In doing that, we not only test the validity of the technical constraints, but also the rationality
of the investment choices of firms. This has been attempted, using data for K and V for 1985,
and cumulated data for investment in automation equipment A/ from 1985 to 1987. Equation
(28) has been estimated using two different search algorithms for nonlinear models, the so called
direct search algorithm and the complex method, which both attempt to find a set of parameters156
which minimizes the sum of squared residuals in a restricted parameter space.' Neither method
converged to a global optimum within the space of admitted parameter values. It turned out that
changes in the value of the objective function are minor over large ranges of the parameters.
In principle, the equations for K, V and A/' could also be estimated as one system of three
equations. Because this would involve some complicated estimation procedures, but also because
the least squares criterion does not yield a clear estimate for the parameters of equation (28) and
the objective function seems to find its minimum on a plain in the parameter space, this sim-
ultaneous estimation has not been attempted. If the squared residuals of equation (28) are
minimized by a large variety of parameters, the outcomes of the simultaneous estimation of
equations (26), (27) and (28) are bound to be the same as the outcomes of the simultaneous
estimation of only equations (26) and (27), as reported in Table 8 and 9.
Finally we may return to the hypotheses presented in Table 1 above. These concern differences
in direction and amount of investment, for firms of different size and variable factor productivity,
given common functions #({}) and /i(M). From equations (2) and (3), using different measures
K and V, the direction of technical progress of each firm can be calculated as
#(P)/|J= 1 -(V'K^Cij^^V^CjJ- Estimates for a, and a, were taken from The ratio c,/c2 was set
equal to unity, as this only implies a monotonous transformation of the series. Tables 8 and 9
for the various sets of data. The bottom left hand corner of Table 1 implies that g(p)/(i should
be lower for more productive firms, crffrij /wrifcitf. The top left hand corner implies that #(P)/|1
should be lower for larger firms, if a, > <Xj. Regressions were run of #(P)/P on size K and pro-
jlucjivijv, KA^.-SAvn^ wejiK.^vMlTOC'vatfMM&a\\^fo'JMCsf \.^v««''fesH\iee''iT;t/nJ"i \ V$i/W
seems to vary negatively with productivity. Coefficients are consistently negative, but only
significant in two cases. No significant relationship between #((})/[} and size was found, an
outcome not unexpected in cases where a, - <Xj. '
TaMt 1 li RwaMi of r»gr—ing g(p>P on site f and productivity K/V.
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3 For • descitotkM of these search alforUvia. see eg BO Bunday and OR Ganide, Optimization Methods
In Pascal. 1987.157
The top right hand corner of Table 1 says that larger firms should invest more and the bottom
right hand corner says that more productive firms should invest more, provided their direction
of progress £(|})/|}< 1. The high correlation between investment and si/e has already been
mentioned. To test the latter hypothesis, the sample of banks was divided in two parts, a group
of banks for which g(PVP < 1 <=* rfv > 0. and a group for which the converse was measured.*
Then a positive relationship between variable factor productivity and investment was searched
for the first group and a negative for the second. Here no evidence supporting the hypothesis
could be found. All together it seems that the relationship between size and variable factor
productivity of firms and their investment choices is weak. This lack of regularity casts some
doubt on the assumption that investment opportunities can be characterized by functions f (fl)
which are common to all banks in the sample. *W f
5.4 Conclusion ^,, ,,,; yjw*s.'S->-^^t--••*•; •!•. *-.v»Lko«rii *••••?• :«'p-«»*••-»!»?«.«SU-
In this chapter, a number of aspects of the model developed in chapter 3 were put to the test,
using data from a banking organization. The model describes the development of capacity and
productivity of a firm over a longer period of time. A more comprehensive test of the model
would thus require time series data. Since there are only short lime series in the data base, but
extensive cross section information is available, only a myopic version of the model could be
estimated. The emphasis of the testing procedures is not on the validity of the model /wr i*. but
on the extent to which firms are u/ni/<jr in the technical constraints they face and consequently
in their investment behaviour. We try to determine, to what extent the firms in the data set are
in a similar situation and take the same decisions, and to what extent they follow each other on
a comparable path, where there are first movers, followers and laggards.
There are four key variables in the model: production capacity, variable factor productivity,
investment and technological level. Output series were used as proxies for production capacity,
labour input series were used for variable factors of production, and five years cumulated
investments in automation equipment was taken for investment. The technological level was
approximated by three different indicators, the average lag in investments in automation
equipment and the number of years of use of back office and of front office automation equipment
respectively. Each of the main data series selected suffers from some drawback: the proxy for
production capacity does not take fluctuations in capacity utilization into account; the proxy for
variable inputs is in fact largely fixed, and the proxy for investments has a rather arbitrary lag
structure and does not include investments in human capital and other efficiency improvement
The estimation results thus have to be considered with some restraint. • i .» .<wj.
One of the main questions addressed was, whether expansion of output capacity and raising of
productivity are processes in which there is a cumulative element or not: do large banks grow
by the same or by a larger volume per unit of investment than small banks. Large banks in our
data set commonly expand more in absolute terms than small banks, but they also tend to invest
more: absolute growth, size and investment are highly correlated. This is not surprising, but the
question remains w/ry large banks grow faster in absolute terms: because they invest more, or
because their size lets them reap more advantage from an amount of investment, though the
4 Since £(0yp = 1 - (vy^cX^V^Cj) < 1 «=> (V^rV») > 0 and ?, K*\ V"" > 0, whether j?(PVP exceed* one or
not depends on the sign of V and is independent of a, and a,.tal
marginal return to investment decreases quickly. Investment may either lead to more efficient
production technology which can better be exploited by larger firms, which is why they invest
more despite rapidly decreasing returns to investment (in a static sense), or it may only lead to
expansion of the capital stock, a process where decreasing returns to investment may be less
rapid and which may be exploited by large and small firms alike. The estimation procedures
that have been used try to disentangle the influence of investment and the influence of size. The
results indicate that, on the one hand, capacity increase depends on investment, but that there
are strongly decreasing returns to investment. On the other hand, the effect of investment on
capacity increase seems to be related to current production capacity, and thus there is likely to
be a cumulative effect. Therefore, the presumption that investment is into production technology
which brings its largest benefits to large firms cannot be refuted. A significant effect of the
current volume of demand for variable inputs on growth of variable factor demand, however,
is not consistently found in the data. If there is a positive effect here, parameter estimates indicate
that it may be smaller than the effect of production capacity on capacity growth."•' " *"*^
The second topic in this chapter was the question to which extent firms follow the same track
of expansion and productivity increase. ()n the one hand we considered whether the trade-off
between capacity expansion and improvement of variable factor productivity can be represented
by one single function #(|)) for all firms in the sample, and whether firms tend to make the same
choice concerning the location on this curve. C)n the other hand we considered whether the effect
of investment on capacity and productivity can be represented by one single function /i(Af) or
JI(M.T) for all firms in the sample, and whether firms are likely to choose the same amount of
investment. Some arguments were developed, why firms of different size or variable factor
productivity would opt for different courses of investment.
The data reveal a large variety in choices by different firms. Our analysis showed that these
differences are not random. It was apparent that differences in amount of W investment are
primarily related to differences in size, but it could not be shown that they also vary with variable
factor productivity. Concerning the direction of investment, four alternative hypotheses were
considered: a constant rate of expansion, a constant rate of productivity increase of variable
factors, a fixed direction of technical change #(P)/p. and a quadratic approximation of the
function *((}). The first three alternatives, all implying that firms in some sense invest in the
same direction and that deviations from this course are random, were refuted by the data. The
fourth alternative, that the trade-off function #((}) can be approximated by a parabolic function,
was retained as working hypothesis. Finally, we considered the possibility that expansion and
rationalization depend on the technological level of the firm. Only weak evidence of such a
relationship could be found. .-< ' - "> »•; > • ,>rt; i: ^ i -. ' .:
Accepting the hypothesis that firms make different decisions on direction and size of investments
in technical progress, we turned back to the hypotheses of Table 1. to see whether the differences
in choices were in accordance with the patterns derived theoretically. Evidence to support the
theoretical claims is weak. Large firms invest more than small firms, but the direction of
investment seems to be unrelated to size. There is an indication that more productive firms invest
relatively more in expansion, but evidence remains inconclusive. No relationship between
variable factor productivity and size of investment was found. This implies that the assumption
that all firms in the sample face similar functions #(P) and >i(A/) is not confirmed.The results should be judged against the background of the limitations of both data and model.
The conceptual problems with the proxies for model variables and the lack of lime series data
have been mentioned already. Given the limited scope of the model, the results are not unsat-
isfactory. The model abstracts from product development, does not account explicitly for
spill-over effects of adoption elsewhere and for bandwagon effects. It abstracts from certain
types of strategic behaviour and expectation formation mechanisms, and does not allow for any
discontinuities, nor in investment, nor in expansion or change of productivity, factors which are
all likely to be important in the case of the banking industry. Possibly the model therefore puts
undue stress on arguments of marginal costs and benefits. Banks operate on markets char-
acterized by monopolistic competition or oligopoly. Strategic considerations are likely to be
important in decisions on investment. Also, because of uncertainties connected to the rapid speed
of technological development in information technology, bandwagon effects arc likely to be
prominent. On the other hand, the price of banking products like a savings account and a payment
transfer, as well as its costs, are generally obscure to the customer. The demand for these products
is therefore not a function of the price. Thus a number of factors that might be of influence in
banking do not appear in the model, whereas a mechanism that does appear in the model, price
sensitivity of output, is likely to be weak in banking. Nevertheless, although the model probably
does not capture a number of mechanisms which influence investment planning within a banking
firm, especially in the short term, it does seem to capture some part of the trend. .',-> ><
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So far we approached the problem of explaining technological change in the banks of our database
from the viewpoint of the profit maximizing firm. The models above are a representation of
rational firm behaviour, assuming profit maximization and opportunities for technical progress.
Although these models may serve to illuminate some aspects of the nature of investment planning
of firms, they turned out to be of limited value in explaining changes in growth and productivity
in banks. We saw that data for size and investments in automation equipment are strongly
correlated, but that labour productivity follows a rather irregular pattern over firms, showing a
weak relation to size and investment. Also, nor investments in automation, nor the use of certain
systems, seemed to bear a firm relationship to growth of production or productivity.
However, whereas we see irregular patterns of industry development when we consider firm
level quantitative variables like productivity, we find fairly regular patterns when we look at
aggregate level qualitative measures as whether banks use a certain automation systems in a
specific year or not (see Figures 4 and 5 in chapter 4). Although it turns out difficult to explain
technological change with a model of optimal investment of firms, there is an orderly diffusion
phenomenon discernible at the aggregate level. Although the links between individual adoptions
of technology and their supposed effects on productivity are not easily apparent in the data, the
number of" adoptions of a system in a specific year seems to develop regularly. Thus we observe
irregularity at the micro level, measuring productivity, but regularity at the aggregate level,
counting adoptions. Moreover, the shape of this aggregate level regularity is the familiar sigmoid
curve, a rather robust finding in diffusion research. In this chapter we shall concentrate on
possible explanations of this industry level pattern of development.
One approach might be to aggregate microeconomic models of firm behaviour. However, it
should be noted that, even if a microeconomic model explains firm behaviour accurately,
additional assumptions are needed to arrive at an explanation of aggregate phenomena. The firm
model used above provides for a slow approach of the newest technology by firms that are not
at the technological frontier, which makes a gradual diffusion of technologies at the industry
level likely. However, the shape of the diffusion path is indeterminate so far, because it depends
on the conditions of firms at the start of the process. Aggregate phenomena can only be explained
with these type of models, when some distribution over characteristics that differentiate between
firms in the industry at the time diffusion starts is specified. Following this course, we would
end up with some type of probit model, where the difference between firms would be char-
acterized by a distribution over size, over current variable factor productivity, or both; it can
also be over technological capabilities, price expectations, or other. This distribution determines
the shape of the diffusion curve.161
The distribution of a characteristic over firms would have to be added to the existing firm model.
This prompts three questions. First of all, one may want to know what explains the distribution.
Secondly, one may wonder whether this distribution stays stable over the course of the diffusion
process; introduction of technology may change characteristics of firms like size, market share,
productivity, etc. Thirdly, it is doubtful that a model that's outcome depends completely on the
specification of a distribution is robust in its predictions.'
Moreover, aggregating micro-models is a promising approach, when one can be convinced of
the explanatory power of the microeconomic base. Because it was argued in the foregoing chapter
that the microeconomic model available could only explain the evidence to a limited extent, it
may be interesting to supplement the analysis attempted there with an alternative approach. In
this chapter, we shall try to explain and model adoption, the patterns of consecutive adoptions
in Figures 4 and S of chapter 4, at the aggregate level.
There are two cases when an aggregate approach may be superior for practical purposes to
aggregating microeconomic models. The first is, if the decision to adopt is predominantly a
bandwagon effect and if there are important technology spill-overs from adoption. The prob-
ability of adopting is then to a large extent determined by other adoptions in the industry, and
diffusion takes on the character of a coherent process at the aggregate level. There are different
reasons why spill-overs may be of substantial influence for technology adoptions. Earlier
adoptions can influence later adopters through a spread of information and skills. This can take
place through communication, but also through labour mobility. There can be effects of adoptions
on price levels, both on input and output markets. These can occur, because firms improve their
productivity and expand their capacity. There can be network externalities. All of these three
effects, information spill-overs, price effects and network externalities, may influence the
adoption decision of a next potential adopter.
Secondly, an aggregate model might be appropriate if regularity in fact only exists at the
aggregate level. If there is a variety of behaviour at the micro level, but a mechanism of selection
at the aggregate level that determines which firms grow and which decline, then a variety of
types of firm behaviour may result in similar aggregate features. Different firms may decide
according to different deterministic or stochastic rules, but competition on the market, which
functions as a mechanism selecting successful and more productive enterprises, imposes certain
regular patterns at the level of the industry. Competition may produce aggregate regularity out
of underlying variety: there is a chance mechanism operative that gives the relatively more
efficient firms a higher probability of survival and growth than the relatively less efficient firms,
no matter how these efficiency differentials arose. In this way, a mechanism at the aggregate
level, instead of a distribution over characteristics at the micro level, accounts for order at the
1 As Dosi writes: "[..] the 'rational-equilibrium' approach loses interpretative significance the more the diffu-
sion process is influenced by particular distributions of the expectalional and technological characteristics of
agents. In this sense, 'equilibrium approaches' show the same limitations, and more so, as so-called rational
expectation models in macroeconomics: 'equilibrium paths' - whenever they exist - are not independent of the
distribution of beliefs, technological capabilities and learning processes of individual agents In fact, one may
simply check the robustness of a unique equilibrium diffusion path ( ) allowing for different stochastic disturb-
ances on, eg expectations: in general, one cannot presume the equilibrium path to be even /«ca//> stable, hence
also the conclusions based on the properties of 'perfect' equilibrium diffusion processes cannot be presumed lo
hold." (Dosi, 1991, pp 2OO-20I).162
aggregate level and the regularity at the aggregate level is relatively />ufc/jemfcnr of the decision
rules or routines that agents follow at the micro level. This could help to explain the robustness
of the sigmoid curve as a description of different types of diffusion phenomena.
The epidemic diffusion model is a model describing adoptions at the aggregate level. It is based
on mechanisms of information spill-overs which are endogenous to the diffusion process itself.
This type of model will be our starting point below. It will be used to describe the spread of
three innovative techniques through our sample of banks. Chapter 3 above presented a model
describing the development of a firm that introduces ever more efficient technology over time.
In chapter 5, we used this model to consider a sample of banks developing parallel to each other.
The model below will describe the development of the use of a technique through time. Then
we shall use this model to consider a sequence of techniques that have been introduced to our
sample of banks. We do not model the (rational) decision making of firms, but only assume that
adoptions of new technology are mainly caused by earlier adoptions in the industry. Typically,
we assume that new technology is surrounded by uncertainty, and bandwagon effects are
dominant in technology adoption decisions.
6.2 Diffusion and probabilities of transition
The adoption of an innovation is a qualitative change in technique. As an innovation diffuses,
it often undergoes major improvements in terms of efficiency, as a consequence of learning by
doing and learning by using. This explains the observation that the differences in terms of
efficiency between an old technique and an innovation are often smaller than between quali-
tatively similar techniques, where the newer variant is an incremental improvement over the
older vuriant [see Rosenberg (1976), Freeman (1988)). Thus there is often a continuum of
techniques in operation that have been developed subsequently, where the qualitative gaps
between some techniques are larger than between others, but where large qualitative differences
are not always parallelled by large differences in efficiency.
In the range of available techniques, there arc obsolete techniques, older established techniques,
average practice techniques, newer techniques, best practice techniques and experimental
techniques, all with their specific yields, productivities, risks and market prices. Firms choose
to work with different techniques according to their capabilities, risk perception and experiences.
The newer the technique, the higher the requirements of technological capabilities, skills and
knowledge to the using firm. Also, characteristics of techniques may be different in terms of
flexibility and quality of the output. Markets for different techniques may be different. Whereas
older techniques may be spread through competitive markets, newer techniques may be offered
by oligopolists or a monopolist.
Assume that there are different techniques which can be numbered from / to m in order of
increasing efficiency at current prices. Assume that every firm makes use of one technique at
any period in time. At any moment in time / there is a distribution of firms over the m techniques.
Figure 1 pictures a hypothetical distribution of users over techniques / to m. The change over
time of the distribution determines the diffusion pattern of the different techniques. Two different
models thai describe the change of such a distribution have been developed by Iwai (1984a&b)
and by Melcalfe (1988). Denote the number of firms using technique; by n,. where 1 £./ £ m.163
Let py, indicate the probability that at some moment r firms using technique 7' decide to switch
to technique 1. Assume that there are no firms entering or exiting the industry. Diffusion of











distribution over 11 techniques
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Time indices have been dropped. Equation (1) says that the change in the number of firms that
uses technique 1 is the sum of the number of firms that used a less efficient technique) before
(1 £y £1 - 1), and decided to switch to technique/.minus the number of firms that used technique
ƒ so far, but decided to move on to a more efficient technique; (i' + lS;fim). To account for
the possibility of entry and exit, the model has to be expanded by specifying probabilities of
entering ar any technological level, and of exiling the industry from any level. This is not
elaborated here, since in the empirical case under consideration, there is exit nor entry. Diffusion
patterns now depend on the specification of the probability p,,. There is an abundance of
possibilities here, all lying between two extremes. One extreme would be p,,., = z, with z going
to zero, which describes the slowest possible diffusion, where every firm goes step by step
through all the techniques / to /n. This specification would be adequate, if diffusion were a type
of learning process, where a firm goes gradually down the learning curve and where no inter-
mediate stage can be skipped. The other extreme would be />,„ = z, with z going to 1, which
describes immediate diffusion of the best practice technique. This specification would be
adequate, in case there is no need to bother with any of the steps in between, because the best
practice technique is clearly superior to everything else, for every potential adopter. This could
be if there is a large cost advantage, the risks are low, and no special capabilities to employ this
technique are required.We shall consider a few intermediate possibilities. Suppose that the chance that a firm goes from
; to / can be separated into two components, the chance that a firm leaves; and the chance that
it goes to i, given that it has lefty: p,, = /?, p,,,. We consider two different hypothetical mech-
anisms of diffusion and for each two alternative specifications. The first is a push mechanism
and the second is a pull mechanism. The difference between the two is the reason why firms
decide to switch from one technique to another.
The economic viability of a technique is a function of its relative efficiency and prices of inputs
and outputs. These depend not only on the technique of any single firm, but also on the techniques
used by other firms in the industry. Thus the whole distribution of firms over techniques, as
pictured in Figure 1, determines whether a technique is attractive to operate or not. The impulse
on any firm to switch to a better technique is a function of all other techniques being used. Firms
can either be pushed out of an old technique, or they can be pulled towards a new technique.
A push mechanism can be said to operate, if the chance that firms decide to leave a technique
;', indicated by />^. depends on the 'pressure' on this technique. The pressure on a technique is a
positive function of the share of firms that work with a more efficient technique. As a larger
share of firms produces more efficiently, chances that prices are competed down rise, profits
lend to erode, and pressure to switch to a more efficient technique mounts. We consider two
specifications for />,, one where the firm that operates technique i takes all other firms into
account, the other where it looks ahead at better techniques, but not back, and only regards the
other firms that operate the same technique / or more efficient, up to technique m. The chance
that a firm switches/ro/n a technique > is thus dependent on pressure. Once the firm leaves
technique7', the chance that it goes to /, where />./', is simply a function of the number of firms
that already use /. The more firms use a technique, the more experience with it exists, and the
smaller are the risks, the larger the network externalities, etcetera. We get the following model
da):
• :** 't
Here A' = Z n, is the total of firms in the industry. The first factor expresses the pressure on
users of technique;', and the second the chance of going to technique /. The alternative expression
(lb) would be:
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The last factor is the same as in equation (2), and the first factor has a more restricted denominator.
These cases can be contrasted with cases where a pull mechanism can be said to operate. Here
the chance that firms coming from technique 7 decide to go to a specific technique /. indicated
by />, „, depends on the 'attraction' of this technique. The attraction of a technique is the mirror
image of the pressure on a technique. It is a positive function of the share of firms that work
with a less efficient technique. As a larger share of firms produces less efficiently, chances that
one can secure a higher profitability with such a technique rise, and firms are pulled towards it.
Here we also consider two specifications for p,,,, one where the pull of technique i is determined
by the current use of all other techniques, the other where the attraction depends only on the use
of the techniques that are less efficient than i. The chance that a firm switches ft» a technique i
is thus dependent on attraction. Where the firm that goes to 1 comes from is dependent on a
simple chance process: every firm that operates a technique 7 that is less efficient than i, j < i,






The first factor expresses the pull by technique /, and the second the chance that an adopter of




Substitution of equations (2) to (5) respectively in equation (1) yields four different diffusion






It is easy to show that model (6) is a generalization for more techniques of the logistic model.
Suppose that model (6) describes the actual diffusion process, and aggregate all techniques from
i -1
1 to / - 1 into one category, called the 'old' technology: n^ = Ï n» Aggregate and the rest,
* • i
from I to /n. into the 'new' technology: «„„ = £ «,. Then the diffusion of the new technology
is determined by the switching of firms from techniques from the interval 1 to / - 1 to techniques
in the interval / to /n. These jumps can be expressed by:
(10)
The operator A is used to indicate change over time. Substitution of expression (2) yields:
(11) - Ï ctVf - Ï of- V'-' Ï a (, O
This is the familiar logistic curve for the 'new' technology. A type of logistic diffusion model
similar to equation (10) is analysed by Iwai (1984a and b): not any single technique, but the
cumulation of techniques / to m passes through a logistic diffusion process.
The models (6) to (9) produce different diffusion curves. The curves of models (6) and (7) have
the well known ogive form, whereas the curves produced by (8) and (9) remind of a more
exponential diffusion process, a diffusion process that emanates if it is driven by information
that spreads from one central source [see Mahajan and Peterson (1985)]. The four models are
illustrated in Figures 2 to 5. At period 0 technique 1 is used by 95 firms and technique 2 by one
firm. At period 30, 38, 50 and 75 techniques 3 to 6 respectively are introduced. Parameter a is
.1 for all runs.
Diffusion as described by the first model, the push variant, displays a slow take off and a gradual
acceleration of the process. Firms are more likely to switch to a new technique once this technique
has been introduced by a substantial number of competitors. Diffusion as described by the second
model, the pull variant, lakes off at high speed, because the attractiveness of the new technique
is highest in the first periods after its launch, when still no competitors use it. Model lb shows
a somewhat quicker introduction of new techniques than model la. The models 2a and 2b yield
very similar graphs, the curves of model 2b being slightly steeper.
All four models have been estimated using data from our case study banking organization. We
distinguish four different levels of technology in these banks (see Figure 5 in chapter 4). The
first level is characterized by traditional, mechanical, techniques; the second level is char-
acterized by an automated back office, and the third by an automated front office; the fourth
level, finally, is characterized by the presence of an automatic teller machine. From our data on
automation, we know the changes in the numbers of banks on each level, between 1980 and
1987. The firsl level has been left behind by every bank in 1984; the third level is first reached
in 1981 and the fourth in 1984. This gives us exactly 22 data points that can be used for the
estimation of equations (6) to (9). 5 for the first level. 8 for the second. 6 for the third and 3 for
the fourth. In equations (6) to (9), the right hand side, except for a, is calculated using data from167
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time r - 1, which serve as explanatory variable for ri,, the change in the number of banks that
use technique / at lime r. Then a is estimated using linear regression, assuming that the error
term is additive and normally distributed. The outcomes of model (6) resemble very closely the
outcomes of model (7). Not unexpectedly, the outcomes of models (X) and (9) are alike. The
results are reported in Table 1 and graphed in Figure 6.










standard errors in parentheses;
": significant at the 5% level; •: significant at the 10% level;













All the dependent variables are highly significant The models have been estimated with a
constant term, but these all proved insignificant. The goodness of fit of all the models is rather
high, but the models built on the assumption of a pressure mechanism perform better than the
models built on the assumption of a pull mechanism. The Durbin-Watson statistics reported are
adjusted for the fact that the sample is pooled out of four sub-samples. These statistics indicate
that the residuals are likely to be autocorrelated. Re-estimation of the equations in first differences
removes the first order autocorrelation. Calculating first differences costs four data points, one
for each technical level, which leaves us with 18 observations. Results can be found in Table 2
and Figure 7.
Tabk 2i Rwulta of «Kmaliom of equation (6) to (9) in fint differences
modW a (*/;.«' D-W«a/
I*. .528" .202 2.160 •,-*
a*;.' (248)
Ik . — 544»« 204 — • 2.140
; a .>£<•'*. ii> (.253) *„„
A; a,, i^rs: M,;[ " .156» •>---." .163 1.581
' '•"' >•.•"" (083) -,
.1 *k\ ƒ \ 156* ^-v .167 1628
•,s ' ^ ' v (.082) ;
* MMdvd cnofi in uwcmhcici;
**: ilgniftcani al the 5% level; *: Mjniflcanl al the 10% level,
fur 18 ot»crvatiims and unc rcgreuor, 5% significance points </, and d. are 1.03 and 1.26 respectively. • •
The estimates for a are all still significantly positive. A constant term, when included, turned
out consistently insignificant. The point estimates for a decrease somewhat and the fit
deteriorates, as was to be expected. The graphs show that the models follow the development
of the second and the third technological level, on which we have most of the data points, best.
The automatic teller machine follows an atypical path of diffusion: in its first year it was adopted
by more banks than in the second year, and the upswing came only in the third year. ,
The conclusion so far must be that these diffusion models do not perform badly in explaining
technical progress in the case study bank. If adoptions can be explained to such an extent only
from previous adoptions, this gives some support to the hypothesis that banks introduce new
techniques, partly because other banks do so. Furthermore, the first type of diffusion model,
based on the idea that banks are pushed out of their present technique, and then look for a better
alternative, seems to perform slightly better than the second type, which was based on the idea
that new techniques attract banks with less efficient techniques indiscriminately.
The diffusion models considered so far are based on different specifications of transitional
probabilities />,,. Instead of estimating the diffusion models, in which these probabilities are
subsumed, one could also try to estimate the specifications of the probabilities themselves.
Suppose that the probability />^. the chance that a firm operating technique y at time r - 1 will
switch to technique i at time /. can be estimated by the acrua/ number of firms which operate
technique _/ at time r - 1 <J/IJ switch to technique i at lime r, divided by the total number of firms
operating technique./ at time f -1: ^ * -r—-, where a hat indicates thai it concerns an estimate.169
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We can see by linear regression how well this estimate is explained by each of the specifications
(2) to (S). The results of these estimates of transitional probabilities are given in Table 3 and
also displayed in Figure 8. There were 20 data points available, 20 observations of transitions
from a technique; to a technique;../ < /, at a time r, which were not first transitions (innovations),
because these are not modelled by specifications (2) to (5).
















**: significant at the 5% level, *: significant at the 10% level;











The evidence from estimations of specifications (2) and (3) is largely in line with the results
from estimating the diffusion models (6) and (7). The parameters a are of about the same size
and arc .significantly positive, constant terms were not significant and the fit is rather well. It is
remarkable, however, that the results for specifications (4) and (5) turn out much worse than
the estimates of the models (8) and (9) would lead one to expect. The parameters a are insig-
nificant and get the wrong sign, and also the fit is very bad. One may conclude that models 2a
and 2b are not appropriate here. Models la and lb do better, although the Durbin-Watson
statistics suggest that there is some autocorrelation in model lb. However, estimation of the
model in first differences did not give better results and also showed autocorrelation. From
Figure 8 we can sec that the transition probabilities based on a pull mechanism overestimate the
number of firms that leaps further than to the very next technique, i.e. from technique 1 to 3 or
from technique 2 to 4. Conversely, it underestimates the number of firms that switches to the
next technical level, from 1 to 2, from 2 to 3 and from 3 to 4.
The fact thai transition probabilities (2) and (3) perform better than (4) and (5) may be accounted
for by the specific nature of the firms and the innovations that are being considered here, rather
than by the diffusion process /vr .«>. The superiority of a 'push' type of model over a 'pull' type
of model invalidates the latter model in this case, but does not invalidate this model in general.
Rather than assuming that a push model describes diffusion more accurately than a pull model,
one may suppose that there are different types of diffusion processes, and the spread of auto-
mation systems in banking fall into a specific category.
There are large, expensive and complex innovations and there are cheap and relatively simple
innovations, and these might diffuse in different ways. More complicated innovations are more
difficult to adopt. They are less likely to be adopted, just because they are at the technological
frontier. Their characteristics and profitability are not easily evaluated, so payoffs to adoption
are uncertain. Firms must be pushed towards new techniques by the necessity to leave their
present technique, because their present position is eroded. They tend to wait until uncertainty
decreases and to switch after experience with the innovation has already been built up. A model171
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of the 'push' type therefore might describe the diffusion of this kind of innovations well. Less
expensive and complicated innovations, conversely, will be adopted following a much simpler
and quicker evaluation and decision making procedure. They will be adopted as soon as they
are perceived at the technological frontier: because they involve a comparatively low risk, it is
attractive to be an early adopter for firms with different technological capabilities. Thus adoption
is likely to occur with equal probability by firms that vary over the use of their present technique.
A 'pull' type of model may describe the diffusion of this sort of innovations best. The outcomes
of the estimations above support these conjectures. The introduction of back office automation,
front office automation and automatic teller machines is certainly a major step for a local branch
office of a bank, involving risk, large investments and retraining of the labour force.
Note that the difference between the two types of transition probabilities is reminiscent of the
two types of diffusion mechanisms that Davies (1979) allows for. Davies arrives at the same
distinction as we do, only from a different direction. He also distinguishes, first of all, the
diffusion of technologically simple and inexpensive innovations (type A) which are usually built
off-site. For this type of innovation learning effects fall drastically at the beginning of the
diffusion process, leaving the technology fairly stable from then on. Diffusion here follows a
concave curve, like in Figures 4 and 5. Secondly, Davies distinguishes technologically complex
and expensive innovations (type B), requiring lengthy periods of installation on the adopter's
site. Here, because of their 'lumpiness' and the small numbers in which these innovations are
produced at the start, learning effects will be slow initially. However, because of the larger scope172
for improvement of these techniques, the innovations of the last group will overtake the inno-
vations of the first group, both with respect to the rate of diffusion and the ceiling for diffusion.
In this case, diffusion follows an S-curve, like in Figures 2 and 3. Examples of items in the first
group might be simple supplementary equipment, and examples of items in the second group
might be new processes in chemical plants and steel works. The automation systems in banks
considered above may also be classified as type B.* Davies expresses the difference between
diffusion of type A and type B innovations in a probit model framework, by assuming a different
type of shifting of the critical size at which a firm will adopt the innovation over time.' The
actual specification of this shifting mechanism, however, seems somewhat ad hoc. Using these
two versions of his probit model, Davies finds empirical support for his classification of inno-
vations and diffusion mechanisms. The approach followed above might constitute an alternative
to Davies' approach of dealing with two kinds of innovations. Our models 1 and 2 give similar
differences in diffusion curves, but the basis of the distinction between the two types of curves
is a different type of mechanism.
The results above can also be compared with results from the marketing literature on diffusion
of consumer products. Mahajan and Peterson distinguish between exponential diffusion pro-
cesses, for items that emanate from one source, and logistic diffusion processes, for innovations
that are transferred by contact between adopters. Similar differences in diffusion curves are
arrived at. and there too the difference may be related to differences in the characteristics and
the complexity of the innovations that diffuse.
6.3 Transition, size and productivity ^». . .-• ^ Ü
In section 2 it was assumed that the probability /?,, that a firm moves from technique./ to technique
i' depends only on the distribution of firms over techniques, like pictured in Figure 1. Although
a large part of the switching of technical levels by our case study banks can be explained by
these simple models, it is worthwhile to see whether the estimates of the transition probabilities
may be improved by making use of additional information on the banks. A first hypothesis
would be that not only the technological position of the firm relative to others in the industry,
but also the characteristics of the firm, would determine its probability to switch. If this is the
case, then firms that switch from technique y to i on any particular moment r have a different
profile than the average of the total group of firms that was using technique/
Possibly relevant characteristics on which data are available are size and productivity. Larger
firms may switch earlier because they can better exploit the innovation and can more easily cope
with the risk; less productive firms can gain more by introducing the innovation earlier, though
a low productivity may indicate lower technical capabilities. There are no indicators for size
and productivity for all 119 banks in the sample used in section 2. For a total of 95 observations
though, there are figures for mutations in current accounts K, in 1986 and figures for numbers
2 DaviM dtMtagaWm eg the electrical hygrometer in weaving as a type A innovation and automatic track
tew In or manufacture, lunnel killns in bhcfc mafam. and the basic oxygen procca and ccnonuom catting in
steel prvxluction as type B innovations ^..^. ,^^ ,,,i ,. ^ j^ ,,- ,^
3 Specifically, the critical firm si/e at which a firm will adopt is J = (6,E,) '*. where fl is a parameter and e i*
auumed to capture firm characteristics and to be lognonnally distributed. Then it is assumed that for type A


















of current accounts K, in 1986 to serve as size indicator. Also there are for 1986 data of costs
of labour which can be used to compute a proxy for productivity. In Table 4, the percentage of
firms using a technique; at time r-1 that switches to a technique i at time r is indicated.
Table 4: The percentage of firms switching from technique./ in year f to technique i in the nut.
} i 1979 1980 Ï9ÏÜ 1982 1983 1984 I98S 1986
1 2 22.6 41.S
13
2 3 y,-t M
2 4.
3 4 ._ _.
Legenda: >: tbe old technique, i: the new technique
The numbers in Table 4 differ somewhat from those in Figure 8, because the sample is about
20% smaller. In Table 5. the percentage is indicated that switching firms arc larger or more
productive than the average firms producing with a certain technique.
The main figures in Table 5 are the ones that come from levels and periods, where a substantial
part of the firms jump to another technique. As can be seen in Table 4, these are the jumps from
level 1 to 2, in the years 1979 to 1982, the jumps from level 2 to 3, in the years 1983 to 1986,
2 to 4, in 1983, and 3 to 4 in 1983 and 1986. Table 5 shows that switching firms tend to be a
little larger than the average of the group they come from: in parts 2 and 3 we see mainly positive
numbers, and the few negative numbers that are recorded are comparatively close to zero. This
certainly holds for firms that skip one level and go from 1 to 3, or from 2 to 4, but also for firms
that go from one level to the next. As far as productivity is concerned, there seems to be no clear
tendency: from inspection of Table S one cannot infer that less efficient firms switch faster or
not.
As shown in chapter 4, the size distribution over banks is rather skewed. To compensate for
possible disturbances by outliers, the table has been recalculated using rank numbers for size
and productivity instead of values. Results are reported in Table 6. The outcomes confirm the
comments made to Table S. Especially in the earlier years of diffusion, large banks seem to
adopt innovations more quickly than small banks. ^ „ **^.« ^-,„^, ,-*.«, -* „ ,*.,
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Table 5: Tbc percentage difference (in various measures) between firms adopting a new technique and tbt
average firm using a certain technique.
> j 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
59.2 28.4 .6 24.5 .0 ...
. . 2673 .....
. -11.9 92 2 21.8
516 20.2 .1.6 29.1
. . 215.3 .
. -1.1 96.9 33.6
2.9 -5.3 2.0 5.3 .0
. . -23.2 ..
. 24.5 -9i 26.1
7.3 11 II 1.6 .0
. . -10.5 ..






















































































Legenda: ƒ the otd technique, i: the new technique;
f,: the percentage that Turns switching from; to i are larger than (he average firm using technique), where
size is measured by mutations in current accounts;
K,: like 2., with size measured by number of current accounts;
-: the percentage that firms switching from; to i are more productive than the average firm using technique
), where productivity Is measured by mutations in current accounts, divided by labour costs;
-: like 4., with productivity measured as number of current accounts, divided by labour costs.
fep hypothesis to be considered might be the assumption that the weight of a firm for the
diffusion process is determined by its size. The choice of production technique of larger firms
may influence the transition probabilities more than the choice of small firm. The chance that
a firm using technique) at time r will use technique i at time f+1 may be larger when the firms
already using / are large rather than small. If this is the case, then a formulation of equations (2)
to (5) in terms of size would yield better results than the estimations in section 2. If v stands for
output, we get:17S
Table 6: Tbc percentage difference in rank number (various ordering*) between firm» adopting a new
technique and the average firm using a certain technique.
> i 1979 1980 198Ï 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
59.8 37.4 10.2 41.5 .0 ...
220.4 .....
75 30.6 35.5
51.4 240 6.2 39.9
178.5
16.5 38.3 39.8
£ 1 2 19.7 2.1 4.5 4.8 .0
. . -67.5
. 33.0 -35.5 45.3


























































































Legenda: see Table 5.
y, ,. - (12)
(13)
.?,'•176
Here K = L y» is total output. Equations (12) to (IS) have been estimated in logarithmic form,
*•• —-
using data from 95 banks, where size has been approximated again by mutations in current





























































































standard erron In parentheses;
ft : number of firms (compare Table 3);
)£ : siae measured as mutations in accounts;
|J : site measured as number of current accounts; ' *" " '*"
**: alpiUlcaM «Be 5% level; * significant at the 10% level;
for 20 iil»»»a|hiii and one regressor, 5% significance points 4 and d. are 1 08 and 1.28 respectively. ' ' '*''
The first part of Table 7 is the equivalent of Table 3, using only data for 95 banks. The results
in the second and the third part are rather similar to the ones in the first part and in Table 3.
Models 2a and 2b also perform as badly as before when taking account of firm size; models la
and 1 b perform reasonably well, although first order autocorrelation may be present The results
indicate that it is hard to improve on the explanatory power of the generalized logistic model,
equation (6), for the diffusion of new technologies within our case study bank. Apparently the
size of a bank does not contribute much to the weight it has in the diffusion process. It may be
concluded from this section that the data suggest that the probability that a bank switches overto a new technique only depends on its own size and the distribution of all hanks over techniques.
Larger banks, on average, seem to switch faster to a new technology than smaller banks, but the
size of a large bank does not seem to be of influence on the switching of other banks.
6.4 Conclusion
The decisions of firms to introduce a new production technology are likely to be based on a
variety of considerations. Firms will attempt to make an estimate of costs and benefits of adopting
an innovation. The benefits can be growth of production capacity and market share and an
increase in efficiency. The costs are an investment in technology, but also in training of labour
and in evaluation and decision making itself. As innovations get more complex and their impact
on the activities of the firm get more profound, it gets more difficult to estimate the benefits of
adoption and the costs of evaluation and decision making start to rise as one tries to reduce
uncertainty. Under these conditions, it is likely that firms will try to learn from each other. The
adoption policy of competitors conveys information on their estimates of the balance of costs
and benefits of an innovation. Moreover, generally it is not efficiency in absolute terms that
counts for survival, but one's efficiency in comparison to competitors (at least in case demand
is not very price elastic). Therefore, firms may adopt merely to reduce the risk of falling behind,
in the hope that adoption will pay off at some later date. In this way, the main motor of diffusion
becomes diffusion itself.
In this chapter, models have been built on the assumption that bandwagon effects are the main
determinants of diffusion. Two types of diffusion mechanism were suggested, one a 'push' and
the other a 'pull' mechanism. The push mechanism expresses that firms start to innovate, when
they begin to loose ground with their present routine and are pushed to improve efficiency. The
pull mechanism expresses that new techniques conquer the market by attracting potential users
from all other techniques indiscriminately, because their superiority to perform a specific
function can be easily evaluated and the risks of adopting are low. Both mechanisms were
translated into two models of the probability of transition from an inferior to a superior technique.
The resulting four formulations of transition probabilities were then used to construct four
diffusion models. These diffusion models were estimated. The difference between the results
obtained from models built on the assumption of a push mechanism were roughly equivalent,
maybe slightly better, than the results obtained from models built on a pull mechanism. The
data set at our disposal, however, does not only contain information on the total number of users
per technique per year, but also more detailed information on what firm switches at what time
from which old technique to which new. This allowed for a direct estimation of the transition
probabilities themselves and a test of the four models for these probabilities. Here the push
models performed considerably better than the pull models. This is not surprising, considering
the character of the innovations which are represented in the data, which can be described as
complex, expensive and risky. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that it is so difficult to discriminate
between the two types of models, when using only aggregate data on the use of techniques,
whereas the difference between the two is so manifest when one can take account of actual
transitions between techniques.
Taking advantage of the range of data available, an attempt was made to improve the estimation
results by making use of information on the size of banks in the model. The size of a bank,
however, does not seem to influence its weight for the diffusion process. On the other hand, it
was shown that on average larger firms tend to lead slightly in the adoption of innovations.178
A comparison of the empirical results of this chapter with those of the foregoing chapters suggests
a conclusion on the relative importance of the two types of considerations mentioned for the
adoption of automation equipment in our sample of banks. A firm's decision to adopt an
innovation may be based partly on a firm's assessment of ils production costs relative to the
benefits, and partly on bandwagon-effects, on perceived decisions of competitors. The analysis
in chapter S was based on the assumption that firms invest in new technology on the basis of
expected costs and benefits. The analysLs in this chapter takes the hypothesis of bandwagon
effects as ils basis. The data analysis in chapter 4 and the estimation results in chapters S and 6
.suggest that, for the sample of banks for which data were available, adoption of a technology
in reaction to competitors adoptions was much more typical than adoption on the basis of a cost
benefit analysis only. Whereas little relationship between productivity, costs and investments
in new technology could be found, fairly regular diffusion patterns of innovations tum up in the
data. This relative importance of bandwagon effects for the adoption of new technologies by
this sample of hanks can be explained various factors. First of all, because the technologies that
banks are deciding on are expensive and complex, and have pervasive consequences for the
production processes, adoption behaviour of other firms in the industry may be an important
source of information. Secondly, because the banks belong to one large organization of banks,









7. Summary and concluding remarks






Economics is closely linked to technology: technology is the way we transform the scarce
resources with which we attempt to fulfil our unlimited needs. Though in the short term tech-
nology may be considered a datum, it is subject to change in the long term. Technological change
both causes changes in the constraints of the economic system and is itself induced by economic
behaviour. To deal with long term economic development, economic analysis therefore needs
the conceptual and mathematical tools to deal with technological change. A number of useful
conceptual tools can be found in evolutionary economics: the concepts of technological tra-
jectories and paradigms, path dependence, dynamic adjustment, complexity and uncertainty,
routines and bounded rationality (see Table 1 in chapter 1). These concepts, however, which
refer to intuitively important aspects of technological development, are not well integrated into
mainstream (micro-) economic thought and modelling practice. This study is an attempt at u
contribution to such an integration.
'••'•• "*• •• - •• • '•• •'••"' •-'-' ' "•• •
7.2 Subject outline ^"'" •*'' -*^- -'-•"'•'' .'=•>••: ••.•->• '•••
Firms invest in new production techniques, and thereby alter their production capacity, their
demand for inputs and their profitability. This thesis tries to contribute to our comprehension
of this process. The central issue is to understand how firms decide on investments in new
production technology. In particular, it is important to specify the c/io/cf 0p/wrrun/r/>.Y of the
firm, its ooyecrivw and its m^f/iods. The analysis has concentrated on opportunities and methods,
accepting profit maximization as the firm's main objective. The choice opportunities open to
the firm are determined by its history; thus development is path dependent. The firm's method
of handling information and taking decisions is tied to the limitations of its cognitive capacity;
thus perception is selective and rationality is bounded.
The study aims at three goals. The first is to contribute to the conceptual analysis of some aspects
of technological progress and of its role in economic development. The second goal is to for-
malize these theoretical reflections in models and to analyse the theoretical postulates with the
help of these models. The third purpose is to use the models as a tool in empirical verification
of the theoretical insights. This chapter first summarizes the main aspects of the thesis. It then
concludes with some general remarks and assessments.180
Summary
r / introduces the subject of the thesis, mentions the various relevant theoretical per-
spectives and gives a brief outline of the things to follow.
C/uipfer 2 provides the theoretical background of the study. It starts out with a general depiction
of economic behaviour. Economic activities of production, exchange and consumption require
cognitive activities to exert control. Depending on the character of the economic activity, these
cognitive activities range from very simple (buying an ice-cream) to very complex (working
out a corporate strategy). As these cognitive activities get more complex, they impose binding
constraints on economic behaviour. The cognitive resources of decision makers are limited, and
therefore choices have to be made on where to employ them. The economic problem of choice
under conditions of scarcity is extended from the real world to the cognitive realm: a preliminary
choice problem in the 'control sphere' becomes which choices in the 'real sphere" to produce,
which knowledge to generate, which information to evaluate, which skills to develop. When
firms try to improve their production technologies, cognitive constraints are likely to become
binding and to co-determine the direction and speed of progress. It is important to note the
diflcrences and .similarities between the economic problem of the 'real sphere' and the economic
problem of the 'control sphere', for these indicate to what extent the same tools of analysis may
be applied to both spheres of economic activity. Production of goods and services in the real
sphere is matched by production of information and decisions in the control sphere. Both types
of production require investments of scarce resources and foregoing consumption opportunities.
An important resource in both spheres is time: investments in both spheres have a gestation
time. The 'products' in both spheres, however, differ in character, mainly because cognitive
products are less appropriable.
Alter this general sketch, chapter 2 turns to the field that further analysis will concentrate on:
the introduction of new technology. Among other topics, the relationship between innovation
adoptions and the diffusion process is explored, and the question emerges where the empirical
regularity of the diffusion curve originates, at the micro level or at the industry level. Either a
regular distribution over firms of the characteristics that determine adoption decisions may
explain a regular diffusion curve, or the regularity of the diffusion curve may be predominantly
determined by the mutual dependence of adoptions, in the sense that every adoption provokes
the next, although one cannot determine in advance the sequence in which firms will adopt
.? elaborates on the verbal description of economic behaviour in chapter 2 and tries to
capture the main thoughts in a model of firm decision making. The firm is assumed to produce
'real sphere' output by means of a constant technique and in constant volumes. In the control
sphere, the firm produces decisions, information, new technology or whatever is necessary, in
order to increase its future profitability. Future profitability depends on production capacity and
on the future productivity of those inputs that have not yet been bought, but will be necessary
in production: the productivity of variable production inputs. Together, output, growth in pro-
duction capacity and variable factor productivity are the products of the firm: on a 'lower' level
the firm produces output, on a 'higher' level it produces itself, its own production possibilities.
These higher level production processes are described by two production functions. Their input
is aggregate gross investment, which is invested both in the control sphere (R&D, decision
making, training) and in the real sphere (production equipment). Because at any moment inSu/wnarv anJ ro/ic/itfioru 181
time, resources for investment are scarce, have a declining marginal productivity and have two
alternative employments, profit maximizing firms are assumed to choose a rate of investment
and a ratio of producing capacity growth and producing productivity growth.
The basis of the model is kept very simple. There is no technical depreciation, no market for
second hand capital goods, no vintage structure of the capital stock, no financing restriction, no
change in the price of investment goods. The model of the production of final output is rigid
and as simple as possible. Any change at the lower production level of the firm originates from
activity at the higher production level. At this higher level of production, the firm is engaged in
a prolonged process of changing its lower level production constraints, of adjustment to changing
opportunities and market conditions. At the lower level, markets clear and the economy is
permanently in momentary equilibrium, at the higher level there is a process of on-going
adjustment. A next issue is to introduce technological change in this model. It is argued thai the
determining characteristic of technological progress is its cumulative character, which can be
associated with the concept of learning and with dynamic economies of scale. This cumula-
tiveness implies that the returns to current investment in technological change depend on the
extent of investment in both the future and the past. The decision problem of the firm is therefore
necessarily a dynamic planning problem: the planning of a time path for investments.
The most important elements of the model can be summarized as follows. The firm maximizes
the present value of its future income, given market, technological and cognitive constraints.
The latter constraints can be characterized by four assumptions. It is assumed, first of all, that
without investments the firm cannot change production capacity nor production technique;
secondly, that investments allow the firm to expand capacity and to increase variable factor
productivity; thirdly, that cognitive constraints restrict the firm in changing scale of operations
and production technique; fourthly, that if the position of the firm on its technological trajectory
allows for technological change, then investments have a cumulative effect.
This model was used to examine the processes of investment planning and of competition, both
analytically and by simulating. The focus was on the course of the development path of firms
and of an industry at large. It was found that firms, given perfectly competitive input and output
markets and technological opportunities, tend to plan investments grow/ng without bound over
time and moving gradually from factor productivity growth toward capacity expansion. How-
ever, when markets are not perfectly competitive (expressed by finite price elasticities), this
conclusion no longer holds: investments will then continue to be directed at improving efficiency
and are likely tottecrawf in the long term. In a particular case, if case price elasticities of inputs
and output are constant, a warranted steady state rate of growth of output can be derived.
However, there is not only no mechanism that ensures convergence of planned growth rales to
the warranted rate, but it is also shown that the warranted rate itself is unstable.
One variable on which investment plans of firms depend is the expected behaviour of competitors
on input and output markets. It was shown that firms of different size are likely to react differently
if they expect competing supply to increase faster in the future. Whereas it is optimal for small
firms to decrease spending on expansion of capacity, it is rational for large firms to plan a
retaliatory increase in capacity. The threshold size above which firms retaliate as they expect
more competition depends on their market share and on the price elasticity of output demand.182
The model has been refined to analyse competition under different conditions on markets for
inputs and outputs. Development of firms and industries in this model depends crucially on
starting conditions: future development cannot be seen separate from historical development.
The model only describes rational planning, given a starting condition.' As there can be many
different starting conditions, the model can accommodate many different types of development,
in which different firms survive side by side for lengthy periods of time with different market
shares, different growth rates, different levels of efficiency and different speeds of technological
progress. Moreover, variables like growth rates, market shares and profits can diverge and
converge at different stages of industry development. An example of this was elaborated with
the help of a computer simulation model, simulating the competitive process of a small number
of different firms conquering a new market.
It was shown that, without entry, if the demand curve for output is downward sloping, investment
halls at some time, despite positive profits. Over lime, the industry develops in accordance with
elements from the /m?<incr /i/r-cyc/r r/i«>ry: output prices fall gradually, investment first rises
and then decreases, the industry moves from an expansionary stage to a stage of rationalization
and consolidation, and the largest profits are made in the periods of sharpest market growth.
Thus the product life cycle is generated in this model by the process of technological progress
and microeconomic competitive behaviour. The marketing strategy known as 'skimming'
appears as an optimal pricing strategy.
The relationship between /i/w .me\ mdrttr» .ffrurfu/r a/w/ f/i* tyv^d o/
turned out to be intricate in this type of model, because it is co-determined by the price movements
und price elasticities of inputs and output Firm size (absolute size) appears to vary positively
with investment in technology, because larger firms reap scale benefits from the introduction
of new technology. At the same time, market share (relative size) varies negatively with
investment in technology, because as firms have a higher share of the market with a given
demand elasticity of output, they internalize a negative price change of output to a larger extent.
The influence of firm size and market structure on the speed of progress varies over the life-cycle
of the market or industry. A fall in the output price reduces the power of the firm size factor and
u rise in the elasticity of demand increases the influence of the market share argument. Firm
size dominates the determination of the speed of technical progress in a developing market and
market structure dominates in a mature market.
The interplay of the firm size and the market share effect on investment in capacity expansion
also explain the appearance of a ji^mou/ c/ij0toio»i curvy of output. As a market opens up. firms
grow and thereby increasingly create the opportunity to exploit economies of scale. This induces
them to expand at un increasing rate. As the market saturates and the price elasticity of output
demand rises, the output price tends to fall rapidly as output expands, putting profits increasingly
under pa*ssure. This induces firms with a large market share to decrease the rale at which they
increase output supply.
1 One may wonder what explains the starting condition, and whether the starting condition is likely to fulfil
certain characteristics Note that in a history dependent world, the conditions at the start are path dependent
determined by the historical process to dale rhercfore there is no reason to assume that starting conditions
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Cfcapfw ¥ is the bridge from the theoretical reflections to the empirical evidence. To find
empirical support for the proposed modelling approach, data were used from the Dutch banking
industry. The banking industry is an important part of the services sector, in which a number of
recent trends, which are prominent in large parts of the services sectors of western economies,
are particularly visible. Services industries, on the one hand, gain in importance relative to
manufacturing industries, e.g. in terms of share of gross national product and employment, and.
on the other hand, start to adopt more and more features that used to be characteristic for
manufacturing industries. Services enterprises get more capital intensive, standardize their
products, compete by diversification and market segmentation, expand and merge to be able to
cover large markets and to reap economies of scale and scope. An important cause of this trend
is the development of computer and telecommunications technologies. The banking industry,
a large-scale consumer of information technology, exemplifies this trend very well. The
application of information technology in banking has lead to the development of a large range
of new products for the retail and the wholesale market, to a large expansion of output and a
dramatic decrease in costs.
A set of data from local branch offices of a Dutch banking organization was available to be used
for testing the models. In chapter 4 these data are first analyzed inductively, showing amongst
other things sigmoid diffusion curves for automation equipment and indications of scale
economies in production. To test the models of chapter 3, variables have been selected from
this data set to approximate output, variable inputs, investment and technological level. The
main investments in technological progress in banking organizations at the local level over the
period 1979 to 1987 were in automatic data processing. At first local banks invested in automation
systems for back office operations, later in automation systems at the front office, and after that
in automatic teller machines and related network systems. The most voluminous product of
these local banks, and the one most affected by the introduction of information technology, is
the administration of accounts, including the transfer of money from one account to the another.
Although the production process is relatively capital intensive, the main inputs into production
of this output are still different types of labour: counter work, data input work, administration,
management. None of these labour inputs are fully variable, but probably some of them are
more variable in the short term than others. Consequently, data on administration of payments
were chosen as proxies for output, different types of labour data as variable input proxies,
cumulated investments in automation equipment as investment proxy and availability of three
different automation systems as technology indicator.
is devoted to tests of the model of chapter 3. Because the available data arc mainly
cross-section data and cover no more than a couple of years, the multi-period model had to be
simplified to a two-period model. The scope of the tests of the model is therefore limited to
certain aspects. Not so much the assumed mechanism of investment itself as the extent to which
the mechanism is the same for different banks is tested. The first question dealt with is, whether
there is evidence that investments have a cumulative effect, whether they lead to technical
change, rather than to pure expansion of the capital slock. The second question is, in how far
technological opportunities for different firms in the same industry at different moments can be
represented by a single stable function, to what extent different firms face the same technological
constraints.184
The outcomes of the estimations have to be considered with care, because the reliability of the
data as proxies for the concepts of output, variable inputs and investment is not unconditional
and because the model is a very stylized representation of a banking firm. Nevertheless, some
positive results deserve to be reported. Estimations lend support to the hypothesis that all banks
face sharply declining marginal returns to investment in automation at any period in lime. In
spite of that, large banks invest more than small banks. Parameter estimates indicate that this
may be explained by the fact that large banks can lake advantage of scale economies in
investment. They reap more benefits in absolute terms from any level of investment, and can
therefore spend more on investment before marginal returns equal marginal costs. This lends
tentative support to the hypothesis that investments have a cumulative effect, which may be
because investments change over-all production technology. The relationship between invest-
ment and demand for variable inputs was less consistent, but does not exclude a cumulative
effect.
Concerning the question to what degree different banks face the same constraints and follow
the same technological track, only preliminary answers could be found. Although all firms take
the same qualitative steps in technological development, by first introducing back office auto-
mation, then Iront office automation, and after that linking up to the network of automatic teller
machines, they do not seem to follow this path with the same speed. Also firms do not move in
a particular order. Considering quantitative variables, firms do not invest in the same direction,
nor do they invest similar amounts in automation equipment; rather they invest at roughly the
same rate. Although the constraints to their development, in terms of the quantitative variables
output, inputs and investment, could be estimated, under the assumption that the main parameters
were the some tor nil firms, a nnmhorof analytically JoiivcJ ilypuiiiesesconcerning the direction
of investment could not be supported by evidence.
, finally, starts out from the observation that no relationship between co.su, benefits
and the introduction of specific technological system was found in chapter S. but that the spread
of these systems through this group of banks nevertheless showed a regular diffusion pattern.
We therefore reverted to a theme introduced in chapter 2, to the question where the regular shape
of the diffusion curve has its roots, at the micro level or at the aggregate level. If at the micro
level the lie between capacity and productivity on one side and investment behaviour and
adoptions of innovations on the other is so ambiguous, a closer look at possible mechanisms at
the aggregate level is warranted. Aggregate level mechanisms may be dominant in determining
the shape of technological progress in an industry, when bandwagon effects are important, or
when individual behaviour is erratic, but the market operates as a selection mechanism once
firms have set out on an investment course. The mechanisms explored in chapter 6 assume that
the relative profitability of a technique, and the relative frequency of its use, determines the
probability that a firm using a less profitable technique will adopt it and a firm currently using
it will leave it for a more profitable alternative. These probabilities may be used to formulate a
diffusion model. A distinction is made between a 'push' and a 'pull' mechanism, depending on
whether a firm is supposed to decide to switch because it is driven out of its old technique, or
because it is attracted to a new. The two different mechanisms result in different types of diffusion
curves, the push-curves being sigmoid and the pull-curves positively sloped and concave. It
may be expected that the push type of mechanism will be operative in the diffusion of complicated
expensive innovations and the pull type in the diffusion of relatively simple and cheap inno-
vations. The two shapes of the curves are reminiscent of the diffusion curves of Davies' type B
and type A innovations, but the supposed mechanisms are differentSummary a/ir/ cwic/us/ons 185
The 'push' and 'pull' diffusion models have been estimated using the data of innovation
adoptions from the sample of banks. Although a test of two diffusion models based on a push
and a pull mechanism respectively did not give radically different results, a direct test of the
transition probabilities according to the two mechanisms showed large differences. The latter
indicated that a push mechanism is more likely to be important in these banks than u pull
mechanism, an outcome which could be expected from the character of the innovations under
consideration. A comparison of the empirical outcomes of chapter 5 and 6 suggests thai, next
to considerations of capacity growth and productivity increase, aggregate mechanisms like
bandwagon and spill-over effects were important determinants for the introduction of infor-
mation technology in banks over the last decade.
7.4 Concluding remarks
Afry aff5i/m/>/ion.y in this thesis are:
1. Development is history dependent; investment decisions concern incremental changes.
2. Cognitive constraints are an important determinant for the process of economic and
technological development.
3. Technological change is driven by economic motives; technological opportunities are
given by the nature of trajectories.
The main conc/iuroru from the study may be briefly summarized under six headings.
Awrsr, an explanation for the product life-cycle and the sigmoid diffusion curve may be found
in the process of competition as described by the firm investment planning model (chapter 3).
5*comWy, whether a small number of competitors generate faster technological progress than a
large number of competitors in a market (cf. the so called Schumpclerian hypotheses) depends,
on the one hand, poj/nYWy on their possibility to realize scale economies in technological
progress and, on the other hand, ne#a«Vf /y on the extent to which they internalize price effects.
The first factor depends on their i/jf, the second on their mür*«'f.ï/iür<'. Moreover, the relationship
between the speed of technological progress and market structure may differ for investments in
capacity expanding and variable input saving technology. Finally, the relative strength of the
size and the market share effect change over the course of the industry life-cycle, as prices fall
and the elasticity of demand for output goes up (chapter 3).
777/rJ/v, there is no steady state growth path for any single market or industry producing a
homogeneous output. If output markets are infinitely elastic, or the number of firms in the market
approaches infinity, investment and the rale of output growth increase without limit; if the
demand curve is downward sloping (not asymptotically horizontal), investment goes to zero; if
the elasticity of demand is constant and above unity, a warranted rate of steady state growth
may be computed, which is unstable, however (chapter 3).
i/y. estimation results indicate that in the sample of banks we considered there are sharply
decreasing marginal returns to investment. They also point at important scale effects to
investment: the same amount of investment generates more returns (in absolute terms) to a larger
firm. These scale effects may reflect technological change (chapter 5).
/y, in our sample of banks, the measurable relationship between costs, benefits and the
adoption of specific technical systems appears weak (chapter S).186
5«r/i/y, bandwagon and spill-over effects appear to contribute importantly to the explanation
of the adoption of technical systems by the banks in the sample. The diffusion patterns fit the
model specification for more substantial, high-risk innovations better than the model specifi-
cation for incremental, low-risk innovations. This accords positively with intuition, since the
technical systems under consideration are relatively complex and influence banking operations
significantly (chapter 6).
The thesis leaves many matters pertaining to its declared topic open, undecided or up in the air.
These may become subjects for further research. A short list of the more theoretical issues for
future exploration might include:
1. The firm model of chapter 3 can be evaluated under different expectations regimes, e.g.
under the assumption of rational expectations and strategic behaviour.
2. The relationship between market structure and technological change can be evaluated,
given not only an indirect external effect from technological change through prices, but
also the direct external effect of technology spill-overs.
3. In the stylized world of chapter 3, the firm is connected to its environment through the
market for output, the market for variable inputs and the credit market. The interest rate
has been assumed constant and thus (he supply of credit infinitely interest elastic; capital
goods were supposed to he supplied at constant prices; the demand curve for output and
the supply curve for variable inputs were assumed exogenously determined and fixed
over time. To examine competition and development in a more dynamic environment,
planning models for suppliers of variable inputs or labour and for consumers of output
could be specified to supplement the firm model, thereby endogenizing the position of
the input supply and output demand curves. Similarly the supply of credit and investment
goods can be modelled, thus endogenizing capital embodied technological change.
These models can be based on the same principles as the firm model: path dependency
and limited cognitive capacities.
4. The relationship between microeconomic adoption behaviour and aggregate patterns
of diffusion, in cases where adoption seems erratic, but diffusion fairly regular, requires
further analysis. The link between microeconomic and aggregate behaviour remains a
dismal issue.
On the empirical side several matters comes to mind:
1. An important issue for the empirical usefulness of the model is a certain stability of the
functions that express technological opportunities, # ((}) and A (M). The model is a better
tool, when these functions are stable across firms and over time. In the banking industry
no evidence for this stability turned up, but banking may not be a typical case.
2. In assessing the relationship between market structure and technological progress
empirically, it may be useful to differentiate between technical progress directed at
capacity expansion and technical progress directed at variable input saving. Based on
the theoretical results above, one might expect that the former goes faster in competitive
markets and the latter in more concentrated markets. Moreover, it may be fruitful to
take account of the life-cycle stage of the market. Technical progress leading toSummary and conc7u.non$ 187
expansion would be expected to dominate input saving progress in markets in early
stages of the life-cycle, whereas the opposite would hold for markets at a later stage of
the life-cycle.
3. A possible use for the firm planning model and similar models for other functions in
the economic system would be to build simulation systems of micro models, appropriate
for evaluating effects of economic policy. The parameters of the ingredients of the
systems, the micro-models, can be estimated with standard procedures. The micro-
models can then be allowed to interact through markets, much like was done in the
simulation procedures in chapter 3. to assess characteristics of future economic
development and consequences of policy.
A source of inspiration for the study of the relationship between technological development and
economic dynamics is the urge to escape from the spell of 'technological determinism' and to
develop effective policies to guide long term economic development in favourable directions.
In this sense, the problem of the links between technological and economic development is an
appearance in the economic realm of the problem of free choice, the question if and to what
degree man can determine his own fate. A first step to a solution of the problem of free choice
is the development of an understanding of opportunities and constraints. May this thesis be a
contribution to the construction of tools to explore the technological constraints to choice and
their determinants.188
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Nederlandse samenvatting - summary in Dutch
De causale relatie tussen economische en technologische ontwikkeling is tweezijdig: enerzijds
bepaalt de technologische ontwikkeling de randvoorwaarden voor economische groei, ander-
zijds stuurt het economisch proces de ontwikkeling van nieuwe technologie. Om economische
ontwikkeling te kunnen analyseren, is er daarom behoefte aan een conceptueel en wiskundig
instrumentarium, toegesneden op het beschrijven en formaliseren van de rol van technologische
verandering in de economie. In dit proefschrift wordt een bijdrage geleverd aan het ontwikkelen
van dit instrumentarium, waarbij aansluiting wordt ge7,0cht voor wat betreft de conceptuele en
theoretische invulling bij de evolutionaire economie en voor wat betreft de wiskundige uit-
werking bij de neoklassieke traditie.
Ondernemingen investeren in nieuwe produktietechnieken en veranderen daarmee hun pro-
dukticcapaciteit en hun produktivitcit, hun vraag naar arbeid, kapitaalgoederen en andere pro-
duklicmiddelcn per eenheid produkt. Het centrale probleem in dit proefschrift is de wijze waarop
ondernemingen keuzes maken omtrent dit soort investeringen. Het gaat hierbij om de analyse
van de doelstellingen, de instrumenten en de mogelijkheden van de onderneming. Uitgang-
spunten zijn de veronderstelling dat de voornaamste doelstelling van de onderneming toe-
komstige winst is; voorts, de veronderstelling dat de mogelijkheden om winst te genereren
worden beperkt door de hoedanigheid van de onderneming op het moment van keuze, door
technische en marklhenerkingen en door de begrensdheid van beschikbare cognitieve capaci-
teiten; en tenslotte, de veronderstelling dat de werkwijze van de onderneming gekarakteriseerd
kun worden als routinematig handelen, dat als gevolg van de uitkomsten van keuzeprocessen
geleidelijk aan veranderende door de omgeving bepaalde voorwaarden wordt aangepast. Deze
uitgangspunten worden in dit proefschrift nader uitgewerkt, geformaliseerd in modellen en
getoetst aan de praktijk van het bankwezen in Nederland.
/ geeft een duiding van hel belang van verandering in technologie voor economische
ontwikkeling en signaleert een toename in de belangstelling voor dit onderwerp vanuit diverse
disciplines, onder andere industriële economie, groeitheorie en strategisch management. Voorts
wordt gewezen op de recente ontwikkeling van een theoretische invalshoek, het 'evolutionair'
perspectief, vanwaaruit bruikbare begrippen en theorieën naar voren gebracht zijn, die echter
slechts sporadisch in modellen zijn uitgewerkt.
levert de theoretische basis van de studie. In het eerste deel wordt gewezen op het
belang van cognitieve activiteiten voor het economisch proces. Onder cognitieve activiteiten
worden onder andere verstaan: het verkrijgen en beoordelen van informatie, het opdoen en
ontwikkelen van kennis, het verwerven van vaardigheden, het onderbouwen van verwachtingen
en inschattingen en het maken van keuzes verstaan. Er wordt betoogd dat cognitieve processen
als onderdeel van economisch gedrag tot op zekere hoogte op dezelfde wijze geanalyseerd
kunnen worden als de materiële produktieprocessen van een onderneming: door opofferingen
van middelen worden resultaten voortgebracht. In de reële sfeer leveren arbeid en kapitaal
diensten om binnen een bepaalde tijdsspanne uit grondstoffen en energie prod uk ten te maken;
in de cognitieve sfeer leveren mensen intellectuele inspanningen om in een proces van zoeken
en afwegen tot informatie, kennis of beslissingen te komen. Net zoals in de materiële sfeer de
produktiemogelijkheden beperkt worden door restricties van materiële aard. worden de
mogelijkheden in de cognitieve sfeer beperkt door cognitieve restricties: beperkingen die
voortvloeien uit het feit dat agenten (mensen danwei organisaties) tijd nodig hebben en zich
inspanning moeten getroosten om informatie te verwerven en beslissingen te nemen. WanneerSummary in Du/cTi 195
het gaat om zaken van zekere complexiteit, zoals bij het ontwikkelen en invoeren van n$
technologieën vaak het geval is. kan de beperkte beschikbaarheid van cognitieve hulpbronn«§
een bindende restrictie vormen, analoog aan de schaarste van materiële hulpbronnen. ui
In het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk wordt een overzicht gegeven van aspecten van hel vers-
chijnsel invoering van nieuwe technologie, waaraan in de literatuur aandacht is besteed. Aan
de orde komen het verband tussen adoptie en diffusie en de vraag waar een verklaring voor de
empirische regelmatigheid van de diffusiecurve gezocht moet worden: op het micro- of op het
macro-economische niveau. De verklaring van een regelmatig diffusiepatroon kan terug gaan
op een regelmatige verdeling van ondernemingen over een met de adoptiebeslissing samen-
hangende variabele, of op het feit dat adopliebeslissingen zelf onderling op enigerlei wijze
samenhangen. Verdere kwesties in dit deel betreffen het (on-)evenwichiskarakter vun het
diffusieproces, het endogene danwei exogene karakter van de oorzaken die het proces drijven,
het routinematige aspect van economisch handelen en het discontinue karakter van technolo-
gische ontwikkeling.
bouwt voort op de beschrijving van economisch gedrag in hoofdstuk 2, en brengt
de voornaamste gedachten onder in een model dat het beslissingsproces van een onderneming
weergeeft. De onderneming produceert op het moment van beslissing een bepaalde hoeveelheid
produkt (output), met behulp van een bepaalde combinatie van middelen (inputs). Er wordt een
onderscheid gemaakt tussen vaste en variabele produküemiddelcn. De doelstelling van de
onderneming is maximale netto contante waarde van de toekomstige winst. De onderneming
kan daartoe investeren, toevoegen aan de wufc- produktiemiddelcn. heigeen leidt tol toename
van de produktiecapaciteit (expansie) en tot verhoging van de produkliviteit van de wunti^/«
produktiemiddelen (rationalisatie). Enerzijds beslist de onderneming hoeveel (e investeren,
gegeven dat investeringen een dalend marginaal rendement hebben; anderzijds beslist de
onderneming in welke verhouding te investeren in capaciteitsuitbreiding en in verhoging van
de produkliviteit van de variabele middelen. Het dalend marginaal rendement op investeringen
op elk moment in de tijd hangt samen met toenemende aanpassingskoslcn en dergelijke, maar
ook met beperkingen in de cognitieve capaciteit van de onderneming.
In het model wordt geabstraheerd van technische veroudering van kapitaalgoederen, van
financieringsreslricties, van markten voor tweedehands investeringsgoederen en van toe- en
uittreding. Markten voor eindprodukten en produktiemiddelen ruimen voortdurend en er is geen
onderbezetting. Mogelijkheden voor technologische verandering vinden hun weerslag in de
technische restricties waarmee de onderneming zich geconfronteert ziel. Indien er géén tech-
nische vooruitgang is voegen investeringen slechts meer van hetzelfde toe aan de bestaande
capaciteit Indien er wel mogelijkheden tot technische verbeteringen bestaan, komt dit tot
uitdrukking in een cumulatief effect van huidige investeringen in de loop van de tijd. Dil
impliceert dat niet alleen het rendement, maar ook het effect op capaciteit en produkliviieit van
tegenwoordige investeringen mede bepaald wordt door toekomstige investeringen, en dat de
optimaliserende onderneming derhalve een tijdpad voor de investeringen moet plannen.
De belangrijkste karakteristieken van het model kunnen als volgt worden samengevat. Ten eerste
wordt aangenomen dat de onderneming noch zijn produktiecapaciteit, noch zijn produktie-
techniek kan wijzigen zonder investeringen. Ten tweede wordt aangenomen dat investeringen
leiden tot incremented aanpassingen van de capaciteit en incremented verhogingen van de
produktiviieit van variabele middelen. Ten derde wordt verondersteld dat zowel technische als
cognitieve restricties de bewegingsvrijheid van de onderneming beperken in het aanpassen van196 Summary in Di/frn
pnxluktieschaal en produktictechniek. Ten vierde wordt verondersteld dat, indien de positie van
een onderneming op het relevante technologische traject ruimte laat voor technologische ver-
betering, investeringen een cumulatief effect hebben.
Dit model is allereerst gebruikt om investeringsbeslissingen van ondernemingen te analyseren.
Aangetoond is dat ondernemingen die zich gedragen volgens de vooronderstellingen van het
model, bij een volledig elastische vraag naar eindprodukten en een volledig elastisch aanbod
van variabele produkticmiddclen, op de lange duur hun investeringen exponentieel laten groeien
en hoc langer hoe meer de richting van hun investeringen verleggen van rationalisatie naar
expansie. Echter, indien markten voor cindprodukten en variabele produktiemiddelen niet
volledig elastisch zijn, stagneren op termijn de investeringen in expansie, ondanks hel feit dat
winsten positief zijn. Het investeringsgedrag van de individuele onderneming wordt cruciaal
beïnvloed door de clasüciteiten van de vraag- en aanbodluncties op de relevante markten
enerzijds, en door zijn marktaandeel op die markten anderzijds.
Het model is verder gebruikt om hel concurrentieproces tussen ondernemingen te onderzoeken,
zowel analytisch als door middel van simulaties. De ontwikkeling van ondernemingen in een
markt hungt binnen de context van dit model in hoge mate af van de startcondilies: de ont-
wikkeling in de toekomst kan niet los gezien worden van de geschiedenis van de ondernemingen.
In een pad-afhankelijke wereld ligt het niet in de rede te veronderstellen dat bij de aanvang van
het proces de toestand door stabonairiieii gekarakteriseerd kan worden en is het derhalve niet
mogelijk iets algemeens over de startcondities te zeggen. De toestand van de ondernemingen
bij aanvang van het concurrentieproces en de aanvankelijke verdeling van de markt kunnen vele
gedaanten hebben, en afhankelijk van die begintoestand kunnen zich binnen het kader van het
model legio ontwikkelingen voordoen, waarbij ondernemingen gedurende lange tijd naast elkaar
voortbestaan met verschillende groeivoeten, marktaandelen, efficienüeniveaus en snelheden
van technologische ontwikkeling. Groeivoeten, marktaandelen en winsten kunnen, afhankelijk
van hel ontwikkelingsstadium van de afzetmarkt, divergeren of convergeren. Een voorbeeld
hiervan, een markt mei zes ondernemingen van verschillende omvang en efficiëntie, is met de
hulp van computersimulaties uitgewerkt.
De computersimulaties betreffen doorrekeningen van marktinteracties tussen ondernemingen
die zich gedragen volgens het microcconomische investeringsmodel. Een van de uitkomsten
van de computersimulaties is dal een aantal geaggregeerde variabelen zich blijken te gedragen
volgens het patronen die bekend zijn uit de literatuur over diffusie en over de produkt-le-
venscyclus. In de loop van de tijd blijkt de afzet toe te nemen volgens een sigmoïde patroon,
terwijl ten gevolge van proecsinnovatics de vraag naar variabele produktiemiddelen weinig
variatie vertoont. Prijsontwikkelingen weerspiegelen volume-ontwikkelingen: de afzetprijs
daalt scherp, terwijl de prijs van variabele produktiemiddelen weinig varieert. De investeringen
stijgen aanvankelijk en zijn in de eerste fase van de ontwikkeling van de markt gericht op
uitbreiding van de produktiecapaciteit. Later dalen de investeringen en verschuift het accent
naar verhoging van de produktiviteil. De grootste winsten worden gemaakt in de meest
expansieve fase van de marktontwikkeling, voordat de markt zijn grootste omvang bereikt heeft
Hel verband lussen marktstructuur en de snelheid van technologische ontwikkeling blijkt nogal
complex in dit model vanwege de simultane afhankelijkheid van investeringsgedrag van
prijselasticiteiien, marktaandelen en ondernemingsomvang. Een grote onderneming profiteert
van schaalvoordelen bij het genereren en implementeren van nieuwe technologie, hetgeen
samenhangt mot het cumulatieve karakter van technologische ontwikkeling, en zal dus geneigdSummary in DufcSi 197
zijn innovatiever te zijn dan een kleine onderneming. Daar staat tegenover, dat een grote
onderneming vaak een groot marktaandeel heeft, en daardoor de daling van de af/eiprijs, die
het gevolg is van een procentuele vergroting van de afzet, in meerdere mate internaliseert dan
een onderneming met een klein marktaandeel. Een groot marktaandeel /al daarom investeringen
in nieuwe technologie, indien die leiden tot expansie, afremmen. In de loop van de tijd. als de
afzetmarkt verzadigd raakt, verandert het samenspel van de factoren ondernemingsomvang en
marktaandeel bij de bepaling van de omvang van de investeringen in capaciteitsuitbreiding. Dit
verklaart het optreden van een sigmoïde diffusiecurve van het eindprodukt binnen dit model. In
tegenstelling tot expansieve investeringen, worden investeringen in verhoging van de pro-
duktiviteit gestimuleerd door een groot marktaandeel. Hoezeer een groot marktaandeel de
expansie van een onderneming afremt en de rationalisatie stimuleert, hangt af van de
prijselasticiteiten van de vraag naar eindprodukten en het aanbod van variabele pmduktiemid-
delen.
vormt de brug tussen de theoretische uiteenzettingen en de empirische toetsing.
Om empirische ondersteuning te vinden voor de eerder geschetste modelmatige benaderingen
zijn data gebruikt die stammen van het Nederlandse bankwezen. Het bankwe/en vormt een
substantiële sector in de Nederlandse economie, waarin een aantal recente trends die algemeen
voorkomen in dienstensectoren in westerse economieön, prominent naar voren treden. Ener/i jds
groeien dienstensectoren in belang, relatief ten opzichte van industriële sectoren, anderzijds
ontwikkelen ze meeren meer karakteristieken die voorheen kenmerkend waren voor industriële
sectoren: diensten worden kapitaalintensiever, produkten worden meer en meer gestandaardi-
seerd en technologie speelt een steeds voornamere rol. Een belangrijke oor/aak van deze trend
is de ontwikkeling van computer- en telecommunicatietechnologie. Het bankwezen is een
duidelijk voorbeeld van deze ontwikkeling: het heeft op grote schaal computer en tele-
communicatie apparatuur in gebruik genomen, daarmee de produktiekosten drastisch ter-
uggebracht en de dienstverlening en het aanbod van produkten behoorlijk uitgebreid.
Voorde toetsing van de modellen was een dataverzameling beschikbaar met cijfers van kantoren
van een grote Nederlandse cooperative bank. In dit hoofdstuk worden deze cijfers inductief
geanalyseerd. Het blijkt onder meer dat de diffusie van nieuwe technieken in het kantorennet
in een aantal gevallen een sigmoïde curve doorloopt, en dat er sprake is van schaalvoordelen in
produktie. Voor het testen van de modellen uit het vorige hoofdstuk worden variabelen gese-
lecteerd die respectievelijk produktiecapaciteit, variabele produkiiemiddelen, investeringen en
technologisch niveau benaderen. De voornaamste investeringen in technologische ontwikkeling
in banken op lokaal niveau in de periode 1979 tot 1987 werden gedaan in automatische gege-
vensverwerking. Allereerst werd er geïnvesteerd in automatisering van de 'back office', daarna
in automatisering van de 'front office', en vervolgens in het installeren van geldautomaten en
daarmee samenhangende communicatienetwerken. Het belangrijkste gestandaardiseerde mas-
saprodukt van deze lokale banken, waarop het grootste deel van de automaiiscringsinspanningen
gericht was, is de rekeningenadministratie, met inbegrip van de administratie van
overschrijvingen, bij-en afboekingen. Hoewel het proces tegenwoordig relatief kapitaalintensief
is, behoren verschillende soorten arbeid, te weten baliedienslen, dataverwerking, administratie
en management, toch nog tot de voornaamste produktiefactoren in het produktieproecs. Geen
van deze soorten arbeid zijn volledig als variabele produktiemiddclcn te karakteriseren, maar
wellicht is arbeid op de korte termijn meer variabel dan andere produkticmiddclcn. Derhalve
zijn data betreffende mutaties in de rekeningenadministraüe gekozen als benadering voor
produktiecapaciteit, data betreffende verschillende typen arbeid als benadering voor variabele198 Swwmjry «n
produktiemiddclen, over een aantal jaren gecumuleerde investeringen in automatisering als
benadering voor investeringen en de beschikbaarheid van drie verschillende automatiserings-
systemen als technologie-indicator.
5 is gewijd aan de toetsing van de modellen uit hoofdstuk 3. Omdat de beschikbare
data voornamelijk dwarsdoorsnede data zijn. terwijl volledige toetsing van het model tijdreeksen
/.ou vereisen, is de toetsing beperkt lot een aantal aspecten. Het model is vereenvoudigd tot een
twee-periodenmodel en er is met name gekeken naar de robustheid van parameters bij bes-
chouwing van verschillende banken: er is gekeken in welke male het investeringsgedrag van
banken weergegeven kan worden met behulp van dezelfde modelparameters. Een eerste vraag
die aan de orde komt is in hoeverre investeringen een cumulatief effect hebben op produktie en
op de vraag naar variabele produktiemiddclen, in hoeverre er aanwijzingen zijn dat er een proces
van technologische vooruitgang plaatsvindt. Een tweede vraag is in hoeverre technologische
mogelijkheden en technologische ontwikkeling van verschillende banken op verschillende
momenten door eenzelfde investenngsmodel kunnen worden weergegeven, in hoeverre
ondernemingen geconfronteerd worden met gelijke technische beperkingen.
De resultaten van de modelschailingcn dienen met omzichtigheid geïnterpreteerd te worden,
omdat het model sterk gestyleerd is en de aansluiting tussen de data en de modelvariabelen te
wensen overlaat. Niettemin dringen een aantal conclusies zich op. Schaltingsresultaten wijzen
erop dat banken scherp dalende marginale rendementen op investeringen ondervinden op elk
specifiek moment in de tijd. Desalniettemin investeren grote banken meer dan kleine. Para-
meterschattingen suggereren dat dit verklaard kan worden door het feit dat grote banken bij
investeringen kunnen profileren van schaalvoordelen. In absolute termen levert dezelfde
investering een grote bank meer extra capaciteit op dan een kleine bank, en daarom kan een
grote bank een groter budget investeren voordat marginale opbrengsten aan marginale kosten
gelijk zijn. Deze uilkomsten zijn verenigbaar met de hypothese dat investeringen een cumulatief
effect hebben, hetgeen erop kan wijzen dat investeringen de produkliviteit van het pro-
duktie-apparaat omhoog brengen. Hel verband tussen investeringen en de vraag naar variabele
produktiemiddelen bleek minder eenduidig te zijn, maar ook hier kan een cumulatief effect niet
worden uitgesloten.
Betreffende de vragen in hoeverre banken geconfronteerd worden met dezelfde technologische
restricties en in welke mate ze hetzelfde technologische traject volgen, konden slechts voorlopige
antwoorden gevonden worden. Hoewel alle banken in kwalitatieve zin dezelfde technologische
slappen zetten, van 'back office" automatisering, via 'front office' automatisering, naar installatie
van geldautomaten, lijken ze dil pad niet met dezelfde snelheid of in dezelfde volgorde af te
lopen. Banken investeren niel in dezelfde richting (dezelfde verhouding expansie-rationalisatie);
ze investeren voorts niet zozeer vergelijkbare absolute bedragen in automatisering alswel
eenzelfde deel van de omzet.
Woo/dv/u* 6 begint met de constatering dat uit hix>fdstuk 4 naar voren gekomen is dat diffu-
siepatronen van produküelechnologieen in banken een zekere mate van regelmaat te zien geven,
maar dat in hoofdstuk 5 niet afdoende is aangetoond dat dit verklaard kan worden op grond van
kosten en baten van het invoeren van technieken, voor zover deze uit de cijfers blijken. Dit werpt
de vraag op die in hoofdstuk 2 al aan de orde is geweest: waar bevindt zich het mechanisme dat
leidt tot de regulariteit van het dilïusiepalroon. op het microniveau of op het niveau van de markt
of de sector' Indien kosten en baten van het invoeren van nieuwe technologieën moeilijk
kwantificeerbaar zijn en informatie over nieuwe technieken schaars is. kunnen 'bandwagon'Suwnarv I/I Dii/cA 199
effecten een voorname rol gaan spelen bij de verspreiding van een innovatie: ondernemingen
vertonen imitatief gedrag, in een streven naar risicomijding. Een verwante hypothese is dat bij
het ontbreken van eenduidige informatie over kosten en baten van een innovatie gedrag van
ondernemingen in zekere mate erratisch wordt, dat in de markt een selectieproces bepaalt welke
ondernemingen groeien en welke ten onder gaan, en dat dit selectieproces een ordelijk patroon
op geaggregeerd niveau tot gevolg heeft. Deze noties zijn in hoofdstuk 6 in modellen van
overgangskansen uitgewerkt. Hierbij wordt ervan uitgegaan dat de relatieve (verwachte)
winstgevendheid van een techniek en de relatieve frequentie van het gebruik de kans bepalen
dat een onderneming van een minder winstgevende techniek naar een meer winstgevende
overspringt. Er wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee mechanismen, een duw- en een
'trek'- mechanisme. Het eerste mechanisme werkt als een onderneming zich onder druk van de
concurrenüe gedwongen voelt om een oude techniek op te geven, en vervolgens naar een nieuwe
techniek op zoek gaat; het tweede mechanisme werkt als een onderneming aangetrokken wordt
dooreen nieuwe techniek en daarom de oude opgeeft. De twee verschillende specificaties leiden
tot twee verschillende diffusiecurves, waarbij het duwmodel een sigmoïde curve oplevert en het
trekmodel een concave curve. Het ligt in de lijn der verwachting dal hel duwmechanisme werkt
bij relatief dure en complexe innovaties, terwijl hel trekmechanisme meer van belang is bij
relatief goedkope en ongecompliceerde innovaties.
Beide modellen zijn geschat met de data betreffende invoering van nieuwe technologieën in
banken uit hoofdstuk 4. Het bleek dat in dit geval een model met een duwmechanisme beter
voldoet dan een model met een trekmechanisme, een uitkomst geheel in de lijn der verwachting,
gegeven het complexe karakter van de innovaties hier aan de orde. Een vergelijking van de
uitkomsten van empirische toetsen in hoofdstukken 5 en 6 suggereert dat, benevens hel streven
naar capaciteits- en produktiviteilsgroei, mechanismen op geaggregeerd niveau zoals imitatie,
'bandwagon' effecten en spill-over mechanismen een rol hebben gespeeld bij de diffusie van
produktietechnieken in banken.
Woo/ifcfu/r 7 besluit met een samenvatting, een opsomming van de voornaamste conclusies en
een korte vooruitblik.200
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